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Abstract 
 This thesis consists of three empirical essays.  The first chapter is focused on the 
economics of gender, and the other two chapters are focused on the economics of 
education.  A common theme in all these three chapters is studying the outcomes of 
disadvantaged groups in society, with an eye to policy interventions that could improve 
these outcomes. 
 The first chapter examines whether women face a glass ceiling in the labour 
market, which would imply that they are under-represented in high wage regions of the 
wage distribution.  I also measure the extent to which the glass ceiling comes about 
because women are segregated into lower-paying firms (glass doors), or because they 
are segregated into lower-paying jobs within firms (within-firm glass ceilings).  I find clear 
evidence that women experience a glass ceiling that is driven mainly by their 
disproportionate sorting across firm types rather than sorting across jobs within firms.  I 
find no evidence that gender differences in sorting across firms can be accounted for by 
compensating differentials.  However, my results are consistent with predictions of an 
efficiency wage model where high-paying firms discriminate against females.  
 The second chapter estimates the effect of publicly-disseminated information 
about school achievement on school choice decisions.  We find that students are more 
likely to leave their school when public information reveals poor school-level 
performance.  Some parents’ respond to information soon after it becomes available.  
Others, including non-English-speaking parents, alter their school choice decisions only 
in response to information that has been disseminated widely and discussed in the 
media.  Parents in low-income neighbourhoods are most likely to alter their school 
choice decisions in response to new information. 
 The third chapter measures the extent to which cross-sectional differences in 
schools’ average achievement on standardized tests are due to transitory factors.  Test-
based measures of school performance are increasingly used to shape education policy, 
and recent evidence shows that they also affect families’ school choice decisions.  There 
are, however, concerns about the precision of these measures.  My results suggest that 
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sampling variation and one-time mean reverting shocks are a significant source of cross-
sectional variation in schools’ mean test scores.  
Keywords:  Gender Wage Gap; Glass Ceiling; Inter-Firm Gender Segregation; Test-
Based School Achievement Measures; School Choice; Transitory Factors 
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1. Glass Ceilings or Glass Doors? 
The Role of Firms in Gender Wage Disparities 
1.1. Introduction 
As in many countries, women earn lower wages than men in Canada.  Despite 
modest improvement in the late 1980s, this gap has been largely unchanged since 1992 
(Baker and Drolet, 2009).  Designing effective policies to improve women’s labor market 
outcomes requires knowledge about the mechanisms that underlie this persistent gender 
wage gap.  Previous studies of the gender wage gap have mainly focused on gender 
differences in conditional mean wages.  While this comparison is interesting, it is only 
indicative of the wage outcomes of “average” workers in each group.  More recently, 
there has been a growing interest in examining the gender wage gap throughout the 
wage distribution.  This has been mainly motivated by a popular notion that females face 
a “glass ceiling” in the labor market; that is, females are over-represented (under-
represented) in low (high) wage regions of the wage distribution, and their under-
representation becomes more pronounced as we move to the top of the wage 
distribution.  As a consequence, the gap between male and female wages will be larger 
at the top of the wage distribution than at the middle or bottom. 
Developing policies that effectively address potential barriers that block the 
advancement of women in the labor market requires knowledge about the magnitude of 
any glass ceiling, and about the underlying mechanisms that give rise to it.  For instance, 
if the glass ceiling is driven by barriers to employment at “high-paying firms”, then 
policies like employment equity policies that target employment decisions directly will be 
more effective.  On the other hand, if the glass ceiling is driven by gender wage 
disparities within firms, then policies like pay equity policies that target wages directly will 
be more effective. 
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This study uses quantile regression methods to estimate the gender wage gap at 
different points of the conditional wage distribution in order to examine whether females 
in Canada face a glass ceiling.  I extend the previous empirical literature on glass 
ceilings faced by women by applying a methodology developed by Pendakur and 
Woodcock (2010) in the context of native-immigrant wage disparities.  I quantify the 
extent to which the observed economy-wide glass ceiling is driven by female 
segregation into low-paying firms (defined as a “glass door” effect) versus female 
segregation into low-paying jobs within firms (defined as a within-firm glass ceiling 
effect).   
Focusing on gender wage gaps at various quantiles is only partly informative of 
women’s representation at high-paying and low-paying jobs, which might be of direct 
policy importance.  Therefore, following Pendakur et al. (2008), I also construct a 
measure of female workers’ representation at high-paying and low-paying jobs.  This 
“representation index” measures the proportion of female workers in different regions of 
the wage distribution, especially the tails, conditional on their personal and job 
characteristics.  I extend their methodology by estimating the extent to which these 
patterns of over-representation and under-representation are driven by gender 
segregation across high-paying and low-paying firms.  
Finally, I investigate some of the potential underlying sources of inter-firm wage 
differentials and inter-firm sex segregation.  I empirically test the implications of two 
competing theoretical models, the compensating differentials model and the efficiency 
wage model with gender discrimination.  The results help to illuminate some of the 
underlying mechanisms that generate the observed difference in male-female sorting 
across high-paying and low-paying firms.  
I find clear evidence that females face an economy-wide glass ceiling: the gender 
wage gap increases from -0.12 log points at the 10th percentile of the conditional wage 
distribution to -0.20 log points at the 90th percentile.  I find strong evidence that the 
economy-wide glass ceiling is mainly driven by glass doors.  Three quarters of the 
increase in the gender wage gap between the 10th and 90th percentile of the conditional 
wage distribution is due to differential sorting of males and females across high- and 
low-paying firms (glass doors).  I find no evidence that inter-firm wage differences, and 
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inter-firm gender differences in sorting, can be accounted for by compensating 
differentials.  However, my results are consistent with predictions of an efficiency wage 
model where high-paying firms discriminate against females.  My results also suggest 
that after controlling for observables and inter-firm sorting, females still experience a 
sizeable within-firm wage gap (about 11 percent) throughout the wage distribution.  
1.2. Previous Literature 
Beginning with the seminal contribution of Albrecht et al. (2003), there has been 
a growing interest in how the gender wage gap varies throughout the wage distribution.  
In contrast with most of the previous studies that compare gender differences in average 
wages, this approach informs us about places in the wage distribution where these wage 
gaps appear, and are more pronounced.1  This recent literature generally finds  larger 
gender wage gaps at the top of the wage distribution than in lower parts of the wage 
distribution, even after controlling for observable person, job and firm characteristics 
(Garfeazabal and Ugidos 2005; Nordman and Wolff 2007; Datta Gupta et al. 2006; 
Arulampalam et al. 2007; de la Rica et al. 2008 ; Jellal et al. 2008). These results, all of 
which are obtained using data from European labor markets, are consistent with what is 
referred to as a glass ceiling effect.  It is of substantial interest to learn whether wage 
patterns are similar in Canada, where government policies, wage-setting institutions, 
women’s relative market qualifications and the wage structure differ in important ways 
from European environments.   
The economy-wide glass ceilings found by these studies could stem from the fact 
that females face glass ceilings within firms.  However, as suggested by Dickens and 
Katz (1987), Groshen (1990 and 1991a), Bronars and Famulari (1997), Wooden (1998), 
                          
1 For instance, any observed gender differences in average wages could be driven by large wage 
gaps faced by females at the top of the wage distribution, or at the bottom of the wage 
distribution, or a uniform wage gap faced by females throughout the wage distribution.  These 
different wage patterns have different implications and require different remedies.  
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Salvanes et al. (1998), Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), and Woodcock (2007), 
inter-firm wage differentials explain a large portion of variation in individuals’ wages. 
Therefore, an alternative explanation for the observed economy-wide glass ceiling 
experienced by females is disproportionate sorting of men and women across high-
paying versus low-paying firms (the glass door effect).  Similar to the glass ceiling effect 
that truncates the distribution of wages for female workers, the glass door effect may 
truncate the distribution of firms at which female workers might find employment.  No 
previous studies of the glass ceiling faced by females distinguish between within-firm 
versus economy-wide wage outcomes, and the extent to which the glass ceiling faced by 
females operates between firms versus within firms. 
A separate literature focuses on inter-firm sex segregation and its effect on the 
average gender wage gap.  Early studies of inter-firm sex segregation use specialized 
samples that are not representative of the national economy and cover only a narrow 
range of industries, occupations or regions.  They found that women are typically 
segregated into lower-paying firms, even within occupations, and this inter-firm sex 
segregation accounts for a considerable portion of the average gender wage gap 
(McNulty 1967; Buckley 1971; Blau 1977; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake 1987; Groshen 
1991b; Reilly and Wirjanto 1999; Carrington and Troske 1995; Griffin and Trejo 1995, 
1997 and 1998). More recent studies (Milgrom et al. 2001; Bayard et al. 2003; Gupta 
and Rothstein 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 2006) use nationally 
representative matched employer-employee data sets to quantify the contribution of sex 
segregation by industry, occupation, establishment and occupation-establishment cell 
(job cell) to the average gender wage gap.  All these studies find that segregation of 
females into lower-paying occupations, industries, establishments and occupations 
within establishments accounts for a substantial portion of the average gender wage 
gap.  With the exception of Milgrom et al. (2001), they also find that there remains a 
considerable within-job-cell average gender wage gap even after controlling for 
observed worker characteristics and accounting for segregation of females into lower-
paying occupations, industries, establishments and occupations within establishments. 
Pendakur and Woodcock’s (2010) methodology, which is developed in the 
context of native-immigrant wage disparities, has several advantages over 
methodologies used in other recent studies (Bayard et al. 2003; Gupta and Rothstein 
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2005; Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 2006).  First, it provides a way to measure the 
effect of inter-firm segregation throughout the wage distribution, not only at the mean.  
Second, it does not rely on estimates of the proportion female in the firm to quantify the 
effects of inter-firm gender segregation on the gender wage gap.2  As pointed out by 
Bayard et al. (2003), because only a sample of firm’s employees are observed in these 
data, sampling error in these estimates can be severe.  In addition, using the estimates 
of the proportion of females in each firm to study the inter-firm sex segregation assumes 
a particular functional form on the way segregation affects wages. 
1.3. Empirical Methodology 
I start by comparing average log wages of males and females, conditional on 
their observed individual and job characteristics, using the following linear regression 
model: 
(1)    ܧሾ ௜ܹ| ௜ܺ , ݃௜ሿ ൌ ௜ܺ′ߚ ൅ ݃௜ߜ,  
where ௜ܹ is the log hourly wage of worker ݅; ௜ܺ is a vector of observable job-
related characteristics that influence wages (e.g. education, labor market experience, 
ethnicity, etc.); ݃௜ is a gender indicator which is equal to one for females; and ߜ 
measures the difference in average log wages of males and females with the same 
observed characteristics ௜ܺ. 
To assess the existence of an economy-wide glass ceiling experienced by 
females, I estimate the gender wage gap at several quantiles of the conditional wage 
distribution.  The existence of an economy-wide glass ceiling would imply that females 
are over-represented (under-represented) in low (high) wage regions of the wage 
distribution, and their under-representation becomes more pronounced as we move to 
                          
2 For example, to quantify the effect of inter-firm gender segregation, Bayard et al. (2003) use a 
regression of wages on the estimates of the proportion of females in worker’s firm, as well as 
usual observable characteristics.  
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the top of the wage distribution.  As a consequence, in the presence of an economy-
wide glass ceiling, the gap between male and female wages will be larger at the top of 
the wage distribution than at the middle or bottom.  
I measure the wage gap at the ߬௧௛ conditional quantile of the wage distribution 
using the quantile regressions that satisfies  
(2)   Prൣ ௜ܹ ൑ ௜ܺ′ߚఛ ൅	݃௜ߜఛห ௜ܺ , ݃௜൧ ൌ ߬,  
where ߚఛ measures the returns to individual characteristics at the ߬௧௛ quantile, 
and ߜఛ measures the difference between the ߬௧௛ quantile of log wages of males and 
females, conditional on ௜ܺ.  Comparing estimates of ߜఛ at different quantiles enables me 
to study how gender wage differentials vary over the conditional wage distribution and 
allows me to examine the existence of a glass ceiling faced by females.  
1.3.1. Glass Doors 
The glass door effect arises if women are disproportionately sorted into lower-
paying firms, compared to their male counterparts.  Such sorting may contribute to the 
gender wage gap.  I apply the methodology developed by Pendakur and Woodcock 
(2010) in the context of native-immigrant wage differentials, to measure the glass door 
effect by comparing within-firm and economy-wide gender wage gaps.  The intuition 
behind their methodology is that if females experience better wage outcomes within 
firms than they do economy-wide, it implies that their low wage outcomes, relative to 
their male counterparts, are partly due to segregation into lower–paying firm.  
I consider three features of the conditional wage distribution in my investigation 
of the glass door effect: conditional means, conditional quantiles and conditional 
representation.  I examine the effect of glass doors on conditional mean wages to 
assess whether female workers are, on average, employed in firms that pay lower 
wages relative to their male counterparts.  I also estimate the glass door effect at 
different quantiles of the conditional wage distribution to quantify the extent to which the 
gender wage gap in different parts of the wage distribution, and its pattern of change 
throughout the wage distribution, is driven by gender differences in sorting across firms.  
This enables me to measure the contribution of glass doors to the economy-wide glass 
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ceiling.  Finally, I measure the contribution of glass ceiling and glass doors to the 
representation of females in different regions of the conditional wage distribution, 
adopting and extending a methodology proposed by Pendakur et al. (2008).  
To measure the glass door effect, I first need to construct within-firm measures of 
average gender wage disparity, which could be obtained by adding firm effects to 
equation (1).  These firm effects will capture both observed and unobserved employer 
characteristics that are common to all employees and constant over time.  In the mean 
regression case, we have 
(3)   ܧሾ ௜ܹ| ௜ܺ , ݃௜, ௜݂ሿ ൌ ௜ܺ′ߚ ൅ ݃௜ߜ ൅ ௜݂′߰, 
where ௜݂ 	is a vector of indicators for each firm and ߰ is a vector of firm effects 
that measure inter-firm differences in average wages, conditional on worker and job 
characteristics ௜ܺ and gender ݃௜.3 Compared to equation (1), ߜ in equation (3) measures 
the average gender wage gap conditional on observed individual characteristics and 
both observed and unobserved employer characteristics that are constant over time.  
Since ߜ is identified within firms, it measures the gender wage gap taking into account 
gender differences in sorting across high-paying and low-paying firms. 
Pendakur and Woodcock (2010) define the glass door effect as ߜ௙ in the 
hypothetical regression: 
(4)    ܧൣ ௜݂′߰ห ௜ܺ, ݃௜൧ ൌ ௜ܺ′ߚ௙ ൅ ݃௜′ߜ௙.  
The coefficient ߜ௙ in this hypothetical regression would measure the average firm 
effect of female workers relative to males, conditional on their characteristics.4  This 
                          
3 An implicit assumption in equation (3) is that firm effects are similar for all employees of a firm, 
conditional on ௜ܺ, and therefore the firm effects are a location shift of the conditional wage 
distribution.  In other words, conditional on worker characteristics and gender, the shape of 
the wage distribution is the same at every firm, and it is only its mean (location) that differs 
across firms. 
4 This is a hypothetical regression because we do not observe the true firm effects. 
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measures how wages are affected by gender differences in sorting across firms, 
conditional on worker’s observed characteristics.  Pendakur and Woodcock (2010) show 
that ሺߜመ െ	ߜሚሻ is an unbiased estimator of  ߜ௙, where ߜመ and ߜሚ are estimates of ߜ from 
equation (3) and (1), respectively.  This is due to the well-known result that omitted 
variable bias can be recovered as least squares coefficient in an artificial regression 
(see, e.g., Greene 2003, pp. 148-149).  
It should be noted that a zero glass door effect does not imply that firm effects do 
not belong to the model.  Rather, it implies that, conditional on worker characteristics, 
firm effects are uncorrelated with gender.  In other words, conditional on their 
characteristics, male and female workers are similarly sorted across firms.  Therefore, 
under the null hypothesis of no glass door effect (ܪ଴:	ߜ௙ ൌ 0ሻ, both specifications 
produce consistent estimates of the gender wage gap, ߜ, but the estimate in the 
specification with firm effects is inefficient.  However, under the alternative hypothesis of 
a nonzero glass door effect (ܪଵ:	ߜ௙ ് 0ሻ, only estimates from the specification that 
includes firm effects are consistent.  This motivates a Hausman test for the presence of 
a glass door effect:5  
(5)    ܪ ൌ ሺఋ෡ି	ఋ෩ሻమ௩௔௥ൣఋ෩൧ି	௩௔௥ሾఋ෡ሿ 	∼ 	߯ଵଶ.  
I measure the contribution of glass doors to the gender wage gap at different 
points of the wage distribution in an analogous fashion.  I estimate quantile regression 
with firm effects: 6 
(6)   Prൣ ௜ܹ ൑ ௜ܺ′ߚఛ ൅ ݃௜ߜఛ ൅	 ௜݂′߰ห ௜ܺ, ݃௜, ௜݂൧ ൌ ߬. 
                          
5 See Pendakur and Woodcock (2010) for the proof. 
6 I use an estimator proposed by Canay (2011) to implement the quantile regressions with firm 
effects.  Pendakur and Woodcock (2010) use Koenker and Ng’s (2005) Frisch-Newton 
algorithm and subroutines in R to implement the quantile regression model with firm effects.  
However, the large number of firms and surveyed employees poses some computational 
challenge and creates some constraints for them.  Canay’s proposed estimator, however, is 
quite simple to compute and can be implemented in standard econometrics packages.  
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Pendakur and Woodcock (2010) show that if equation (6) is correctly specified, 
then ሺߜመఛ െ	ߜሚఛሻ has a similar interpretation as the mean regression case, where ߜመఛ and 
ߜሚఛ are coefficients on ݃௜	in quantile regressions that include and exclude firm effects, 
respectively.  Specifically, ሺߜመఛ െ	ߜሚఛሻ estimates the gender coefficient in a hypothetical 
least square regression of ௜݂′߰ on ௜ܺ and ݃௜ using quantile-specific weights.7  This 
provides a measure of the glass door effect at the ߬௧௛ quantile of the conditional wage 
distribution.  As in the mean regression case, I can also test for the glass door effect at a 
particular quantile using a Hausman test. 
1.3.2. Conditional Representation 
The location of a particular wage quantile for males and females does not 
provide much information about their prevalence in (or access to) a region of the wage 
distribution.  For instance, knowing that the conditional top decile of earnings is $20,000 
lower for women than men tells us that females are under-represented in the top decile 
of the population conditional wage distribution, but it does not tell us the magnitude of 
their under-representation.  Since the glass ceiling effect causes women to be under-
represented in high-wage regions of the wage distribution, it would be interesting to 
quantify their degree of under-representation as another measure of women’s labor 
market outcomes. 
I use an index developed by Pendakur et al. (2008) to measure females’ 
representation in different regions of the wage distribution, conditional on their observed 
personal and job characteristics.  To construct this index, I estimate quantiles of the 
population wage distribution, conditional on characteristics ௜ܺ, from the quantile 
regression that satisfies 
(7)    Prൣ ௜ܹ ൑ ௜ܺ′ߚఛ൧ ൌ ߬.  
                          
7 These weights are large (small) for employees of firms with large (small) ψ at upper quantiles of 
the conditional wage distribution, and the opposite at lower quantiles.  For a more detailed 
description of these weights, see the discussion following the proof of Proposition 1 in 
Pendakur and Woodcock’s (2010) appendix. 
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The conditional representation of female workers above the ߬௧௛ quantile of the 
population wage distribution is: 
(8)    R෡୤τ ൌ ଵ୒౜ ∑ ܫ୧∈୤ ൫ ௜ܹ ൒ ෡ܹ௜
ఛ൯, 
where N୤ is the number of females, ܫ denotes the indicator function, and ෡ܹ௜ఛ is 
the ߬௧௛ quantile of the population wage distribution conditional on ௜ܺ estimated by (7).  R෡୤τ 
measures the proportion of female workers who earn more than the ߬th quantile of the 
population conditional wage distribution, given their characteristics ௜ܺ.8  
I extend this methodology to quantify the effect of gender differences in sorting 
across high-paying and low-paying firms on females’ representation in different parts of 
the wage distribution.  I estimate quantiles of the population wage distribution, 
conditional on characteristics, ௜ܺ, and firm affiliation from the quantile regression that 
satisfies: 
(9)    Prൣ ௜ܹ ൑ ௜ܺ′ߚఛ ൅ ௜݂′߰൧ ൌ ߬. 
The representation of females above the ߬௧௛ quantile, conditional on their 
observed characteristics and their firm affiliation, is: 
(10)     R෩୤τ ൌ ଵ୒౜ ∑ I୧∈୤ ൫ ௜ܹ ൒ పܹ
ఛ෪ ൯. 
Pendakur et al. (2008) show that comparing conditional and unconditional 
representation indices is informative of the contribution of individual characteristics to 
female’s over- or under-representation in different regions of the income distribution.  
Using the same intuition, it follows that comparing females’ representation conditional on 
their characteristics ௜ܺ, and females’ representation conditional on their characteristics                           
8 If R୤த ൐ 1 െ τ, the proportion of females above the τth quantile exceeds the population proportion 
and the group is overrepresented in that region.  Similarly, if R୤த ൏ 1 െ τ, the group is under-
represented in that region.  For example, if the conditional representation of female workers 
in the top decile of income is 0.08, then we can conclude that there are 20 percent less 
females in the top decile of income than we would expect given their characteristics. 
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and firm affiliation is informative of how inter-firm gender segregation affects females’ 
representation in different regions of the wage distribution.9 The value of R෡୤଴.ଽ measures 
the proportion of females in the top decile of the economy-wide population wage 
distribution, given their characteristics ௜ܺ.  In contrast, the value of R෩୤଴.ଽ measures the 
proportion of females in the top decile of the within-firm population wage distribution, 
given their characteristics ௜ܺ.  If R෩୤τ >	R෡୤τ, then females’ segregation into low-paying firms 
explains part (or if R෩୤τ ൒ 0.1, all) of their under-representation in the top decile.  
1.4. Data and Sample Characteristics 
My estimates are based on the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES).  This is 
one of a few linked employer-employee databases worldwide, and the only such data for 
Canada.  The survey was administered from 1999 to 2005.  The employer sample is 
longitudinal and refreshed every second year (i.e. in 2001, 2003 and 2005) to maintain a 
representative cross section.  The target population of employers is all business 
locations in Canada that have paid employees in March of each surveyed year, except 
employers in Yukon, Nunavut and Northwest Territories and employers operating in crop 
                          
9 I run a simulation to confirm the validity of this interpretation.  I assign males and females 
randomly to high-paying and low-paying firms (no inter-firm gender segregation).  I then use a 
DGP to construct an artificial economy-wide gender wage gap.  In this new dataset, the 
estimated economy-wide and within-firm gender wage gap are the same since there is no 
inter-firm gender segregation.  Estimating females’ representation using equations (8) and 
(10), I find that the difference between these two indices is zero.  In other words, the glass 
door effect has no effect on over- or under-representation of female workers in different 
regions of the wage distribution if there is no inter-firm gender segregation. 
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production and animal production; fishing, hunting and trapping; private households, 
religious organizations and public administration10.  
A maximum of twenty-four employees were sampled from each firm in each odd 
year, and were followed the next year. 11 My analysis is based on the pooled 1999, 2001, 
2003 and 2005 cross-sections.  The data from even-numbered years are not used to 
avoid sample selection problems associated with employee attrition in these years.  
I restrict the sample to non-Aboriginal workers between the age of 24 and 65.  I 
also restrict the sample of firms to those that report on average 6 employees or more per 
year, and that have at least two workers sampled over the entire period they appear in 
the data.  The restricted sample comprises 73,251 employees of 6,584 firms.  I observe 
between 2 and 63 employees of each firm; the mean number is 16 and the median is 15.  
I observe 2,373 firms in all 4 years, 1,519 firm in three years, 1,262 firms in two years 
and the remaining 1,430 in one year.  
I estimate wage differentials and representation indices for the sample of all 
workers, as well as for five different subgroups including workers with at least one 
dependent child, workers without dependent children, workers younger than 44 years of 
age, workers older than 43 years of age, and single workers without dependent 
children.12  
                          
10 Public Administration comprises establishments primarily engaged in activities of a 
governmental nature, that is, the enactment and judicial interpretation of laws and their 
pursuant regulations, and the administration of programs based on them.  Legislative 
activities, taxation, national defence, public order and safety, immigration services, foreign 
affairs and international assistance, and the administration of government programs are 
activities that are purely governmental in nature (Industry Canada: http://www.ic.gc.ca/cis-
sic/cis-sic.nsf/IDE/cis-sic91defe.html). Public Administration’s share of employment in 
Canada is around 6.5 percent (Statistics Canada, Table 281-0024). 
11 The number of workers sampled for each firm was proportional to firm’s size except workplaces 
with fewer than four employees where all employees are selected. 
12 I use the sample of all workers and appropriate interactions with gender to identify the wage 
differentials for these subgroups. For instance, to estimate the average wage gap for workers 
younger than 44 and older than 43, I use the following regression:ܧሾ ௜ܹ| ௜ܺ, ௜݃ሿ ൌ ௜ܺ′ߚ ൅
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My outcome measure is the natural logarithm of hourly wages.13 The individual 
characteristics used in my main regression specification are: highest level of schooling 
(8 categories), marital status (6 categories), age (9 categories), number of dependent 
children (5 categories), a quartic in years of (actual) full-time labor market experience, a 
quadratic in years of seniority with the current employer, an indicator for full-time 
employment, occupation (6 categories), an indicator for membership in a union or 
collective bargaining agreement, and indicators for being a Canadian born visible 
minority, white immigrant, or a visible minority immigrant.  
I estimate all specifications using employee sample weights provided by 
Statistics Canada.  Standard errors are estimated following Statistics Canada’s 
recommended procedure, using 100 sets of bootstrap sample weights. 14  
Table 1.1 reports weighted sample means for males and females.  In comparison 
to males, the average female is more educated, less likely to have children, and has 
fewer years of fulltime labor market experience.  In terms of job characteristics, the 
average female has fewer years of employer seniority, is less likely to work fulltime, 
more likely to be a member of union or collective bargaining agreement, less likely to 
work flexible hours, less likely to be able to carry out work duties at home and less likely 
to be a manager.  In terms of employer characteristics, the average female is more likely 
to work for a non-profit enterprise, and more likely to work for an employer with an 
employment or pay equity program. 
                                                                                                                                              
ܨܧܯܣܮܧ ∗ ܻܱܷܰܩܧܴ44 ൅ ܨܧܯܣܮܧ ∗ ܱܮܦܧܴ43 ൅ ܻܱܷܰܩܧܴ44 Where “ܻܱܷܰܩܧܴ44” and 
“ܱܮܦܧܴ43” are indicators for workers younger than 44 and older than 43, respectively. 
13 The hourly wage measure includes extra earnings such as over-time, bonus, profit sharing, etc. 
14 The bootstrap weights will consider the potential non-independence of error terms for workers 
within the same firm.  They will also correctly adjust for the variation due to the two-stage 
sampling of employees, as well as the complex survey design of the WES (Drolet 2002). 
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1.5. Results 
1.5.1. Glass Ceilings and Glass Doors 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the distribution of the proportion of female employees at 
firms in which male and female workers are employed, seperately.15  As the figure 
suggests, firms tend to be quite segregated by gender.  Males on average are employed 
at firms where only 32 percent of workers are female, while females are on average 
employed at firms where 62 percent of workers are female.  Figure 1.2 illustrates the 
distribution of estimated firm effects from equation (3) for four different categories of 
firms:  firms with proportion of female employees below 25 percent, between 25 and 50 
percent, between 50 and 75 percent, and above 75 percent.  Firm effects are on 
average larger in firms that employ fewer females.  Together, figure 1.1 and 1.2 suggest 
that there is significant gender segregation at the firm level, and firms that employ fewer 
females tend to pay higher wages, conditional on observed individual and job 
characteristics.  This result highlights the importance of studying the effect of gender 
segregation across firms on gender wage gap.  
Table 1.2 presents mean and quantile estimates of economy-wide and within-firm 
gender wage gaps, and estimates of the glass door effect.  Table 1.2 also reports 
females’ representation index in different parts of the population wage distribution, 
conditional on their characteristics, and firm affiliation. 
Females face substantial economy-wide and within-firm average wage gaps 
compared to their male counterparts: about -0.16 log points and -0.11 log points, 
respectively, in the sample of all workers.  Almost one-third (-0.05 log points) of the 
economy-wide average wage gap that females face is due to the glass door effect.  
There is also strong evidence that females face an economy-wide glass ceiling: the 
wage gap increases from -0.12 log points at the 10th percentile of the conditional wage 
                          
15 Both figure 1.1 and figure 1.2 are generated using data from 2003 and 2005. This is because 
the total number of female workers in each firm is a new variable added to WES in 2003. 
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distribution to -0.16 log points at 50th percentile and -0.20 log points at the 90th 
percentile.  
Females also face within-firm glass ceilings, but their effects are much less 
pronounced than the economy-wide glass ceiling (-0.10 log points at the 10th percentile 
versus -0.12 log points at the 90th percentile).  Most of the economy-wide glass ceiling, 
therefore, is due to the glass door effect.  For example, out of an 8 percentage point 
increase in the economy-wide wage gap experienced by females between the 10th and 
90th percentiles of the conditional wage distribution, only one-fourth is due to the 
increase in the within-firm gender wage gap.  The remaining three-fourths is due to the 
increasing contribution of gender differences in sorting across firms (i.e. glass door 
effect).  The same pattern holds when we compare the 50th and 90th percentiles.  
Figure 1.3 further illustrates the importance of the glass door effect.  The vertical 
distance between the red line (the estimated economy-wide gender wage gap) and the 
blue line (the estimated within-firm gender wage gap) measures the glass door effect at 
different points of the conditional wage distribution.  The upward slope of the economy-
wide gender wage gap across different quantiles is mostly due to the glass door effect.  
Altogether, these results suggest that, conditional on their observed personal and job 
characteristics, females tend to sort into lower-paying firms than their male counterparts, 
and this differential sorting explains a substantial part of the gender wage gap.  
Moreover, this differential sorting contributes more to the gender wage gap at the top of 
the wage distribution and hence drives the economy-wide glass ceiling.  As the other 
panels of table 1.2 suggest, this general pattern holds for different subgroups of workers. 
To assess the sensitivity of my estimates to the presence or absence of 
dependent children for females, I present estimates of the gender wage gap for female 
workers with and without dependent children, compared to all male workers, in panels 3 
and 4 of table 1.2.  Both groups face wage gaps similar to the overall sample of workers, 
although economy-wide wage gaps are slightly larger for women with dependent 
children than women without dependent children.  Both groups face a substantial 
economy-wide glass ceiling that is mostly due to the glass door effect. 
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Panel 2 of table 1.2 presents estimates for all single workers without dependent 
children.  In this group, there are fewer concerns regarding self-selection of females into 
lower-paying jobs due to child or family responsibilities, which some might argue are 
partly responsible for the observed gender wage gaps.  The estimates reveal that single 
female workers also experience a substantial, though smaller economy-wide mean wage 
gap (-0.07 log points).  Interestingly, the average glass door effect is small and 
statistically insignificant for this group, so that the average within-firm gender wage gap 
is about as large as the economy-wide wage gap.  One might therefore conclude that 
the sole source of the average economy-wide wage gap that single females experience 
is the within-firm wage gap.  Estimated wage gaps at different quantiles of the 
conditional wage distribution, however, contradict such a conclusion.  Single female 
workers experience an economy-wide glass ceiling that is mainly driven by the glass 
door effect.  The economy-wide wage gap is small and statistically insignificant at the 
bottom decile of the conditional wage distribution, while there exists a significantly large 
within-firm gender wage gap.  This large within-firm gender wage gap is offset by a 
positive glass door effect.  This result suggests that at the bottom of the conditional 
wage distribution, single females tend to be employed at higher-paying firms than their 
male counterparts.  At the 50th percentile of the conditional wage distribution, females 
face substantial economy-wide and within-firm wage gaps (-0.06 log points and -0.09 log 
points, respectively).  Again, a positive glass door effect offsets part of the within-firm 
gender wage gap.  At the top decile of the conditional wage distribution, however, the 
economy-wide gender wage gap is more than twice as large as the median economy-
wide gender wage gap (-0.14 log points), which is mainly attributed to a large negative 
glass door effect (-0.08 log points).  
Single females without children are the only group of female workers that are 
sorted into higher-paying firms than their male counterparts at lower parts of the 
conditional wage distribution.  To investigate the potential sources behind this difference, 
I estimate the gender wage gap for single females without children and non-single 
females, using non-single male workers as the comparison group.  These estimates are 
illustrated in figure 1.10 and suggest there are no significant differences between wage 
outcomes of these two groups of female workers when compared with the same 
comparison group.  Hence, the difference in results reported for single workers without 
 17 
children at lower parts of the wage distribution might be driven by poor wage outcomes 
of single males without children.  To test this hypothesis, I estimated economy-wide and 
within-firm wage gaps between single males without children and non-single males.  
These results are illustrated in figure 1.11 and suggest that single males without children 
face substantial economy-wide wage gaps with non-single males that are mainly driven 
by the glass door effect, except at the top of the wage distribution.16  This result 
suggests that single males without children are sorted into lower-paying firms than non-
single males.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that different wage outcomes 
and the glass door effect faced by single females without children at lower parts of the 
wage distribution are driven mainly by poor wage outcomes of the single males without 
children that they are compared with. 
As Albrecht et al. (2003) point out, a potential explanation for an economy-wide 
glass ceiling is a compositional effect.  If females’ labor market prospects have improved 
over time relative to males, then the wage gap between older men and women will be 
larger than the gap between younger men and women.  On the other hand, since wages 
increase with experience in the labor market, older workers tend to have higher wages 
than younger workers.  The combination of these two factors could generate an 
increasing gender wage gap as we move to the top of the wage distribution, which looks 
like a glass ceiling.  The estimates reported in panels 5 and 6 of table 1.2 rule out this 
hypothesis.  Here we see that younger workers experience larger economy-wide wage 
gaps than older workers.  Therefore, the observed economy-wide glass ceiling in my 
data cannot be explained through the compositional effect described.  
The mean glass door effect is larger for younger female workers than older 
female workers (-0.06 log points versus -0.03 log points, respectively).  This result 
suggests that younger workers are more under-represented in high-paying firms 
compared to their male counterparts.  Both younger and older women experience a 
substantial economy-wide glass ceiling that is mainly driven by the glass door effect.  
                          
16 This result is consistent with findings of Peterson et al. (2011). 
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The estimates illustrated in figure 1.8 suggest that the magnitudes of the 
economy-wide wage gap and the glass door effect are almost identical in the top half of 
the conditional wage distribution for both younger and older female workers.  In lower 
parts of the conditional wage distribution, however, younger females face a glass door 
effect while older females face no glass doors.  This result could be due to an age effect 
or a cohort effect.  The age effect hypothesis suggests that as female workers stay 
longer in the labor market, they sort into higher-paying firms in lower parts of the wage 
distribution, thus eliminating the glass door effect they face.  The cohort effect 
hypothesis suggests that labor market conditions have deteriorated over time in ways 
that have reduced females’ access to high-paying firms in lower parts of the wage 
distribution.  Therefore, younger females face glass doors at lower parts of the 
conditional wage distribution.  
Appendix A presents estimates of a number of additional robustness checks.  In 
each case, these alternative specifications yield estimates similar to those reported in 
the main text.17  
1.5.2. Conditional Representation of Females and the Contribution 
of Glass Doors 
As it was explained before, I also examine the representation of females at 
different regions of wage distribution, conditional on their characteristics.  Furthermore, I 
examine the extent to which females’ representation in different parts of the wage 
                          
17 Table 1.A1 re-estimates the above regressions by adding some additional control variables 
including family income from employment (excluding worker); family income from other 
sources; four indicators for people who are willing but unable to work more hours due to 
unavailability of childcare, family responsibilities, going to school and transportation 
problems; an indicator for possibility to work flexible hours; and an indicator for possibility to 
carry out work duties at home.  Table 1.A2 exclude the immigrant workers from the sample.  
Table 1.A3 allows the returns to observable characteristics to differ across different 
subgroups.  Table 1.A4 decomposes the glass door effects to sorting across firms and across 
industries and sorting across firms and within industries.  Following De la Rica et al. (2008), I 
also estimate the gender wage differentials for subsamples of workers stratified by education 
level.  These results are not reported here but are available upon request.  I find the same 
qualitative results for these subsamples. 
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distribution is influenced by their differential sorting across high-paying and low-paying 
firms.  These results are also summarized in table 1.2.  
Looking at the sample of all workers, females are over-represented at the bottom 
decile of the economy-wide population wage distribution by 21 percent (R෡୤଴.ଵ ൌ 0.121ሻ, 
and under-represented at the top decile by 32 percent (R෡୤଴.ଽ ൌ 0.067ሻ, conditional on their 
observed personal and job characteristics.  This result is partly explained by gender 
differences in sorting across firms.  Adding firm effects to equation (7) reduces females’ 
representation index at the bottom decile to 15 percent (R෩୤଴.ଵ ൌ 0.115) and increases it at 
the top decile to 20 percent (R෩୤଴.ଽ ൌ 0.080).  These findings are consistent with wage 
patterns I found before.  
Similar results are found for the other subsamples.  Females are consistently 
over-represented (under-represented) in the bottom (top) decile of the economy-wide 
population wage distribution, conditional on their characteristics.  These patterns of over-
/under-representation are less pronounced for females when I take into account the 
differential sorting of males and females across firms by looking at females’ 
representation in different parts of the within-firm population wage distribution.  Single 
females without dependent children are the only group of females, however, who are 
under-represented at the bottom decile of the population wage distribution (R෡୤଴.ଵ ൌ
0.093ሻ.  Their representation index increases to R෩୤଴.ଵ ൌ 0.109, however, when we look at 
within-firm population wage distribution.  This result suggests that compared to other 
female workers, single females without children are sorted into higher-paying firms at the 
bottom of the wage distribution.  This is consistent with the gender wage gap estimates 
illustrated in figure 1.10. 
1.5.3. Possible Explanations: Compensating Differentials versus 
Efficiency Wages 
My measure of glass ceiling is based on gender differences that are not 
explained by other job-relevant characteristics that affect wages.  Ideally, inequalities 
that are generated by past discrimination in education or training, or from choices that 
people make regarding market and nonmarket goals should not be considered part of 
the glass ceiling.  Obviously, it is impossible to measure and control for all job-relevant 
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characteristics that could affect wages.  Therefore, part of the residual gender difference 
in wages may reflect differences in productivity or preferences, not discrimination. 
If unobserved gender differences in productivity are driving the observed glass 
ceiling effect, this would imply that men are more productive than women, and this 
productivity gap becomes larger as we move to the top of the wage distribution.  As a 
result, females will become increasingly under-represented in higher-paying firms.  To 
the best of my knowledge, this explanation does not have any theoretical or empirical 
support.  Moreover, as different studies suggest, women have smaller probabilities of 
promotion into high-paying jobs, and therefore reaching high-wage regions of the wage 
distribution, compared to their male counterparts.18  Regardless of the underlying 
reasons behind this gender difference in promotion opportunities (such as superior 
ability in non-market activities, discrimination or unmeasured differences in preferences, 
commitment, and other unspecified factors), the sequential selection effect generated 
through this process should reduce the unobservable differences between men and 
women by the time they make it to the top of wage distribution.19  Therefore, if anything, 
we would expect these unobservable differences in productivity to have smaller effects 
on residual male-female wage gaps, and gender differences in sorting across firms, as 
we move to the top of wage distribution.  
Finally, as it is discussed below in more details, I find some evidence that 
suggests there is a positive relationship between firm’s profitability and the proportion of 
                          
18 For instance, Lazear and Rosen (1988) develop a model of jobs where men and women have 
the same distribution of labor market ability, but women have superior ability in non-market 
activities.  Their results suggest that “a woman must have greater ability than a man to be 
promoted.  Some women are denied a promotion that goes to a lower ability man.”   
19 Imagine that we have 120 male and 120 female workers, and there are 2 levels of 
management hierarchy.  Women have two-thirds the chance of being promoted.  Therefore, 
80 women and 120 men will be promoted to the second level.  If females lower chance of 
promotion was purely due to discrimination, since these 80 females were more stringently 
selected compared to their male colleagues, they will have better job-related characteristics 
than their male counterparts, and therefore should face lower wage gaps.  If the lower odds 
of promotion were purely due to differences in unobserved factors such as productivity or 
preferences, these differences should be on average smaller between men and women in the 
second level, and again women should face lower wage gaps. 
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females employed at the firm.  If females’ under-representation in high-paying firms is 
only a reflection of their lower productivity compared to their male counterparts, we 
should not observe any relationship between profitability and the sex composition of 
workforce across firms. 
The theory of compensating differentials could provide an alternative explanation 
for inter-firm wage differentials and subsequently gender differences in sorting across 
firms, which could be used to explain the observed glass ceiling effect.  In the context of 
a compensating differentials model, the inter-firm wage differentials stem from inter-firm 
differences in working conditions.  High-paying firms offer higher wages on average, but 
also have relatively harder working conditions.  If men and women value job 
characteristics differently, then gender pay differentials may be compensated by other 
characteristics of female jobs such as more pleasant working conditions.20  Females will 
choose low-paying firms because they care more about non-pecuniary aspects of a job, 
while men will choose high-paying firms because they care more about wages.  As a 
result, females’ under-representation in high-paying firms will become more pronounced, 
and gender wage gap will grow larger, if inter-firm differences in working conditions get 
larger as we move to the top of the wage distribution.  This will generate an increasing 
gender wage gap that looks like a glass ceiling.  
To test this possibility, I estimate a specification that controls for job 
characteristics including flexible work hours; possibility to carry out work duties at home; 
indicators of inability to work more hours due to unavailability of childcare, personal and 
family responsibilities, going to school, or transportation problems.  I also control for total 
family income from employment and other sources.  These results are reported in 
                          
20 The theory of compensating differentials is usually applied to explain the inter-occupational 
gender segregation and wage differentials while this study already controls for different 
occupations and looks at the segregation of females within occupations but across different 
firms.  Filer (1985) and Jacob and Steinberg (1990) show that there are no significant 
differences in average measures of working conditions within occupations (even very broad 
categorization) and once we control for occupation the effect of these measures is not 
significant anymore.  In addition, most of the studies that look at inter-industry wage 
differentials find no evidence in support of compensating differentials (Smith, 1979; Brown, 
1980; Kruger and Summers, 1988). 
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appendix table 1.A1 and are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the main results in 
table 1.2.  This result suggests that these job characteristics do not explain the observed 
glass ceiling and glass door effects. 
As a second and more comprehensive test, I examine whether reported job 
satisfaction differs on average between workers employed in high-paying and low-paying 
firms.  If wages compensate for undesirable job characteristics, workers employed at 
lower-paying firms should report higher levels of job satisfaction, conditional on observed 
individual and job characteristics and worker’s pay satisfaction.21  I run a regression of 
estimated firm effects from equation (3) on the observable worker and job characteristics 
used in my main specification, as well as 4 indictors for pay satisfaction (very satisfied, 
satisfied, dissatisfied and indifferent, with very dissatisfied as the omitted category) and 
2 indicators for job satisfaction (very satisfied or satisfied, and indifferent, with 
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied as the omitted category).  I run this regression for the 
sample of all workers and for male and female workers separately. 
The results are reported in table 1.3.  Those employed at lower-paying firms do 
not report higher levels of job satisfaction, on average, than those employed at relatively 
higher-paying firms, conditional on observed characteristics and pay satisfaction.22 
Altogether, my results don’t provide any evidence that compensating differentials 
contribute to the economy-wide glass ceiling through inter-firm gender differences in 
sorting. 
Efficiency wage theory provides another potential explanation for inter-firm wage 
differentials.  The efficiency wage hypothesis (See Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, Stiglitz 
1986, Bowles 1985, Bulow and Summers 1986, Yellen 1984 and Katz 1986) suggests 
that firms might find it profitable to pay above market clearing wages to increase effort, 
reduce shirking, lower turnover, attract a higher quality workforce, increase productivity, 
                          
21 The reason that I control for pay satisfaction rather than worker’s wage is that wages will be 
mechanically correlated with the dependant variable. 
22 These results are consistent for the sample of all workers, and for the samples of male workers 
and female workers. 
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and improve worker morale and group work norms. If the conditions necessitating 
efficiency wage payments differ across firms, then the optimal wage will also differ 
across firms.  This implies that workers with identical productive characteristics may be 
paid differently depending on their firm affiliations.  These wage differences for similar 
workers might reflect firm characteristics that do not directly influence worker utility, and 
thus would not require compensating differentials in a competitive labor market.  Kruger 
and Summers (1988), Katz and Summers (1989) and Groshen (1991a) find empirical 
support in favor of efficiency wage theory. 
I test the predictions of efficiency wage theory regarding the relationship between 
firm-specific premium and firm’s characteristics such as productivity and quite rates by 
regressing estimated firm effects from equation (3) on a wide set of firm-level 
characteristics including industry (14 categories), firm size (4 categories), an indicator for 
a pay equity program, an indicator for an employment equity program, foreign ownership 
(4 categories), degree of competition faced (4 categories), quit rate, proportion of full-
time workers, an indicator for good labor-management relations, proportion of workers 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement,  a standardized z-score measure for 
provision of non-wage benefits (e.g. dental care, life insurance, Supplemental medical,  
Pension plan, Group RRSP, Stock purchase, etc), an indicator for incentive 
compensation schemes (e.g. productivity/quality gain-sharing, individual incentive 
systems, merit pay and skill-based pay, or profit sharing, etc), the logarithm of training 
expenditures per worker, an indicator for innovative work practices in the firm (e.g. self-
directed work groups, problem-solving teams, employee suggestion groups, etc), and 
productivity measured as the logarithm of value-added per worker.23 
                          
23 This regression is only run for the sample of for-profit firms since the productivity measure is 
only available for these firms.  I have run the same regression for all firms, without including a 
productivity measure, and my results are similar to those reported here.  I also use other 
alternative measures of training and provision of different benefits by the firm, and I find the 
same qualitative results.  These results are available upon request.  Refer to the data 
appendix for a more detailed description of the variables.  
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The results are reported in table 1.4.  Firms that pay higher premiums to their 
employees (after accounting for inter-firm differences in workforce composition) are on 
average larger, more likely to have a pay equity program, face more competition, are 
more likely to provide non-wage benefits, have lower quit rates, have higher training 
expenditures, have higher productivity, are more likely to have incentive compensation 
schemes, and are less likely to have innovative work practices.  These results support 
the predictions of the efficiency wage theory such as lower quit rates and higher 
productivity for higher-paying firms.  In addition, the fact that higher-paying firms not only 
offer higher premiums to their employees, but also provide more non-wage benefits and 
training, provides further evidence against the compensating differentials theory.  
The question that still remains is whether efficiency wage theory can help us to 
understand the glass ceiling effect faced by females arising from inter-firm gender 
differences in sorting?  It is difficult to think of a supply-side reason that explains why 
women would avoid jobs with efficiency wages.  On the other hand, since a central 
element in efficiency wage theory is wage differentials that are unrelated to productivity 
differentials across workers, it is natural to think that it can provide the basis for a theory 
of discrimination.  Yellen (1984) argues that in the context of efficiency wage model, 
employers can costlessly discriminate against a group of workers with some observable 
characteristics.  Bulow and Summers (1986) also develop an efficiency wage model that 
rationalizes discrimination based on group differences that are unrelated to productivity. 
Firms paying efficiency wages would believe it is not optimal to hire women if 
they assume that females don’t alter their behavior in response to higher wages, for 
instance because they are less career oriented or less productive.  Or if they assume it 
takes a higher wage increment to deter women’s behavior like shirking because they 
have higher quite rates and as a result the cost of losing their job is less than the cost for 
men.  These assumptions could be based on stereotypes about female workers, 
considering them as more communal, caring and family oriented compared to males 
who might be considered as more assertive and work-oriented.  If stereotype-based 
assumptions about females are incorrect, these lower wages are discriminatory and 
inefficient.  Even if these assumptions about females are on average correct, it does not 
rule out the possibility of statistical discrimination against females that could lead to 
gender differences in sorting across firms.  For instance, there could be statistical 
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discrimination against women based on beliefs in gender differences in turnover rates 
(Aldrich and Buchele, 1989). 
I adopt an empirical test proposed by Hellerstein et al. (2002) to examine the 
presence of discrimination against women in the labor market in the context of efficiency 
wage theory, which would limit females’ access to high-paying firms.  I implement the 
test by examining the cross-sectional relationship between profitability and the sex 
composition of the workforce.  If discrimination plays no role in gender differences in 
sorting across firms, then there should be no relationship between profitability and the 
sex composition of the workforce.  In the absence of discrimination against females that 
blocks their access to high-paying firms, females’ under-representation in high-paying 
firms, and the gender wage gap generated through this sorting, must reflect only 
observed or unobserved gender differences in productivity or preferences.  Therefore, 
lower-paying firms with higher proportion of females should earn no higher profits than 
higher-paying firms with lower proportion of females.  A finding that firms with higher 
proportion of females earn higher profits, in contrast, would be consistent with sex 
discrimination against females that limits their access to high-paying firms. 
The profitability measure I use to test this hypothesis is the firm’s gross operating 
revenue minus gross operating expenditures (including payroll and nonwage expenses, 
and the purchase of goods) divided by gross operating revenue.24  The variable of 
interest, proportion of females in the firm, is based on the actual number of females in 
the firm reported by the employer.25  In examining the relationship between profitability 
and the proportion of females in a firm, I include as control variables other demographic 
characteristics of the workforce, and firm-level characteristics that are likely to affect 
firm’s profitability.  The results are reported in table 1.5 and are robust across different 
specifications.  They suggest that irrespective of the set of control variables included in 
                          
24 The average profit rate after eliminating observations with extreme values (about 1 percent of 
the sample) is 17%.  This is slightly lower than the number reported by Hellerstein et al. 
(1997) using US manufacturing linked employer-employee data (22%). 
25Since the question regarding the total number of females in the firm was included in the WES 
from 2003, the regression is implemented using only pooled 2003 and 2005 firm-level data. 
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the regression, there is a positive relationship between the proportion of females in the 
workforce and firm’s profitability.  For example, the point estimate in column (6) indicates 
that a ten percentage point increase in female employment in an average firm increases 
the profit rate by 0.73 percentage point.    
Altogether, my results suggest that gender differences in preferences or 
productivity cannot explain inter-firm gender segregation and therefore the glass ceiling 
faced by females.  My results, however, favor the predictions of efficiency wage theory 
with higher-paying firms discriminating against females.  
1.6. Conclusion 
I find clear evidence that females face economy-wide glass ceilings that are 
mainly driven by glass doors (i.e. segregation of females in lower-paying firms).  I find 
similar patterns for different subgroups of the workforce (i.e. females without any 
dependent child and all males, females with at least one dependent child and all males, 
workers younger than 44, workers older than 43, and single workers without any 
dependent children).  Females are significantly under-represented (over-represented) at 
the top (bottom) of the wage distribution, conditional on their observable personal and 
job characteristics, and these patterns of over/under-representation are partly due to 
glass doors they face.  I also find that females experience substantial wage gaps 
throughout the conditional wage distribution, even within firms.  I find no evidence that 
these wage patterns can be explained by compensating differentials.  However, my 
results support the predictions of the efficiency wage theory with higher-paying firms 
discriminating against females. 
The policy implications of my results are two-fold.  First, policies that aim to 
identify and eliminate the glass ceiling faced by females will be more effective if they 
focus on mechanisms that lead women to sort into lower-paying firms.  This is possible, 
for instance, by addressing hiring practices in higher-paying firms.  Employment equity 
policies that target employment decisions directly could be effective in this context and 
will have a bigger effect in reducing the gender wage gap in high wage regions of the 
wage distribution.  Second, more general policies that try to improve females’ labor 
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market outcomes throughout the wage distribution will be more effective if they focus on 
practices that improve females’ labor market performance within firms.  To the extent 
that the jobs performed by males and females within firms require similar effort, skill, 
responsibilities and working conditions, policies that target pay decisions directly, such 
as pay equity programs, could be effective in reducing the within-firm gender wage gap.  
Finally, the sizable within-firm gender wage gap found in my analysis throughout the 
wage distribution suggests that further research is required to identify the sources of 
within-firm gender wage gap.  
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1.8. Tables and Figures 
Figure 1.1. Distribution of Firm-Level Proportion of Females, for Male and 
Female Employees 
 
Figure 1.2. Distribution of Firm Effects by Different Firm-Level Proportion of 
Females 
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Figure 1.3. Sample of All Workers 
Figure 1.4. All Female Workers without any Dependent Child and All Male 
Workers 
 
  
 34 
Figure 1.5. All Female Workers with at Least One Dependent Child and All Male 
Workers 
 
Figure 1.6. All Workers Younger Than 44 
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Figure 1.7. All Workers Older Than 43 
 
Figure 1.8. Younger versus Older Workers 
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Figure 1.9. All Single Workers without Dependent Children 
 
Figure1.10. Single Females without Dependent Children and Non-Single 
Females, Versus Non-Single Males 
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Figure 1.11. Single Males without Dependent Children Versus Non-Single Males 
 
  
 38 
Table 1.1. Sample Means 
 Males Females 
Number of observations 40230 30115 
Subsamples:   
Workers with at least one dependent child 52.53 50.12 
Workers without dependent children 47.47 49.88 
Workers younger than 44 43.84 43.95 
Workers older than 43 56.16 56.05 
Single workers without any child 18.20 18.54 
Personal Characteristics:   
Hourly wage 24.12 19.01 
Family income excluding worker (from employment) Ϯ 25,785 33,916 
Family income (from other sources) Ϯ 2,486 2,480 
Age 42.03 41.99 
Years of (actual full-time) experience 20.01 16.70 
Ethnicity   
Visible Minority Canadian 0.015 0.017 
Visible Minority Immigrants 0.092 0.090 
White Immigrants 0.116 0.104 
White Canadians* 0.775 0.787 
Highest educational attainment   
Ph.D., Master's, or M.D 0.052 0.044 
Other graduate degree 0.023 0.024 
Bachelor's degree 0.143 0.147 
Some university 0.081 0.085 
Completed college 0.168 0.253 
Some college or trade certificate 0.248 0.204 
High school degree 0.162 0.167 
Less than high school* 0.119 0.072 
Marital Status   
Married 0.623 0.581 
Common law 0.144 0.132 
Separated 0.023 0.035 
Divorced 0.035 0.077 
Widowed 0.004 0.015 
Single* 0.168 0.157 
Number of Dependent Children   
zero* 0.474 0.498 
One 0.177 0.182 
Two 0.247 0.235 
Three 0.078 0.068 
Four or more 0.022 0.014 
Willing but unable to work more hours because of Ϯ   
Childcare not being available 0.001 0.002 
Personal and family responsibilities 0.013 0.009 
Going to school 0.002 0.003 
Transportation problems 0.000 0.000 
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Table 1.1. Sample Means (Continued) 
 Males   Females 
Job characteristics:   
Fulltime 0.870 0.589 
Member of Union or CBA 0.288 0.306 
Years of seniority with current employer 9.717 8.817 
Possibility to work flexible hours Ϯ 0.375 0.322 
Possibility to carry out work duties at home Ϯ 0.280 0.238 
Occupation:   
Manager 0.181 0.093 
Professionals 0.155 0.225 
Technical/Trades 0.507 0.320 
Marketing/Sales 0.029 0.081 
Clerical/Administrative 0.060 0.219 
Production workers * 0.068 0.062 
  Pay and benefits satisfaction considering the duties and responsibilities of the job Ϯ 
Very Satisfied 0.335 0.346 
Satisfied 0.570 0.562 
Dissatisfied 0.072 0.071 
Very Dissatisfied 0.019 0.017 
No opinion 0.002 0.001 
Job Satisfaction Ϯ   
Very Satisfied 0.270 0.302 
Satisfied 0.604 0.582 
Dissatisfied 0.091 0.089 
Very Dissatisfied 0.028 0.024 
No opinion 0.003 0.000 
Employer Characteristics Ϯ:   
Any employment equity program 0.227 0.257 
Any pay equity program 0.236 0.291 
Non-profit enterprise 0.136 0.322 
log(revenue per worker) 11.945 11.712 
Number of employees   
Less than 20* 0.216 0.226 
20-99 0.357 0.321 
100-499 0.245 0.225 
500 or more 0.180 0.226 
Number of competing firms   
Zero 0.024 0.018 
1 to 5 0.285 0.222 
6 to 20 0.288 0.200 
More than 20* 0.212 0.185 
Missing 0.189 0.373 
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Table 1.1. Sample Means (Continued) 
Industry:   
Resource 0.025 0.007 
Labour intensive tertiary manufacturing 0.061 0.045 
Secondary product manufacturing 0.057 0.022 
Capital intensive tertiary manufacturing 0.082 0.031 
Construction 0.064 0.013 
Transportation, warehousing, wholesale 0.145 0.072 
Communication and other utilities 0.027 0.012 
Retail trade and consumer services 0.162 0.206 
Finance and insurance 0.031 0.066 
Real estate, rental and leasing operations 0.015 0.012 
Business services 0.106 0.103 
Education and health services 0.120 0.356 
Information and cultural industries 0.036 0.034 
Primary product manufacturing* 0.063 0.014 
Notes: * indicates reference category for regressions. Ϯ indicates that the variable is not used in the main 
regressions and is only used for robustness checks. All the means are computed using sample weights 
provided in the data (Statistics Canada does not allow the report of these means without using the weights). 
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Table 1.2. Gender Wage Gap and Glass Door Estimates 
 (1) All workers  (2) All single workers without any 
dependent child 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms Glass door 
Mean  
Wage Differential -0.160*** -0.113*** -0.047*** -0.073 *** -0.076 *** 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.007) [0.000] (0.015) (0.011) [0.292] 
Quantile Differential       
10th percentile -0.117*** -0.103*** -0.014 0.003 -0.073 *** 0.077*** 
 (0.017) (0.010) [0.335] (0.032) (0.021) [0.000] 
Median -0.156*** -0.113*** -0.043*** -0.059 *** -0.091 *** 0.032*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) [0.000] (0.017) (0.011) [0.018] 
90th percentile -0.197*** -0.124*** -0.073*** -0.143*** -0.066 *** -0.076** 
 (0.019) (0.013) [0.000] (0.039) (0.024) [0.012] 
       
Number  
of Observations 70345 70345  70345 70345  
       
Females’ 
Representation Index       
Below 10th percentile 0.121 0.115  0.093 0.109  
Below Median 0.563 0.552  0.532 0.540  
Above 90th percentile 0.067 0.080  0.077 0.093  
   
  
 42 
Table 1.2. Gender Wage Gap and Glass Door Estimates (Continued) 
 (3) All female workers without 
any dependent child and all male 
workers 
(4) All female workers with at least 
one dependent child and all male 
workers 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms Glass door 
Mean  
Wage Differential -0.150*** -0.116*** -0.034*** -0.176*** -0.113*** -0.063*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) [0.000] (0.011) (0.008) [0.000] 
Quantile Differential       
10th percentile -0.101*** -0.108*** 0.007*** -0.123*** -0.099 *** -0.024** 
 (0.014) (0.015) [0.000] (0.015) (0.012) [0.025] 
Median -0.149*** -0.116*** -0.033*** -0.174*** -0.109*** -0.065*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) [0.000] (0.011) (0.006) [0.000] 
90th percentile -0.188*** -0.125*** -0.063*** -0.212*** -0.124*** -0.088*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) [0.000] (0.025) (0.018) [0.000] 
       
Number of 
Observations 70345 70345  70345 70345  
       
Females’ 
Representation Index       
Below 10th percentile 0.110 0.113  0.133 0.118  
Below Median 0.542 0.542  0.584 0.562  
Above 90th percentile 0.073 0.083  0.062 0.076  
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Table 1.2. Gender Wage Gap and Glass Door Estimates (Continued) 
 (5) All workers younger than 44 (6) All workers older than 43 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms Glass door 
Mean  
Wage Differential -0.165*** -0.106*** -0.059*** -0.153*** -0.121*** -0.032*** 
 (0.011) (0.007) [0.000] (0.010) (0.010) [0.000] 
Quantile Differential       
10th percentile -0.120*** -0.102*** -0.018 -0.112*** -0.103*** -0.009 
 (0.018) (0.012) [0.192] (0.019) (0.013) [0.527] 
Median -0.167*** -0.108*** -0.059*** -0.144*** -0.120*** -0.024** 
 (0.013) (0.008) [0.000] (0.014) (0.008) [0.038] 
90th percentile -0.196*** -0.123*** -0.073*** -0.200*** -0.127*** -0.073*** 
 (0.031) (0.015) [0.000] (0.023) (0.022) [0.000] 
       
Number  
of Observations 70345 70345  70345 70345  
       
Females’ 
Representation Index       
Below 10th percentile 0.125 0.116  0.116 0.114  
Below Median 0.571 0.553  0.554 0.550  
Above 90th percentile 0.065 0.078  0.071 0.082  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values for glass door test are in brackets. Simulated standard 
errors for estimates of females’ representation are all less than 0.002. Given the precision of our estimates, 
we omit standard errors from the tables to minimize clutter. Details are available on request. *** indicates 
statistically significant at 1%, ** indicates statistically significant at 5%, and * indicates statistically significant 
at 10%. All regressions are based on pooled samples of all males and females. Gender wage gap estimates 
for different subsamples are generated using interaction between gender and appropriate indicators. 
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Table 1.3. OLS Regression Results, Firm-Specific Premiums and Worker 
Characteristics 
 All workers Male only Female Only 
Female -0.044***   
 (0.005)   
PhD., Master’s, or MD 0.186*** 0.166*** 0.209*** 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
Other Graduate Degree 0.183*** 0.185*** 0.190*** 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) 
Bachelor Degree 0.183*** 0.174*** 0.198*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) 
Some University 0.112*** 0.075*** 0.153*** 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) 
Completed College 0.129*** 0.115*** 0.151*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) 
Some college or trade certificate 0.094*** 0.078*** 0.112*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
High school diploma 0.053*** 0.031** 0.079*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
Married 0.039*** 0.066*** 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) 
Common Law 0.009 0.038*** -0.022* 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) 
Separated 0.020 0.037 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.020) 
Divorced 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.016 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) 
Widowed 0.008 0.032 -0.016 
 (0.021) (0.059) (0.020) 
Very satisfied or satisfied with current  job -0.004 -0.001 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) 
Indifferent about current job 0.014 0.084 -0.094 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.077) 
Very satisfied with job’s pay 0.173*** 0.179*** 0.160*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.017) 
Satisfied with  job’s pay 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) 
Dissatisfied with  job’s pay 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.043*** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) 
Indifferent about  job’s pay 0.005 -0.002 0.016 
 (0.051) (0.065) (0.080) 
One child -0.013** 0.004 -0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
Two children 0.005 0.021*** -0.011 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Three children -0.006 0.022 -0.039** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) 
 45 
Table 1.3. OLS Regression Results, Firm-Specific Premiums and Worker  
  Characteristics (Continued) 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%, ** indicates 
statistically significant at 5%, and * indicates statistically significant at 10%. All coefficients are estimated 
using sampling weights provided by Statistics Canada and all the standard errors are computed using 100 
sets of bootstrap weights provided by Statistics Canada. The dependent variable is estimated firm effects 
after controlling for workers and job characteristics (estimates of ψ from equation 3). The regressions also 
include control for age (8 categories), quartic in experience and quadratic in years of seniority, immigration 
status and ethnicity (4 categories). 
  
Four children or more -0.018 0.010 -0.053 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.032) 
Experience 0.000 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Fulltime 0.057*** 0.100*** 0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) 
Member of Union or CBA 0.102*** 0.109*** 0.097*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Years of seniority 0.002*** 0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Professionals 0.034** 0.013 0.061*** 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.020) 
Technical/Traders 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.129*** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) 
Marketing/Sales 0.046*** 0.036** 0.049*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) 
Clerical/Administrative -0.122*** -0.074*** -0.131*** 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.018) 
    
Number of observations      70345     40230      30115 
Adjusted R-squared 0.208 0.177 0.243 
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Table 1.4. Firm-Specific Premium and Firms Average Characteristics 
Industry:   
Resource 0.150*** ( 0.020) 
Labour intensive tertiary manufacturing -0.117*** ( 0.020) 
Secondary product manufacturing  0.044*** ( 0.015) 
Capital intensive tertiary manufacturing  0.013 ( 0.017) 
Construction 0.157*** ( 0.020) 
Transportation, warehousing, wholesale - 0.012 ( 0.017) 
Communication and other utilities  0.064*** ( 0.016) 
Retail trade and consumer services -0.156*** ( 0.017) 
Finance and insurance  0.050** ( 0.021) 
Real estate, rental and leasing operations - 0.053* ( 0.031) 
Business services  0.072*** ( 0.023) 
Education and health services 0.109*** ( 0.028) 
Information and cultural industries  0.036* ( 0.020) 
Number of Employees:   
20-99  0.027** ( 0.010) 
100-499  0.081*** ( 0.013) 
500 or more 0.122*** ( 0.031) 
Number of competing firms   
Zero - 0.025 ( 0.025) 
1 to 5 - 0.066*** ( 0.018) 
6 to 20 - 0.047*** ( 0.016) 
Foreign ownership   
1 to 49 percent - 0.008 ( 0.027) 
50 to 90 percent -0.104 ( 0.064) 
90 to 100 percent  0.028 ( 0.018) 
   
Existence of any employment equity program  0.007 ( 0.027) 
Existence of any pay equity program  0.052* ( 0.028) 
Proportion of fulltime workers 0.142*** ( 0.032) 
Proportion of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement  0.015 ( 0.023) 
Good rating of labor-management relations - 0.009 ( 0.012) 
Existence of any innovative work practices - 0.033** ( 0.015) 
Quit rate -0.171*** ( 0.063) 
Log of value added per worker (proxy for productivity)  0.066*** ( 0.007) 
Log of training expenditures per worker  0.006*** ( 0.002) 
z-score measure for provision of different benefits 0.006*** (0.001) 
Existence of incentive schemes in the compensation system  0.069*** ( 0.014) 
Number of observations 14015  
Adjusted R-squared 0.416  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%, ** indicates 
statistically significant at 5%, and * indicates statistically significant at 10%. All coefficients are estimated 
using sampling weights provided by Statistics Canada and all the standard errors are computed using 100 
sets of bootstrap weights provided by Statistics Canada.  The dependent variable is estimated firm effects 
after controlling for workers and job characteristics (estimates of ψ from equation 3). For a detailed 
description of variables included in the regression please refer to the data appendix.  
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Table 1.5. Firm’s Profitability and the Sex Composition of the Workforce 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
% females  0.086*** 0.101*** 0.089*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
% with a bachelors degree or higher 0.000 -0.010 -0.027 -0.031 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
% with a college degree or higher -0.023 -0.025 -0.038 -0.043* -0.043* -0.043* 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
% with a  high school degree of higher 0.018 0.017 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
% married  -0.007 -0.012 -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
% immigrants -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
% with at least one dependent child 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.018 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
% between the age of 35 and 54 -0.022 -0.029 -0.028 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
% older than 54 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.022 -0.024 -0.028 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) 
% with 10 to 25 years of experience -0.006 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.014 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
% years of experience > 26 0.028 0.010 0.012 0.018 0.020 0.024 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
% covered by union  -0.041** -0.043** -0.045** -0.040** -0.040** 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
% fulltime  0.038* 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.036* 
  (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
% with 10 to 25 years of   0.036* 0.034 0.033* 0.032* 0.031 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
% with more than 25 years of tenure  0.048* 0.048* 0.047* 0.047* 0.045* 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
% managers   0.017 0.017 0.017 0.02 
   (0.049) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
% professionals   0.070 0.061 0.062 0.068 
   (0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) 
% technical/Trades   0.025 0.019 0.021 0.024 
   (0.050) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) 
% Marketing/Sales   0.040 0.037 0.035 0.039 
   (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) 
% Clerical/Administrative   0.082 0.077 0.078 0.083* 
   (0.052) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) 
Firm size 20 to 99     -0.024* -0.023* 
     (0.013) (0.012) 
Firm size 100 to 499     -0.005 -0.003 
     (0.015) (0.015) 
Firm size more than 500     -0.031 -0.029 
     (0.027) (0.027) 
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Table 1.5. Firm’s Profitability and the Sex Composition of the Workforce 
(continued) 
Number of competing firms: zero      0.024 
      (0.020) 
Number of competing firms: 1 to 5      0.004 
      (0.012) 
Number of competing firms:6 to 20      -0.007 
      (0.013) 
       
Control for Industry (14 categories) NO NO NO YES YES YES 
       
Number of observations 6089 6089 6089 6089 6089 6089 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%, ** indicates 
statistically significant at 5%, and * indicates statistically significant at 10%. All coefficients are estimated 
using sampling weights provided by Statistics Canada and all the standard errors are computed using 100 
sets of bootstrap weights provided by Statistics Canada. The dependant variable is profit rate: (gross 
operating revenue – gross operating income) / gross operating income. Observations with extreme values 
on the dependant variable (around 1 percent of the sample) are deleted. The regressions are only based on 
2003 and 2005 observations since the actual number of females in a firm was only reported for those years. 
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1.9. Appendices 
1.9.1. Appendix A: Additional Tables 
Table 1.A1. Economy-wide and within-firm wage disparities, and glass door 
estimates – Using additional control variables 
 (1)All workers  (2)All single workers without any 
dependent child 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
Mean Wage 
Differential -0.161*** -0.108***  -0.053*** 
 
-0.075***   -0.078***   0.003 
 (0.008 ) (0.006 ) [0.000]  (0.015 ) (0.011 ) [0.735] 
Quantile Differential        
10th Percentile -0.117***  -0.095***   -0.022*  -0.012  -0.074 ***  0.062** 
 (0.015 ) (0.009 ) [0.093]  (0.030 ) (0.018 ) [0.012] 
Median -0.164***  -0.109***  -0.055***  -0.072***  -0.094 ***  0.022 
 (0.010 ) (0.005 ) [0.000]  (0.023 ) (0.009 ) [0.292] 
90th Percentile -0.195***  -0.120***  -0.075***  -0.121***  -0.059***   -0.062*** 
 (0.017 ) (0.012 ) [0.000]  (0.021 ) (0.021 ) [0.000] 
        
Observations 70345 70345   70345 70345  
        
 (3) All female workers without any 
dependent child and all male 
workers 
 (4) All female workers with at 
least one dependent child and all 
male workers 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
Mean Wage 
Differential -0.149***  -0.110***  -0.039*** 
 
-0.179***  -0.109***  -0.07*** 
 (0.008 ) (0.006 ) [0.000]  (0.011 ) (0.008 ) [0.000] 
Quantile Differential        
10th Percentile -0.105***  -0.101***  -0.004  -0.123***  -0.093***   -0.03* 
 (0.019 ) (0.010 ) [0.812]  (0.019 ) (0.010 ) [0.078] 
Median -0.152***  -0.113***  -0.039***  -0.180***  -0.106***  -0.074*** 
 (0.010 ) (0.005) [0.000]  (0.014 ) (0.007 ) [0.000] 
90th Percentile -0.183***  -0.115***  -0.068***  -0.213***  -0.122***  -0.091*** 
 (0.017 ) (0.014 ) [0.000]  (0.020 ) (0.014 ) [0.000] 
        
Observations     70345      70345         70345       70345  
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Table 1.A1. Economy-wide and within-firm wage disparities, and glass door 
estimates – Using additional control variables (Continued) 
 (5) All workers younger than 44  (6) All workers older than 43 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms Glass door 
Mean Wage 
Differential -0.167***  -0.102***  -0.065*** 
 
-0.154***  -0.116***  -0.038*** 
 (0.011 ) (0.007 ) [0.000]  (0.009 ) (0.010 ) [0.000] 
Quantile Differential        
10th Percentile -0.120***  -0.094***   -0.026*  -0.113***  -0.099***   -0.014 
 (0.019 ) (0.012 ) [0.099]  (0.021 ) (0.011 ) [0.426] 
Median -0.171***  -0.107***  -0.064***  -0.156***  -0.113***  -0.043*** 
 (0.013 ) (0.005 ) [0.000]  (0.011 ) (0.009 ) [0.000] 
90th Percentile -0.193***  -0.121***  -0.072***  -0.198***  -0.116***  -0.082*** 
 (0.027 ) (0.016 ) [0.000]  (0.021 ) (0.019 ) [0.000] 
        
Observations 70345 70345   70345 70345  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values for glass door test are in brackets. *** indicates 
statistically significant at 1%, ** indicates statistically significant at 5%, and * indicates statistically significant 
at 10%.  All coefficients are estimated using sampling weights provided by Statistics Canada and all the 
standard errors are computed using 100 sets of bootstrap weights provided by Statistics Canada. All 
regressions are based on pooled samples of all males and females. Gender wage gap estimates for 
different subsamples are generated using interaction between gender and appropriate indicators. Additional 
control variables used in these regressions are: family income from employment (excluding worker), family 
income from other sources, four indicator for people who are willing but unable to work more hours due to 
unavailability of childcare/family responsibilities/ going to school/ transportation problems, indicator for 
possibility to work flexible hours, indicator for possibility to carry our work duties at home.  
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Table 1.A2. Economy-wide and within-firm wage disparities, and glass door 
estimates – Excluding all immigrants 
 (1)All workers  (2)All single workers without any 
dependent child 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms Glass door 
Mean Wage 
Differential -0.170***  -0.117***  -0.053*** 
 
-0.083***  -0.083***  0.000 
 (0.012) (0.007) [0.000]  (0.007) (0.006) [0.964] 
Quantile Differential        
10th Percentile -0.124***  -0.111***  -0.013***  0.000 -0.097***  0.097*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) [0.000]  (0.035) (0.026) [0.000] 
Median -0.172***  -0.117***  -0.055***  -0.070***  -0.093***  0.022* 
 (0.015) (0.008) [0.000]  (0.021) (0.015) [0.087] 
90th Percentile -0.216***  -0.133***  -0.083***  -0.156***  -0.074*** -0.081*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) [0.000]  (0.037) (0.028) [0.000] 
        
Observations 58082 58082   58082 58082  
 -0.170***  -0.117***  -0.053***  -0.083***  -0.083***  0.000 
 (3) All female workers without any 
dependent child and all male 
workers 
 (4) All female workers with at least 
one dependent child and all male 
workers 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
Mean Wage 
Differential -0.161***  -0.122***  -0.039*** 
 
-0.186*** -0.117***  -0.069*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) [0.000]  (0.013) (0.009) [0.000] 
Quantile Differential       0 
10th Percentile -0.119***  -0.112***  -0.007  -0.130***  -0.107***  -0.023 
 (0.017) (0.011) [0.446]  (0.023) (0.013) [0.102] 
Median -0.159***  -0.123***  -0.036***  -0.186***  -0.114***  -0.072*** 
 (0.011) (0.007) [0.000]  (0.016) (0.009) [0.000] 
90th Percentile -0.202***  -0.133***  -0.069***  -0.238***  -0.135***  -0.103*** 
 (0.022) (0.017) [0.000]  (0.029) (0.029) [0.000] 
        
Pbservations      58082      58082        58082      58082  
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Table 1.A2. Economy-wide and within-firm wage disparities, and glass door 
estimates – Excluding All Immigrants (Continued) 
 (5) All workers younger than 44  (6) All workers older than 43 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
Mean Wage 
Differential -0.174***  -0.111***  -0.063*** 
 
-0.164***  -0.127***  -0.037*** 
 (0.014) (0.008) [0.000]  (0.012) (0.011) [0.000] 
Quantile Differential        
10th Percentile -0.129***  -0.109***  -0.020*  -0.115***  -0.113***  -0.002 
 (0.021) (0.013) [0.098]  (0.020) (0.015) [0.806] 
Median -0.180***  -0.113***  -0.067***  -0.159***  -0.121***  -0.038*** 
 (0.016) (0.010) [0.000]  (0.017) (0.010) [0.005] 
90th Percentile -0.220***  -0.131***  -0.089***  -0.214***  -0.139***  -0.075*** 
 (0.026) (0.020) [0.000]  (0.028) (0.017) [0.000] 
        
Observations 58082 58082   58082 58082  
        
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values for glass door test are in brackets. *** indicates 
statistically significant at 1%, ** indicates statistically significant at 5%, and * indicates statistically significant 
at 10%.  All coefficients are estimated using sampling weights provided by Statistics Canada and all the 
standard errors are computed using 100 sets of bootstrap weights provided by Statistics Canada. All 
regressions are based on pooled samples of all males and females. Gender wage gap estimates for 
different subsamples are generated using interaction between gender and appropriate indicators 
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Table 1.A3. Economy-wide and within-firm wage disparities, and glass door 
estimates – Allowing returns to  be different for subgroups 
 (1)All workers  (2)All single workers without any 
dependent child 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms Glass door 
Mean Wage 
Differential -0.160*** -0.113*** -0.047*** 
 
-0.072*** -0.074*** 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.007) [0.000]  (0.015) (0.014) [0.631] 
Quantile Differential        
10th Percentile -0.117*** -0.103*** -0.014  0.007 -0.052*** 0.059*** 
 (0.017) (0.010) [0.326]  (0.029) (0.025) [0.003] 
Median -0.156*** -0.113*** -0.043***  -0.062*** -0.090*** 0.028** 
 (0.011) (0.006) [0.000]  (0.019) (0.016) [0.012] 
90th Percentile -0.197*** -0.124*** -0.073***  -0.157*** -0.063*** -0.094*** 
 (0.019) (0.013) [0.000]  (0.036) (0.019) [0.002] 
        
Observations 70345 70345   11914 11914  
        
 (3) All female workers without any 
dependent child and all male 
workers 
 (4) All female workers with at least 
one dependent child and all male 
workers 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
Mean Wage 
Differential -0.112*** -0.113*** 0.001 
 
-0.191*** -0.120*** -0.071*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) [0.809]  (0.012) (0.010) [0.000] 
Quantile Differential        
10th Percentile -0.087*** -0.095*** 0.007  -0.152*** -0.115*** -0.037** 
 (0.018) (0.011) [0.574]  (0.019) (0.011) [0.014] 
Median -0.132*** -0.115*** -0.017  -0.188*** -0.119*** -0.069*** 
 (0.012) (0.006) [0.101]  (0.015) (0.007) [0.000] 
90th Percentile -0.181*** -0.124*** -0.057***  -0.217*** -0.131*** -0.086*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) [0.000]  (0.020) (0.015) [0.000] 
        
Observations 55410 55410   55165 55165  
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Table 1.A3. Economy-wide and within-firm wage disparities, and glass door 
estimates – Allowing returns to  be different for subgroups 
(Continued) 
 (5) All workers younger than 44  (6) All workers older than 43 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
 Economy 
wide 
Within 
firms 
Glass 
door 
Mean Wage 
Differential -0.163*** -0.106*** -0.057*** 
 
-0.149*** -0.118*** -0.031*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) [0.000]  (0.011) (0.010) [0.000] 
Quantile Differential        
10th Percentile -0.120*** -0.095*** -0.024  -0.111*** -0.112*** 0.001 
 (0.021) (0.012) [0.163]  (0.025) (0.010) [0.974] 
Median -0.170*** -0.110*** -0.06***  -0.148*** -0.116*** -0.032** 
 (0.014) (0.007) [0.000]  (0.015) (0.008) [0.014] 
90th Percentile -0.204*** -0.124*** -0.08***  -0.185*** -0.122*** -0.063*** 
 (0.030) (0.017) [0.000]  (0.018) (0.017) [0.000] 
        
Observations 38430 38430   31915 31915  
        
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values for glass door test are in brackets. *** indicates 
statistically significant at 1%, ** indicates statistically significant at 5%, and * indicates statistically significant 
at 10%.  All coefficients are estimated using sampling weights provided by Statistics Canada and all the 
standard errors are computed using 100 sets of bootstrap weights provided by Statistics Canada. 
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Table 1.A4. Decomposing the Glass Door Effect 
 (1)All workers 
 Mean wage 
differential 
10th 
percentile 
Median 90th 
percentile 
(1) Economy-wide -0.16*** -0.117*** -0.156*** -0.197*** (-0.008) (0.017) (0.011) (0.019) 
(2)Within-Industry -0.136*** -0.113*** -0.135*** -0.154*** (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.022) 
(3)Within-firm -0.113*** -0.103*** -0.113*** -0.124*** (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.013) 
(4) Sorting across firms, within and across 
industries [(1)-(3)] 
-0.047*** -0.014 -0.043*** -0.073*** 
[0.000] [0.335] [0.000] [0.000] 
(5)Sorting across firms and across industries 
[(1)-(2)] 
-0.024*** -0.004 -0.021*** -0.043*** 
[0.000] [0.708] [0.000] [0.000] 
(6)Sorting across firms and within industries 
[[(2)-(3)] 
-0.023*** -0.01 -0.022** -0.03* 
[0.000] [0.305] [0.029] [0.094] 
 (2)All female workers without any dependent child and all male workers 
 Mean wage differential 
10th 
percentile 
Median 90th 
percentile 
(1) Economy-wide -0.150*** -0.101*** -0.149*** -0.188*** (0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) 
(2)Within-Industry -0.129*** -0.093*** -0.127*** -0.148*** (0.009) (0.013) (0.0104) (0.020) 
(3)Within-firm -0.116*** -0.108*** -0.116*** -0.125*** (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.016) 
(4) Sorting across firms, within and across 
industries [(1)-(3)] 
-0.034*** 0.007*** -0.033*** -0.063*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(5)Sorting across firms and across industries 
[(1)-(2)] 
-0.021*** -0.0071* -0.022*** -0.04*** 
[0.000] [0.098] [0.000] [0.000] 
(6)Sorting across firms and within industries 
[(2)-(3)] 
-0.013*** 0.0141*** -0.011 -0.023* 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.176] [0.063] 
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Table 1.A4. Decomposing the Glass Door Effect (continued) 
 (3)All female workers with at least one dependent child and all male workers 
 Mean wage differential 
10th 
percentile 
Median 90th 
percentile 
(1) Economy-wide -0.176*** -0.123*** -0.174*** -0.212*** (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.025) 
(2)Within-Industry -0.147*** -0.125*** -0.146*** -0.174*** (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.027) 
(3)Within-firm -0.113*** -0.099 *** -0.109*** -0.124*** (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.018) 
(4) Sorting across firms, within and across 
industries [(1)-(3)] 
-0.063*** -0.024** -0.065*** -0.088*** 
[0.000] [0.025] [0.000] [0.000] 
(5)Sorting across firms and across industries 
[(1)-(2)] 
-0.029*** 0.002 -0.028*** -0.038*** 
[0.000] [0.777] [0.000] [0.000] 
(6)Sorting across firms and within industries 
[(2)-(3)] 
-0.034*** -0.025*** -0.037*** -0.05** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.012] 
 (4)All workers younger than 44 
 Mean wage differential 
10th 
percentile 
Median 90th 
percentile 
(1) Economy-wide -0.165*** -0.120*** -0.167*** -0.196*** (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.031) 
(2)Within-Industry -0.137*** -0.122*** -0.142*** -0.153*** (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017) 
(3)Within-firm -0.106*** -0.102*** -0.108*** -0.123*** (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015) 
(4) Sorting across firms, within and across 
industries [(1)-(3)] 
-0.059*** -0.018 -0.059*** -0.073*** 
[0.000] [0.192] [0.000] [0.000] 
(5)Sorting across firms and across industries 
[(1)-(2)] 
-0.028*** 0.002 -0.025*** -0.043*** 
[0.000] [0.735] [0.000] [0.004] 
(6)Sorting across firms and within industries 
[(2)-(3)] 
-0.031*** -0.02 -0.034*** -0.03*** 
[0.000] [0.109] [0.000] [0.000] 
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Table 1.A4. Decomposing the Glass Door Effect (continued) 
 (5)All workers older than 43 
 Mean wage differential 
10th 
percentile 
Median 90th 
percentile 
(1) Economy-wide -0.153*** -0.112*** -0.144*** -0.200*** (0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.023) 
(2)Within-Industry -0.134*** -0.0988*** -0.123*** -0.158*** (0.010) (0.018) (0.015) (0.024) 
(3)Within-firm -0.121*** -0.103*** -0.120*** -0.127*** (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.022) 
(4) Sorting across firms, within and across 
industries [(1)-(3)] 
-0.032*** -0.009 -0.024** -0.073*** 
[0.000] [0.527] [0.038] [0.000] 
(5)Sorting across firms and across industries 
[(1)-(2)] 
-0.019*** -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.042*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(6)Sorting across firms and within industries 
[(2)-(3)] 
-0.013** 0.0042 -0.003 -0.031*** 
[0.045] [0.760] [0.817] [0.000] 
 (6)All single workers without any dependent child 
 Mean wage differential 
10th 
percentile 
Median 90th 
percentile 
(1) Economy-wide -0.073 *** 0.003 -0.059 *** -0.143*** (0.015) (0.032) (0.017) (0.039) 
(2)Within-Industry -0.0646*** -0.0115 -0.0669*** -0.110*** (0.015) (0.027) (0.018) (0.033) 
(3)Within-firm -0.076 *** -0.073 *** -0.091 *** -0.066 *** (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.024) 
(4) Sorting across firms, within and across 
industries [(1)-(3)] 
0.003 0.077*** 0.032*** -0.076** 
[0.292] [0.000] [0.018] [0.012] 
(5)Sorting across firms and across industries 
[(1)-(2)] 
-0.008*** 0.015 0.007 -0.033* 
[0.000] [0.384] [0.527] [0.083] 
(6)Sorting across firms and within industries 
[(2)-(3)] 
0.012*** 0.0624*** 0.024* -0.043** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.084] [0.050] 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values for glass door test are in brackets. *** indicates 
statistically significant at 1%, ** indicates statistically significant at 5%, and * indicates statistically significant 
at 10%. All regressions are based on pooled samples of all males and females. Gender wage gap estimates 
for different subsamples are generated using interaction between gender and appropriate indicators. 
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1.9.2. Appendix B: Data Appendix 
In this section I provide more details regarding the variables used in our 
regression analysis reported in table 1.4.  
Non-wage benefits: Our measure of non-wage benefits is based on the following 
categories of non-wage benefits provided by employers to all employees: (1) Dental 
care, (2) Pension plan, (3) Group RRSP, (4) Stock purchase or other saving plans, (5) 
Life insurance plan, (6) Supplemental medical (7) other non-wage benefits.  I use the 
sum of standardized z-scores of these binary indicators for each firm in every year as 
our non-wage benefit measure. 
Innovative work practices: I use an indicator which is equal to one if a given firm 
in a given year has any of the following innovative work practices: (1) Employee 
suggestion program, (2) Flexible job design, (3) Information sharing with employees, (4) 
Problem-solving teams, (5) Joint Labour-management committees, (6) Self-directed 
work groups. 
Existence of incentive schemes in the compensation system: I use an indicator 
which equal to one if a given firm in a given year has any of the following incentives in its 
compensation system: (1) Productivity/Quality gain-sharing, which are systems that 
reward individuals on the basis of group output or performance, (2) Individual incentive, 
such as bonuses, piece-rate, and commissions are systems that reward individuals on 
the basis of individual output or performance, (3) Merit pay and skill-based pay, which is 
a reward or honour given for superior qualities, great abilities or expertise that comes 
from training, practice etc., (4) Profit sharing, which is any plan by which employees 
receive a share of the profits from the workplace.  
Productivity: Our productivity measure is based on value added per worker, 
where value-added is measured as gross revenue minus expenses on materials.  I 
approximate expenses on materials by subtracting payroll expenses and expenses on 
non-wage benefits and training from gross operating expenditures (which includes 
payroll, nonwage expenses and the purchase of goods).  As it was mentioned before, 
since the gross revenue is only provided for for-profit firms I can only include our 
productivity measure in a specification that excludes nonprofit firms.   
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Quite rates: our measure of quit rate is constructed by total number of people 
resigning between April 1st of year t-1 and March 31st of year t,  divided by sum of 
employment at April 1st of year  t-1 and number of employees hired between April 1st of 
year t-1 and March 31st of year t.  To calculate the sum of employment at April 1st of year 
t-1 and number of employees hired between April 1st of year t-1 and March 31st of year t  
I use the sum of the following variables: (1) total employment in the last pay period of 
March of year t, (2) total number of employees dismissed for a cause between April 1st  
of year t-1 and March 31st of year t,  (3) total number of employees laid-off  between 
April 1st  of year t-1 and March 31st of year t,  (4) total number of employees permanently 
left the location because of special workforce reduction between April 1st  of year t-1 and 
March 31st of year t26, (5) total number of employees retired between April 1st  of year t-1 
and March 31st of year t, (6) total number of employees resigned between April 1st  of 
year t-1 and March 31st of year t, (7) total number of employees separated permanently 
for other reasons between April 1st  of year t-1 and March 31st of year t.  
                          
26 Special workforce reductions include resignations and early retirements induced through 
special financial incentives (i.e. where employees voluntarily leave). 
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2. How do School “Report Cards” Affect School 
Choice Decisions?27 
2.1. Introduction 
Economists have long argued that policies designed to increase competition in 
markets for education can improve educational outcomes by increasing disadvantaged 
students’ access to high quality schools, and by causing underperforming schools to 
become more effective or to shrink as families “vote with their feet” (Friedman 1955, 
Becker 1995, Hoxby 2003).  Recent evidence shows that providing information about 
school-level achievement directly to parents can influence school choice (Hastings and 
Weinstein 2008).  However, it is unknown whether publicly disseminating information 
about school achievement through the media has the same effect.28  On the one hand, 
widespread dissemination has the potential to influence the choices of many parents, 
and may therefore substantially increase the effectiveness of school choice policies.  
However, a large increase in the demand for high-achieving schools will not increase 
competitive pressure on weaker schools unless preferred schools can actually 
accommodate more students.  Furthermore, children whose parents have poor access 
to media, or who are not part of well-informed social networks, may not benefit from 
public dissemination strategies.  In addition, if school achievement measures are subject 
to substantial sampling variation, then parents could be misled or confused when 
education authorities update public information about achievement.  Our study 
                          
27 This chapter is based on a work co-authored with Jane Friesen, Justin Smith and Simon 
Woodcock and is published in the Canadian Journal of Economics (issue 45(2), May 2012). 
28 Information about school achievement is publicly disseminated in jurisdictions including 
England (West and Pennell 2000), Chile (Urquiola, McEwan and Vegas 2007), New Zealand 
(Fiske and Ladd 2000), and many U.S. states (Figlio and Lucas 2004) and Canadian 
provinces (Cowley 2007). 
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addresses these issues by examining the effect of public information about school 
achievement on school choice behavior in British Columbia (B.C.).  Our estimates are 
based on student-level longitudinal data for multiple cohorts of students that span the 
introduction of standardized testing and the subsequent wide dissemination of school-
level results.  We study the propensity of elementary school students to leave their 
school in response to new information about school-level performance on those 
standardized tests.  We also investigate whether the response to information about 
school achievement differs among parents who may face higher costs of accessing the 
information, such as those with low income or those who do not speak English at home.  
School-level achievement measures may be correlated with unmeasured 
characteristics of schools that influence parents’ beliefs about school quality and affect 
student mobility.  We identify parents’ response to new information using two separate 
identification strategies that exploit the timing of testing and the release of test results.  
The first is a difference-in-differences approach that controls for unobserved factors that 
jointly determine mobility and test scores by comparing the relationship between mobility 
and lagged test scores before and after the public release of information about test 
scores.  The second is a control function approach (Navarro 2008) that uses current 
cohort test scores to control for unobserved factors that jointly determine mobility and 
test scores.  Because test scores are not publicly revealed until the school year following 
the exam, the current cohort’s exam results are a valid control for such unobservables, 
and new information about the achievement of previous cohorts is a conditionally 
exogenous shock to parent’s information about school quality.  
We find that publicly disseminated information about school-level achievement 
has a substantial effect on the inter-school mobility of some public school students.  In 
general, students are more likely to leave their school when they learn that their 
schoolmates have performed relatively poorly.  Families that speak English at home 
respond strongly to early information releases, and continue to respond to subsequent 
releases.  Families that speak a language other than English respond only to the later, 
more highly publicized information releases.  The response is most pronounced among 
English-speaking families in low-income neighborhoods.  Arguably, these families may 
have had poor private information about school quality, and hence valued the new public 
information more highly than families in higher-income neighborhoods.  The delayed 
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response of non-English speakers suggests they face high costs of accessing public 
information. 
2.2. Previous Literature 
Hastings and Weinstein (2008) find that parents of children attending low-
achieving schools in a North Carolina school district were more likely to enroll their child 
in a higher-achieving school when the district provided them with information about 
school achievement.  They also find that simplified information sheets distributed 
randomly to parents in low- and middle-income schools doubled the estimated 
preference parameter on school test scores in a school choice model.  Using data from 
the same school district, Hastings et al. (2009) find that test scores play a small role in 
parents’ school choice decisions relative to travel distance and peer composition, and 
that parents’ preferences vary substantially with characteristics such as income.   
Unlike these studies, we focus on information that is disseminated to all parents, 
at all schools, through public media.  Public information may have different effects on 
school choice behaviour compared to the private information strategies studied 
previously, for several reasons.  First, newly informed parents, especially those of 
disadvantaged children, may face less competition for spaces in preferred schools when 
they are part of a smaller, targeted group.  Second, parents of children who attend low-
achieving schools may respond differently to new information than those of the broader 
student population.  Third, media dissemination may be a less effective way to inform 
disadvantaged parents compared to direct communication from schools. 
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An alternative method for learning about the effect of public information about 
school-level achievement on school choice is through its effect on housing prices.29  
Figlio and Lucas (2004) and Fiva and Kirkebøen (2010) find that public information about 
school-level achievement is capitalized into housing prices in Florida and Oslo 
respectively, but the effect diminishes quickly over time.  Kane et al. (2003) find that 
while housing prices reflect long-run average school-level test scores, they do not 
respond to year-to-year fluctuations in a given measure of school quality or to the 
introduction of newly framed test score information.   
Housing price studies only capture the effects of information about school 
achievement on school choice decisions that operate through residential choice.  
However, the link between residential and school choice decisions in many jurisdictions 
is weakened by the availability of private schools, charter and magnet schools and/or 
open enrolment policies.  To the extent that information affects school choice decisions 
along these margins, it will not be reflected in housing prices.  Moreover, housing price 
studies reveal little about the characteristics of the families whose decisions are affected.   
Several studies examine the direct effect of public information about achievement 
on school choice decisions.  Mizala and Urquiola (2008) find that, when measures of 
school achievement are already widely available, receiving a highly publicized SNED 
award has no effect on enrollment levels, tuition fees, or socioeconomic composition of 
Chilean schools. Hussain (2007) finds that enrollment falls by up to 6 percent in the 
three years after English schools receive a public “fail" rating, while enrollment increases 
by up to 2 percent in schools rated “very good."  
Finally, publicly disseminated information in the form of “report cards” or rankings 
like those examined here has been shown to affect consumer decisions in other 
                          
29 A large body of literature examines the relationship between school-level achievement 
measures and real estate prices, but most studies do not focus on the effect of new 
information on prices (e.g. Black 1999; Barrow 2002; Bayer et al. 2004; Gibbons and Machin 
2003, 2006; Ries and Somerville 2010). These studies typically find that residential property 
values are higher in neighborhoods with higher-achieving schools. 
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markets.  These markets include health services (Dranove et al. 2003, Dafny and 
Dranove 2008, Jin and Sorensen 2006) and restaurant patronage (Jin and Leslie 2003).  
2.3. Institutional Background  
2.3.1. School Access and Funding in B.C. 
As in many other jurisdictions, B.C. students are guaranteed access to their 
neighborhood “catchment” public school.  B.C.’s provincial education authority (the 
Ministry of Education) instituted an official “open boundaries” policy in July 2002 that 
allows students to attend any public school that has space and facilities available after 
catchment area students have enrolled.  Provincial legislation requires that school 
boards give priority to students who reside within the district; boards may elect to give 
priority to children whose siblings are already enrolled, and must establish policies for 
allocating spaces among students within a priority category.  Entry into most public 
magnet programs is restricted to students entering Kindergarten or Grade 1, and space 
in popular programs is often allocated by lottery.  Finally, students may choose a private 
school.  
Along with capital funding, the B.C. Ministry of Education provides districts with 
operating funds in proportion to total district enrolment.  Supplementary funding is 
provided for each student who is Aboriginal, is gifted or disabled, or who qualifies for 
English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction.  Public districts are not authorized to 
raise their own revenue.  Private schools receive per-student operating grants of up to 
50% of the base public school rate, and are responsible for teaching the provincial 
curriculum and meeting various provincial administrative requirements (B.C. Ministry of 
Education 2005).  
2.3.2. Testing and Information 
Prior to 1999, the BC Ministry of Education administered standardized Provincial 
Learning Assessment Program (PLAP) exams, in various subject areas on a rotating 
schedule, to students in grades 4, 7, and 10.  These were replaced by standardized 
Foundation Skills Assessment (FSA) exams in the 1999/2000 school year.  The FSAs 
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are administered in the spring of each year to students in grades 4, 7, and 10 in reading 
comprehension, writing, and numeracy.30  Neither the PLAP or FSA exams has any 
academic consequences, and teachers and schools face no financial incentives related 
to students’ exam performance. 
PLAP exam results were never disseminated to parents or the public.  The 
Ministry of Education first released individual and provincial, district, and school-level 
FSA exam results to schools in fall 2000 (based on the 1999/2000 exam).  Schools were 
instructed to share this information with parents upon request (B.C. Ministry of Education 
2000).  School-level results of the 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 FSA exams were first 
posted on the Ministry’s website in October 2001 (B.C. Ministry of Education 2001).  
Subsequent exam results have been posted on the Ministry’s website in the following fall 
of each year.  Since 2003, schools have been required to share individual students’ 
exam results with parents prior to September 30.  Note that in each case, FSA results 
are released in the school year following the year of the exam. 
The Fraser Institute, an independent research and educational organization 
(Fraser Institute 2008),31 began issuing annual “report cards” on B.C.’s elementary 
schools in June 2003 (Cowley and Easton 2003).32  These include school scores and 
rankings based on FSA results.  From the outset, the school report cards have received 
widespread media coverage in the province’s print, radio and television media.33  
                          
30 The grade 10 FSA exams were discontinued after the 2002/2003 school year. 
31 The authors are not affiliated with the Fraser Institute in any way. 
32 The Fraser Institute scores released in 2003 were based on school-average exam results in 
reading, writing and numeracy in Grades 4 and 7, and the average gap between male and 
female scores on the Grade 7 reading and numeracy exams. The scores released in 2004 
were constructed using different weights and included the percentage of students that did not 
“meet expectations” according to provincial standards (see Cowley and Easton (2008, p. 96) 
for details). 
33 A ProQuest search of Vancouver’s two most widely-read daily newspapers (the Vancouver Sun 
and the Province) returned twelve articles (including editorial content) published about the 
Fraser Institute’s first elementary school report cards in June, 2003. 
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2.4. The Effect of New Information on School Choice 
2.4.1. Basic Model 
We present a highly simplified model of school choice that accounts for 
uncertainty about school quality and focuses attention on the effects of new 
information.34  Assume parent ݅’s utility ( ௜ܷ௦) depends on the quality (ݍ௦) of their child’s 
school ݏ, 
(1)      ௜ܷ௦ ൌ ݍ௦	൅	ߝ௜௦  
where ߝ௜௦ is a random taste-shifter with mean zero.  We interpret ݍ௦  as an index 
of school characteristics that determine parents’ utility, such as teacher experience, peer 
ability, the state of technology at the school, the quality of sports programs, and class 
size.    
We assume that parents cannot perfectly observe ݍ௦.  They consequently form 
beliefs about each school’s quality based on directly observable school characteristics
, such as neighbourhood income and the demographic composition of the student body.  
Their prior beliefs are normally distributed with mean ܺ௦ᇱߚ  and precision ݄௤௜, where ߚ is 
the vector of weights given to observable characteristics.  Parents are assumed to know 
݄௤௜.  Although prior precision is the same for all schools, it varies between parents to 
reflect the idea that some (e.g., new immigrants) may have less precise beliefs about 
school quality than others (e.g., a native born individual who has lived in the area for 
many years). 
Absent any additional information and given a set of available schools , a parent 
chooses school ݏ if 
(2)    
                          
34 The notation is adapted from Moretti (2010), where a similar model is used to study peer 
effects in movie consumption. 
Xs
E Uis | X s cis  E Uik | X k  cik   k ,k  s
 67 
where ܿ௜௦ reflects the direct (e.g., tuition) and indirect (e.g., commuting distance) 
costs of attending school ݏ.  Given our assumed prior beliefs and utility function, this 
implies that the average parent chooses school	ݏ if 
(3)    . 
Now suppose that parents also observe a noisy signal ܵ௦ of each school's quality, 
such as standardized test scores aggregated to the school level, 
(4)      ܵ௦ ൌ ݍ௦ ൅ ߟ௦   
where .  The noise component s has zero mean, implying that test 
scores provide unbiased information about school quality.  The precision of test scores 
as a signal of school quality,݄ఎ௜, is known but varies across parents.  This reflects the 
possibility that test scores are more informative signals of school quality for some 
parents than others. 
Parents are assumed to update their expectations about each school's quality 
using Bayes’ rule.35  Their posterior beliefs are normally distributed with mean sm and 
precision iqi hh  , where 
(5)      s
qii
i
s
qii
qi
ssss Shh
h
X
hh
h
SXqEm  


 ,| . 
Parents’ updated expectation of school quality is a precision-weighted average of 
the signal and their prior expectation.  The greater is the precision of test scores relative 
to prior information, the greater is the weight that parents will place on test scores.  If test 
                          
35 For recent applications of Bayesian learning, see Moretti (2010), Ichino and Moretti (2009), 
Erdem and Keane (1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001), Lange (2007), Chernew et al. (2008), 
and Woodcock (2010). 
X s  c is  X k  c ik   k  ,k  s
s ~ N 0,hi1 
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scores are very noisy, prior information will continue to dominate parents’ beliefs about 
school quality. 
Defining  as the weight that parents place on test scores, and 
rearranging equation (5), we can write the average parent’s expected utility from 
choosing school ݏ as  
(6)     . 
Define  to be the test score “shock,” which represents the new 
information acquired from the signal.  Parents will choose to enroll their child in school ݏ 
if 
(7)   . 
Parents choose school ݏ if the information shock is sufficiently good relative to 
other schools that it outweighs any relative differences in the schools’ other 
characteristics and attendance costs.  Conversely, parents will choose school ݏ even if 
they receive a relatively poor information shock, provided its characteristics are good 
enough and attendance costs low enough to outweigh the “bad news” about school-level 
test scores.  Note also that test score information only affects school choice if it is 
sufficiently precise to be useful (i  > 0).  Furthermore, i  varies across individuals 
because of interpersonal differences in the precision of prior beliefs, and differences in 
the precision of test scores as a signal of school quality.   
2.4.2. Model Dynamics 
We now extend the model to accommodate a sequence of signals rather than a 
one-time event.  Suppose that in each period ܶ, parents observe an unbiased signal of 
school quality ܵ௦் that conforms to equation (4), such as the results of an annual 
standardized test that are revealed to the public in each school year.  We define parents’ 
beliefs about school quality recursively.  After observing ܶ signals, parents’ beliefs are 
normally distributed with mean sTm  and precision iqi Thh  , where 
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and  is the average of all observed signals.   
From the first line of equation (8) we see that, as in the case of a single signal, 
parents’ revised expectations about school quality are a precision-weighted average of 
the new signal ( sTS ) and expected quality prior to observing the signal ( 1sTm ).  We also 
see that each new signal receives successively smaller weight in parents’ Bayesian 
update, because the previous ܶ	– 	1 signals have already contributed to the precision of 
their beliefs, and consequently increased the weight assigned to 1sTm .  From the second 
line of equation (8), however, we see that the combined weight assigned to the average 
of all signals ( iTT , where ) increases with ܶ, and the weight 
assigned to observable school characteristics ܺ௦ consequently decreases.  
Defining  to be the information shock embodied in the new 
signal, and rearranging the first line of equation (8), parents choose school ݏ over school 
݇ if 
(9)        isiksTkTkTsTiT ccmmSS   11**** . 
The intuition behind this maximization condition is the same as before: parents 
choose school ݏ if the information shock contains sufficient “good news” about school 
quality relative to what was previously believed and attendance costs. 
S sT  T1 Sstt1
T
iT  hi hqi Thi 1
SsT
**  SsT msT1 
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2.5. Methodology 
2.5.1. Empirical Model 
For tractability and because of data limitations, we treat residential location as 
exogenous and examine inter-school mobility conditional on residential choice.  
Specifically, we model the probability that a student separates from their current school 
after September 30 of year ݐ and enrolls in a new school before September 30 of year 
ݐ ൅ 1, conditional on their residential location.  In terms of our theoretical model, students 
will separate from their current school ݏ if some alternative school satisfies equation (9). 
The fundamental identification issue is that school-level achievement measures 
may be correlated with unmeasured characteristics of schools that influence parents’ 
beliefs about school quality and affect student mobility.  Our first estimator addresses 
this problem by comparing the relationship between lagged school-average test scores 
and the probability of separating from the current school, conditional on observable 
characteristics, before and after lagged test scores were first released to the public in fall 
2000.  Under some identifying assumptions described below, this strategy allows us to 
estimate the effect of the 1999/2000 test score information on separations in the year it 
was released.36  The estimating equation takes the form 
(10)
iststsiststit
t
tSt
t
tstist CXZdSdSy    20001320002110   
where ݕ௜௦௧ is a binary variable indicating whether student ݅ separated from school 
ݏ at the end of school year ݐ; ܵ௦௧ିଵ is a measure of lagged test scores; 2000ttd is a binary 
indicator for the 2000/2001 school year; ܼ௜௧ is a vector of observable student 
                          
36 According to our theoretical model, FSA scores will continue to affect school choice decisions 
in subsequent school years, but with a smaller weight.  Estimating the effect of information on 
separations in years after 1999/2000 in the difference-in-differences framework therefore 
would require us to include higher order lags of test scores in our specification. This approach 
is not feasible because numeracy and reading exams were not administered regularly during 
the 1990s.     
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characteristics; ܺ௦௧ is a vector of observable school characteristics; ܥ௜௦௧  is a vector of 
proxies for the student’s cost of attending school ݏ; is a fixed school effect, st is a 
random school-by-year effect that captures any unmeasured correlation among 
students’ separation behavior in a given school and year;37 ist is a stochastic error term; 
and  ,,,,,, 3210  are coefficients to be estimated.  The coefficient of interest, 3 , 
measures how the relationship between lagged test scores and separations differs 
before and after the release of test score information to parents.   
Since FSA testing began in 1999/2000, there is no lagged FSA score from which 
to identify the baseline relationship between lagged test scores and separations in 
1999/2000.  Instead, we use the results of the PLAP reading exam as our measure of 
pre-policy achievement, and use the FSA reading scores as our measure of post-policy 
achievement.  The use of the PLAP results as a proxy for baseline achievement raises 
two issues.  First, although the exams were not identical, they tested similar skills 
(Raptis and Fleming 2006: 1204), so we expect that their underlying relationship with 
mobility behavior would be similar.  Second, because the PLAP reading test was not 
administered in 1998/1999, we use the 1997/1998 PLAP reading results as a proxy for 
the lagged baseline score.  Our identifying assumption therefore is that the relationship 
between the 2000/2001 separations and the 1999/2000 FSA test scores (written one 
year previously) would have been the same as the relationship between the 1999/2000 
separations and the 1997/1998 PLAP test scores (written two years previously), had 
information about FSA performance not been released.  
We estimate a second specification that allows us to identify the effects of a 
series of information shocks on inter-school mobility, while separately identifying the 
effect of new information versus the lagged effect of previously released information, and 
that does not rely on proxy test score measures.  This estimator includes the current 
cohort’s average FSA score, ܵ௦௧, as a control for unobserved time-varying school 
                          
37 Stated differently, our reported standard errors account for clustering at the school-by-year 
level. 
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characteristics that jointly affect test scores and separations.  We estimate the following 
specification using data from the 1999/2000 through 2003/2004 school years: 
(11)
 
yist 0  3jSsj
j1999
2002 dtjt1  4jSsj
j1999
2002 dtj t1 5Sst  Z it  X stt  C ist  t s st  ist
 
 As before, ܵ௦௝ is a school-level aggregate of test scores.  Here, however, we 
have no need for test scores prior to 1999/2000, and therefore all test scores are 
aggregates of FSA reading and math results.  Each test score measure ݆ is interacted 
with a pair of binary indicator variables: 1tjtd  equals one when ݆	 ൌ 	ݐ	 െ 	1 and zero 
otherwise; similarly 1tjtd  equals one when ݆	 ൏ 	ݐ	 െ 	1.  We call j3  “news” coefficients 
because they measure how each information release affected students’ separation 
probability in the year in which that particular information first became available to 
parents.  Each information release also takes a separate “old news” coefficient j4  that 
measures its effect on separation probabilities in subsequent school years.  As 
discussed in more detail below, ܵ௦௧ is the current cohort’s FSA score and takes 
coefficient 5 ; and t  is a fixed year effect.  All other terms are as previously defined.  
Note, however, that t  now varies over time.38  This reflects our theoretical model’s 
prediction that parents will give less weight to observable school characteristics as more 
test-based information becomes available to them.  As with the difference-in-differences 
estimator, we include fixed school effects that control for any between-school differences 
in average separation rates that may be correlated with between-school differences in 
average achievement. 
                          
38 Specifically, ߚ௧ varies across three information “regimes” that reflect the nature of information 
available to parents.  During the first regime (1999/2000), parents observed no formal 
measures of school-level achievement.  Parents could observe school-average FSA exam 
results during the second regime (2000/2001 and 2001/2002), and they could observe both 
school-average FSA exam results and the Fraser Institute scores and rankings during the 
third regime (2002/2003 and 2003/2004). 
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We include the current cohort’s FSA score (ܵ௦௧) in equation (11) to control for 
unmeasured time-varying school characteristics that have persistent effects on student 
achievement and separation probabilities.  Suppose, for example, that a school hires an 
unusually bad grade 4 teacher in year ݐ െ 1 who produces lower FSA results.  If her 
continuing presence at the school negatively influences parents’ beliefs about school 
quality in year ݐ, this directly increases students’ year ݐ separation probability.  Absent 
an adequate control, the bad teacher’s independent effect on year ݐ െ 1 FSA scores and 
year ݐ separations will be confounded with parents’ year ݐ response to information about 
year ݐ െ 1 FSA scores.  It is reasonable to assume, however, that if the bad teacher 
influences students’ separation probability in ݐ then she also influences students’ FSA 
performance in ݐ.  Because year ݐ FSA scores are not observed by parents until year 
ݐ ൅ 	1, they are a valid control for the “bad teacher effect” in year ݐ, as well as any other 
school-level unobservables that jointly affect mobility and performance and have 
persistent effects over time.  Controlling for the current cohort’s FSA scores (ܵ௦௧) thus 
allows us to identify parents’ response to information from lagged test scores, under the 
identifying assumption that unobserved time-varying factors that influenced previous 
cohorts’ achievement are only correlated with current-year unmeasured heterogeneity in 
separations ( st  and ist ) via their persistent effect on achievement.  When this 
assumption is satisfied, lagged FSA scores are exogenous in the separation equation 
conditional on current FSA scores.  The formal proof of identification is provided in an 
Appendix. 
If parents at low-achieving schools were more constrained by neighborhood 
enrolment policies than parents in high-achieving schools, then separations from low-
achieving schools might have increased relative to separations from high-achieving 
schools when the open boundaries enrolment policy took effect in 2002/2003.  We 
therefore allow the coefficient on ܵ௦௧ to differ before and after 2002/2003.  Under our 
maintained assumption that unobserved time-varying factors that influenced previous 
cohorts’ achievement are only correlated with Ʋ௦௧ and ߝ௜௦௧ via their persistent effect on 
achievement, this identifies the effect of information released in 2002/2003 separately 
from the effect of the change in enrolment policy.  
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2.5.2. Data  
Our investigation focuses on B.C.’s Lower Mainland region, a large metropolitan 
area with a population of approximately 2.5 million that includes the city of Vancouver 
and its suburbs.  It encompasses fourteen public school districts with a total annual 
enrollment of roughly 375,000 students in Kindergarten through Grade 12 (B.C. Ministry 
of Education 2007:8).39 
Our student-level data are based on two administrative databases, integrated via 
a unique student identifier: an enrollment database (collected for each student on 
September 30 of each year), and an FSA exam database.  Our analysis is based on an 
extract of the enrollment database that includes all students in the Lower Mainland who 
entered Kindergarten between 1994/1995 and 2003/2004.  We restrict our analysis to 
public school students who made regular progress through the grades and remained in 
the Lower Mainland through grade 5.  Our regression estimates are based on the subset 
of this population enrolled in grade 4, because the FSA exam is administered in this 
grade.40,41 We create our indicator of separations, ݕ௜௦௧, by comparing the school at which 
the student was enrolled on September 30 of their grade 4 year and the school at which 
they were enrolled on September 30 of the following year.  Because FSA results are 
released in October, ݕ௜௦௧ measures separations during or at the completion of the grade 
4 year, following the release of FSA results.  
                          
39 The region is geographically isolated from other populated areas by the U.S. border to the 
south, the Strait of Georgia to the west, and rugged mountains to the north and east. 
40 Our control function approach relies on current cohort FSA scores to control for unobserved 
time-varying factors that have persistent effects on FSA scores and separations. This 
identification strategy is most credible for those students in the current FSA cohort (grade 4). 
Focusing on grade 4 also allows us to control for students’ own FSA scores. 
41 To test the hypothesis that parents’ response to new information might be strongest upon initial 
school entry, we have also used a difference-in-differences specification to estimate how 
kindergarten enrollment changed in response to the release of FSA test scores. We do not 
report these estimates for two reasons.  First, they were too imprecise for us to be able to 
draw any reliable conclusions.  Second, impacts on enrollment levels (unlike separations) 
might be muted by capacity constraints, and a full analysis under such constraints is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
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We augment these data with: (1) school-by-grade average student 
characteristics; (2) selected characteristics of each student’s neighborhood as measured 
in the Census of Population; (3) school-average 1997/98 PLAP reading scores; (4) 
annual Fraser Institute school scores and rankings for the 1999/2000 through 2003/2004 
school years, and a three-year average score released in 2003; and (5) geographic 
coordinates associated with each school’s postal code and each student’s residential 
postal code.42  
The complete set of information shocks and the variables we use to capture them 
in our control function specification are summarized in Table 2.1.  In each case, these 
variables are based on school-average performance on the FSA reading and numeracy 
exams.  The first set of FSA results was released by the Ministry at the beginning of the 
2000/2001 school year, and a new set was released in each subsequent year.  The 
Fraser Institute released their first scores and rankings in June 2003, based on the FSA 
exams written in 1999/2000, 2000/2001 and 2001/2002.  That release included overall 
scores (out of 10) for each school in each of the three years, the three-year average 
score (also out of 10), and school rankings based on the 2001/2002 score and the three-
year average score.43  The three-year average was arguably the most salient measure, 
since schools were ordered on this measure in the ranking published in local 
newspapers.44  The Fraser Institute released an additional set of scores and rankings 
based on the 2002/2003 FSA exams in spring 2004.  We normalize all information shock 
variables in Table 2.1 to have mean zero and variance one over schools in each year. 
                          
42 We use these geographic coordinates to calculate measures of distance between the student’s 
home and various schools. Details of how we construct these measures are provided in the 
Data Appendix (Appendix C). 
43 Our estimation sample includes only students who attended schools for which a full set of 
Fraser Institute scores was released in both 2003 and 2004.  See the Data Appendix 
(Appendix C) for details.  
44 See, for example, “Elementary school rankings one useful tool for B.C.,” in The Province 
newspaper, June 8, 2003: pg. A.20. Also “Elementary schools get their grades, by Janet 
Steffenhagen in The Vancouver Sun newspaper, June 9, 2003: pg. B.1. 
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The specific control variables included in our regressions are listed in the table 
notes and described further in Appendix C. 
2.6. Results 
2.6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Our estimation sample consists of 65,180 students who attend 361 public 
elementary schools.45  We report sample means and mean separation rates for some 
key characteristics in Table 2.2 (sample means for all control variables are reported in 
Table 2.A1 in Appendix B).  Almost five percent of students self-report as Aboriginal, and 
these students have significantly higher separation rates than average (18.4% vs. 8.9%).  
Almost one-third of students speak a language at home other than English, and overall 
these students have a higher than average separation rate.  Only a small fraction (3.6%) 
has been diagnosed with disabilities at this early stage of their education and 
approximately 7% of students attend a French Immersion program.  The separation rate 
of disabled students is higher than average (13.6%) and that of French Immersion 
students is lower than average (6.4%). 
Table 2.3 shows school separation rates by grade for the five Kindergarten 
cohorts that we are able to follow through grade 5.  Over 60% of students remain in the 
same school throughout these grades, and about 30% separate once.  The remaining 
students experience multiple separations between Kindergarten and grade 5.  The 
separation rate is highest following Kindergarten, but is still fairly high (between 8% and 
10%) following grade 4. 
                          
45 Students with missing data are excluded. In particular, note that our sample includes only 
students who made regular progress through grades K-5 in a Lower Mainland school. This 
excludes students who separate and move to a school outside of the province.  See the Data 
Appendix (Appendix C) for information about the nature and frequency of missing data. 
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2.6.2. Econometric Estimates 
Our theoretical model contains a number of testable implications.  Most 
fundamentally, when parents observe new information about school quality, they may 
alter their original school choice if the information shock makes an alternative school 
appear more attractive.  For this to occur, the shock must provide new information about 
school quality rather than simply confirming what they already know, and the signal 
cannot be so noisy relative to prior information that parents ignore it.   
2.6.2.1. Difference-in-differences Estimates of Response to First Information 
Shock 
We begin by investigating parents’ response to the first public release of 
information about school-level achievement.  On the one hand, we expect parents to 
respond most strongly to this first shock, since our model predicts that parents’ response 
to new releases of test score information gets weaker over time as information 
accumulates and their beliefs about school quality become increasingly precise.  On the 
other hand, this first information release was not as widely publicized as subsequent 
releases, so its effect may have been muted if some parents did not absorb and act on 
this information.   
Selected coefficient estimates from our difference-in-differences estimator (eq. 
10) are presented in Table 2.4.46  Column 1 presents estimates for the full sample of 
grade 4 students in 1999/2000 and 2000/2001.  The estimated coefficient of interest (the 
lagged test score interacted with an indicator for the first year test score information was 
publicly released) is negative.  This indicates that students’ separation probability 
declined at public schools that received better news (higher school-average test scores), 
                          
46 Complete coefficient estimates are given in Appendix B, Table 2.A3. All else equal, the 
probability of separation is higher among disabled students, and is strikingly higher among 
Aboriginal students.  It is lower among high-achieving students and students in English as a 
Second Language programs.  Distance to school has a significant positive effect on 
separations, but the magnitude is small. Unsurprisingly, prior mobility is a strong predictor of 
current separation.  Students who live in neighborhoods where a greater proportion of 
household heads have a university degree are substantially more likely to leave their school.  
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relative to public schools where the news was worse.  However the estimate is small and 
imprecise and we cannot reject the null of no effect at conventional levels.  
The remaining columns of Table 2.4 explore possible heterogeneity in parents’ 
response to the first information release.  In columns 2 and 3, we divide the sample into 
students who report speaking English at home and those who report speaking another 
language.  Language barriers may impede some parents’ access to information, 
reducing the precision of test scores as signals of school quality.47  Indeed, we find no 
evidence that non-English speakers responded to the first information release.  In 
contrast, we observe a substantive and statistically significant response among parents 
who speak English at home: all else equal, a one standard deviation improvement in a 
school’s average test score reduced students’ separation probability by a full percentage 
point on a baseline separation rate of 8.3%. 
In the remaining columns of Table 2.4, we investigate how parents’ responses to 
the first information release varied by neighborhood income.  Parents who live in 
disadvantaged communities may have relatively poor access to private information (i.e., 
imprecise prior beliefs) or fewer school choice opportunities, both of which could mediate 
their response to information about school achievement.  We consequently break out 
families who reside in Census EA/DAs in the top (richest) and bottom quartiles of the 
distribution of average household income.  The results in columns 4 and 6 suggest that 
parents in top quartile neighborhoods do not respond to test score information, 
regardless of home language.  Families in high-income neighborhoods may already 
have had good access to private information, so that the new public information did not 
cause them to update their beliefs about schools in any meaningful way.  In contrast, 
English-speaking families in low-income neighborhoods responded quite strongly to new 
information (column 5).  We investigate this further below. 
                          
47 Home language may also proxy for preferences or cultural norms. 
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2.6.2.2. Control Function Estimates  
Our estimates of parents’ response to the first release of school-average test 
scores suggest that either this information did not reach certain groups, or the quantity or 
quality of the news it contained was not sufficient to alter their school choices.  Further 
insight into the factors that shape parents’ heterogeneous responses can be gained by 
investigating how they responded to subsequent releases of test scores, when this 
information was more widely disseminated.  We consequently turn to estimates for the 
full series of information shocks, based on our control function specification.  This 
specification allows us to distinguish between the lingering effects of previous 
information releases versus the effect of newly released information.  Recall that our 
theoretical model predicts that even after new information about school quality is 
observed, “old news” continues to influence parents’ beliefs (via ) and hence their 
choices. 
The first column of Table 2.5 presents selected coefficient estimates for the full 
sample of grade 4 students.48  We restrict the specification to a single information 
measure in each year: FSA exam scores in the first two years (when these were the only 
information measures available) and Fraser Institute scores in the latter two years (since 
these were published in the media, and therefore are arguably more salient).49  In three 
of four years, the coefficient estimates are negative, indicating that students’ separation 
probability declined at schools where the news was better.  The exception is the second 
release of Fraser Institute scores, where the coefficient is effectively zero.  The point 
estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the 1999/2000 FSA score 
relative to other schools reduced students’ separation probability by 0.9 percentage 
                          
48 Complete coefficient estimates are given in Appendix B, Table 2.A4. 
49 Estimates for specifications that include the full set of information measures released in each 
year (for those years where multiple measures were released, e.g., 2002/2003 when the 
Ministry published school-average FSA scores via its website and the Fraser Institute 
released their first set of scores and rankings) are available on request.  Because 
contemporaneous information measures are highly correlated (see Appendix B, Table 2.A2), 
estimates from specifications that include multiple information measures for each year are 
imprecise and difficult to interpret.  Hence we prefer the reported estimates. 
msT 1
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points.  This is almost identical to the corresponding point estimate from the difference-
in-differences estimator.  The corresponding figure for the 2000/2001 FSA score is 1.1 
percentage points, and 3.5 percentage points for the first release of Fraser Institute 
scores.  Only the latter release had any effect beyond the initial year and, as predicted 
by our model, the “old news” effect was smaller than the “news” effect (-0.027 versus -
0.035).  The estimated “old news” effects associated with the other information releases 
are all statistically insignificant, and the point estimates are small.  
The coefficient on the current-year mean FSA score is statistically insignificant, 
indicating no systematic relationship between current-year achievement and 
separations.50  The sign of the point estimate on the interaction between the current-year 
mean FSA score and an indicator for those years that the open enrolment policy was in 
effect is positive, indicating that if anything open enrolment increased separations from 
high-achieving schools relative to low-achieving schools.  Thus we are confident that the 
estimated negative effect of the first Fraser Institute release, which coincided with the 
introduction of open enrolment, captures parents’ response to the release of the Fraser 
Institute report cards, and not unobserved heterogeneity that jointly affects achievement 
and mobility, or changes in behavior associated with the introduction of open enrolment.  
Furthermore, the statistically significant response to FSA scores released by the Ministry 
in 2000 and 2001, which predate the introduction of the open boundaries policy, 
reinforces the impression that some parents were able to respond to new information 
about school-level achievement even absent official open enrolment policies.  
As with the difference-in-differences estimates, the point estimates in columns 2 
and 3 indicate that parents of children who speak English at home responded to the first 
release of FSA exam scores, while non-English speaking parents did not.  The 
magnitude of the point estimate is slightly larger than from the difference-in-differences 
estimator, and implies that when a school scored one standard deviation higher in the 
distribution of published school-average FSA scores, students’ separation probability 
                          
50 In other specifications reported below, the coefficient on current-year FSA scores differs 
significantly from zero. 
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declined by 1.3 percentage points.  On a base separation rate of about 8.3% per year, 
this is quite a large response.  Parents in this group responded further to the first release 
of information by the Fraser Institute in 2002.  The magnitude of the point estimate 
implies that when a school scored one standard deviation higher in the distribution of 
Fraser Institute scores, students’ separation probability declined by 3.1 percentage 
points.  Again, this is quite a large response.  
As before, parents of children who report speaking a language other than English 
at home did not respond to the release of FSA scores in 2000/01 and 2001/02.  
However, they did respond to the release of Fraser Institute scores.  The point estimate 
implies that a one standard deviation increase in the first Fraser Institute score relative to 
other schools reduced these students’ separation probability by 4.6 percentage points.  
Such a large response suggests poor access to previously released information, rather 
than resources or preferences, explains these parents’ delayed response to information 
about school-level achievement. 
A potential concern is that language barriers may not be the genuine cause of 
observed heterogeneity in responses.  Rather, heterogeneity could be driven by 
correlates of language, such as income.  In Table 2.6, we present estimates broken out 
by quartiles of the distribution of neighborhood income.  The results follow essentially the 
same pattern as the difference-in-difference estimates for the first information release.  
Parents in top quartile neighborhoods, both in the full sample and in the English-
speaking sub-sample, do not respond to test score information.  In contrast, those in 
low-income neighborhoods respond strongly.  Public information releases evidently 
contained substantial news for these parents, leading them to update their beliefs about 
school quality and respond substantively.  Non-English speaking parents do not respond 
to the first or second release of FSA scores by the Ministry, regardless of neighborhood 
income.  However they do respond to subsequent releases of Fraser Institute scores, 
although the timing of the response differs by neighborhood income.  Overall, it seems 
clear that access to information about test scores, rather than school choice 
opportunities, preferences or financial resources, is the essential factor determining how 
parents respond. 
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We explore the sensitivity of our results to sample composition and specification 
in Table 2.A5 in Appendix B.  These robustness checks show that English-language 
parents’ estimated response to information is not driven by the behavior of Aboriginal 
parents or parents of French Immersion students (as shown in Table 2.2, both of these 
groups had unconditional separation rates significantly different from the average 
student); nor are our estimates sensitive to specifying information measures based on 
schools’ Fraser Institute rankings instead of Fraser Institute scores.  
Under our identifying assumptions, our reported estimates can be interpreted as 
causal.  We cannot test these identifying assumptions directly.  We therefore look for 
contradictory evidence via two falsification tests for each specification reported in Tables 
2.A6 and 2.A7.  In each, we replace our “news” variables with false information 
measures based on year ݐ	 ൅ 1 and year ݐ test scores respectively, and correspondingly 
update the “oldnews” variables.  Parents could not directly observe these false news 
measures at the time they were making school choice decisions, and consequently there 
should be no systematic relationship between them and separations.  Estimates, 
reported in Tables 2.A6 and 2.A7 in Appendix B confirm this to be true. 
2.7. Conclusion 
We find that the public release of information about school-level achievement 
had a substantial effect on the inter-school mobility of some public school students in the 
Lower Mainland of B.C.  A substantial proportion of parents appear to revise their beliefs 
about the relative quality of their child’s school in response to this information, and “vote 
with their feet” by moving their child to a preferred school.  This response is observed 
primarily among parents who reside in low-income neighborhoods, and occurs the first 
time that school-level achievement measures are placed in the public domain.  While 
both English and non-English language parents respond strongly to public information 
about school achievement, non-English parents appear to face higher costs of accessing 
school achievement information.  They respond strongly to school achievement 
information, but only when the media provided widespread coverage to the Fraser 
Institute’s school report cards.  These results suggest that high-profile dissemination can 
 83 
play a crucial role in ensuring access to publicly provided information in environments 
with culturally and linguistically diverse populations.  
Jurisdictions that publicize school-level results typically update this information 
annually, raising concerns that parents may respond to year-to-year fluctuations that are 
largely noise (Kane and Staiger 2002, Mizala, Romaguera and Urquiola 2007).  Our 
results show that English-speaking parents in low-income neighborhoods respond 
immediately to the first release of information, and continue to respond to subsequent 
releases in later years.  Our data provide no way to determine whether these ongoing 
responses are a series of reactions to noisy information updates, or whether they simply 
reflect the time it takes for information to reach all members of the community.  Likewise, 
the delayed response of non-English-speaking parents suggests substantial 
heterogeneity in parents’ access to public information.  Consequently, annual releases of 
school achievement information that elicit ongoing media coverage may play an 
important role in communicating that information to all segments of the community, 
including recent immigrants. 
Our results add to a growing body of evidence that information about school-level 
achievement affects behavior in ways that may have real consequences for educational 
outcomes.  In addition to ensuring that all parents are able to access the information 
provided, educational authorities should therefore take care to ensure that widely 
disseminated information brings competitive pressure to bear on schools that are 
ineffective, rather than on schools that serve disadvantaged populations.  As a growing 
literature attests, designing meaningful measures of school effectiveness continues to be 
a challenge (Hægeland et al. 2004, Mizala, Romaguera and Urquiola 2007). 
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2.9. Tables 
Table 2.1. Information Shocks and Information Variables 
Information  Date "News" Variables "Old News" Variables 
1999/2000 cohort school 
mean FSA exam results 
released to parents on 
request 
Oct. 
2000 
(1999 Mean FSA 
Score)*(Yr=2000) 
(1999 Mean FSA 
Score)*(Yr>2000) 
2000/2001 cohort school 
mean FSA exam results 
released on Ministry of 
Education website 
Oct. 
2001 
(2000 Mean FSA 
Score)*(Yr=2001) 
(2000 Mean FSA 
Score)*(Yr>2001) 
2001/2002 cohort school 
mean FSA exam results 
released on Ministry of 
Education website 
Oct. 
2002 
(2001 Mean FSA 
Score)*(Yr=2002) 
(2001 Mean FSA 
Score)*(Yr>2002) 
1999/2000, 2000/2001 and 
2001/2002 cohort Fraser 
Institute (FI) scores and 
rankings released 
June 
2003 
(1999-2001 Mean FI 
Score)*(Yr=2002);(2001 FI 
Score)*(Yr=2002) 
(1999-2001 Mean 
FIScore)*(Yr>2002); 
(2001 FI Score)*(Yr>2002) 
2002/2003 cohort school 
mean FSA exam results 
released on Ministry of 
Education website 
Oct. 
2003 
(2002 Mean FSA 
Score)*(Yr=2003) out of sample 
2002/2003 cohort Fraser 
Institute scores and rankings 
released 
June 
2004 (2002 FI Score)*(Yr=2003) out of sample 
Source: See text. 
Note:  Calendar years in “News” and “Old news” variable names refer to the calendar year in which the 
school year began. For instance, “2001 FI Score” refers to the Fraser Institute score based on the FSA 
exam administered in the 2001/2002 school year. This measure was released in June 2003, and hence 
could first affect separations at the end of the 2002/2003 school year (Yr=2002). 
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Table 2.2. Sample Percentages and School Separation Rates 
 Sample Percent Separation Rate 
All 100 8.9 
Male 50.6 8.9 
Non-English Home Language 32.4 10.1 
English Home Language 67.6 8.3 
English as a Second Language 30.7 10.1 
Aboriginal 4.7 18.4 
Disabled 3.6 13.6 
Attends French Immersion 6.8 6.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment database. 
Table 2.3. Frequency of Separations by Year of Kindergarten Entry 
Kindergarten 
Entry Year 
Never 
Separate
d Before 
Grade 5 
Separated 
Once 
Before 
Grade 5 
Separated After… 
Kinder- 
garten Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 
1995 0.610 0.292 0.151 0.120 0.107 0.094 0.091 
1996 0.606 0.294 0.165 0.117 0.103 0.099 0.080 
1997 0.618 0.292 0.147 0.111 0.096 0.090 0.097 
1998 0.617 0.294 0.141 0.106 0.086 0.100 0.099 
1999 0.605 0.305 0.138 0.098 0.109 0.103 0.103 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment database. 
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Table 2.4. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of Information 
about School-level Achievement on Separation Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Full Sample English Non-English 
  All English 
Non-
English 
Top 
Quartile 
Bottom  
Quartile 
Top 
Quartile 
Bottom  
Quartile 
Lagged Score -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.009 -0.016 -0.019 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.035) (0.012) 
Lagged Score*(Yr=2000) -0.007 -0.010** 0.003 0.000 -0.024* -0.010 0.021* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.033) (0.013) 
Number of Observations 26360 18599   7761   6207 3323    995    2709 
Number of Schools 361 361 347 254 306 191 238 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment database and auxiliary data. 
Notes:  “Lagged score” refers to the school-average 1998 PLAP reading score in 1999; and the school-
average 1999/2000 FSA reading score in 2000. All scores are normalized to have mean zero and variance 
one over schools in each year. Additional control variables in these regressions are: main effects for student 
characteristics (non-English home language; Aboriginal; enrolled in ESL program; male; disabled; gifted; 
changed schools prior to Grade 4; enrolled in French Immersion, own FSA reading and numeracy scores, 
travel distance to school, and the numbers of public and private schools nearby), school proportions of 
student characteristics (non-English home language; Aboriginal; enrolled in ESL program; male; disabled; 
enrolled in French immersion) fully interacted with year dummy, school proportion excused from the FSA 
reading exam, Census characteristics for the student’s EA/DA of residence (mean and dispersion of 
household income; proportion visible minority; proportion one-parent families; unemployment rate; average 
dwelling value; proportion of dwellings owned; proportion moved last year and in last 5 years; proportion of 
household heads with less than grade 9 education, some high school, high school, and bachelor’s degree or 
higher; proportion immigrant), and fixed main effects for year and school. See Table 2.A3 in Appendix B for 
complete coefficient estimates for specifications in columns 1-3 and additional information.  Complete 
coefficient estimates for all other specifications available from the authors on request.  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. ***indicates statistically significant at the 1% 
level, **indicates significant at the 5% level, *indicates significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.5. Control Function Estimates of Effect of Information about School-
Level Achievement on Separation Probability  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Sample English Non-English 
“News” Measures 1999 FSA Score*(Yr=2000) -0.009** -0.013*** 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
2000 FSA Score*(Yr=2001) -0.011* -0.011 -0.015 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 
1999-2001 FI Score*(Yr=2002) -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.046*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) 
2002 FI Score*(Yr=2003) 0.001 0.006 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
“Old News” Measures 1999 FSA Score*(Yr>2000) -0.001 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
2000 FSA Score*(Yr>2001) 0.009 0.006 0.016* 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
1999-2001 FI Score*(Yr>2002) -0.027*** -0.024** -0.032** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) 
Current FSA Score -0.005 -0.002 -0.011* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Current FSA Score*(Yr>2001) 0.009* 0.003 0.020** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Number of Observations 65180 44077 21103 
Number of Schools 361 361 360 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment database and auxiliary data. 
Notes: “FSA Score” refers to the school-average of FSA Reading and Numeracy scores. “FI Score” refers 
to the Fraser Institute school score. All scores are normalized to have mean zero and variance one over 
schools in each year. Additional control variables in these regressions are: main effects for student 
characteristics (as described in notes to Table 2.4), school proportions of student characteristics (as 
described in notes to Table 2.4) interacted with dummies for three information regimes (1999/2000, 
2000/2001-2001/2002, 2002/2003-2003/2004), the school proportion excused from each FSA reading and 
numeracy exam interacted with the same “news” and “old news” year dummies as the corresponding test 
scores, Census characteristics for the student’s EA/DA of residence (as described in notes to Table 2.4), 
and fixed main effects for year and school.  See Table 2.A4 in Appendix B for complete coefficient estimates 
for all three specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. 
***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, **indicates significant at the 5% level, *indicates 
significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.6. Effect of Information about School-level Achievement on Separation 
Probability, by Home Language and Quartile of Distribution of 
Neighborhood Income 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All English Non-English 
 Top Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom 
Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile 
“News” Measures 
1999 FSA Score*(Yr=2000) -0.003 -0.018** 0.001 -0.038*** -0.022 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.023) (0.012) 
2000 FSA Score*(Yr=2001) -0.000 -0.024** -0.002 -0.033** -0.008 -0.028 
             (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.026) (0.019) 
1999-2001 FI Score*(Yr=2002) -0.002 -0.045*** 0.006 -0.078*** -0.046* -0.015 
             (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.027) (0.018) 
2002 FI Score*(Yr=2003) 0.005 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.036* 0.022 -0.033** 
             (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018) (0.031) (0.014) 
“Old News” Measures 
1999 FSA Score*(Yr>2000) -0.008 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.023 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.023) (0.013) 
2000 FSA Score*(Yr>2001) -0.008 0.012 -0.018 0.024 0.028 0.001 
             (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.027) (0.014) 
1999-2001 FI Score*(Yr>2002) -0.016 -0.007 -0.001 -0.027 -0.078 0.019 
             (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023) (0.047) (0.020) 
Current FSA Score -0.010 0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.029 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.019) (0.009) 
Current FSA Score*(Yr>2001) 0.009 0.013 0.002 0.021 0.045* 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013) 
Number of Observations 17592 14928 14783 7705 2809 7223 
Number of Schools 332 350 303 344 281 289 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment database 
and auxiliary data.  
Notes: For details of this specification refer to notes to Table 2.5. Complete estimates of 
all coefficients are available from the authors on request.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. *** indicates statistically significant at 
the 1% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, * indicates significant at the 10% 
level. 
  
 93 
2.10. Appendices 
2.10.1. Appendix A: Identification via the Control Function 
Estimation 
For illustrative purposes, consider a simplified version of equation (11): 
(A1)    istststtistist SXy   13 . 
We have subsumed all observables, including the constant, fixed school and 
year effects, and student characteristics, into ௜ܺ௦௧.  We have also omitted longer lags of 
test scores for expositional clarity, and omitted the current test score, ܵ௦௧, to illustrate the 
potential endogeneity problem.  We assume observables are exogenous in the sense 
that ௜ܺ௦௧	and ௜ܺ௦௧ିଵ are uncorrelated with st and ist . 
Consider the projection of school-average test scores onto contemporaneous 
observables: 
(A2)    stistst XS    
where ܺ௦௧	has mean zero and is orthogonal to ௜ܺ௦௧	by construction.  It is helpful to 
think of ܺ௦௧	as a mean-zero “shock” that represents the effect of teachers and other time-
varying school-specific unobservables on test scores.  Equation (A2) implies 
111   stistst XS  .  Given exogeneity of ௜ܺ௦௧ିଵ, lagged test scores are therefore 
endogenous in (A1) if and only if past shocks to achievement, ௜ܺ௦௧ିଵ, are correlated with 
unobserved heterogeneity in separations ( st or ist ).   
Suppose that shocks to achievement are correlated with unobserved time-
varying school-specific heterogeneity in separation probabilities.  We represent this via 
the projection: 
(A3)    ststst    
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where E st  E stst  0 by construction.  Suppose further that shocks to 
achievement are persistent, as represented via the projection:  
(A4)    ststst   1  
where ߩ	 ് 	0 and     .01   ststst EE   It is easy to see that lagged test scores 
are now endogenous in (A1), because     .011   ststst VarE   
Consider the “long” regression, analogous to (11), which includes current test 
scores as a control: 
(A5)   istststtistist SSXy    413  
where ߟ௜௦௧ is the compound statistical error that arises when (A1) is the DGP. 
Proposition:  
Under the identifying assumption     0,|,| 11   stististststiststst SXESXE  , the least 
squares estimate of ߙଷ in the long regression (A5) is unbiased.51  In words, our 
identifying assumption is that conditional on observables and current test scores, 
unobserved time-varying school-specific factors that influenced previous cohorts’ 
achievement are only correlated with current-year unmeasured heterogeneity in 
separations via their persistent effect on achievement.  
Proof: Substituting (A3) into (A1), we can write the DGP as: 
(A6)   iststststtistist SXy   13 . 
                          
51 For equation (11), where the model also includes longer lags of test scores, a more complete 
statement of our identifying assumption is E st  jst | X ist ,Sst  E st  j ist | X ist ,Sst  0  
for each included lag of test scores Sst  j  X ist  j  st  j . 
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The least squares estimate of α3 from the long regression (A5) satisfies: 
 
       stististststiststststiststst SXSEVSXSEVSXSEVE ,|,|,|ˆ 11111133   
 
where  stistst SXSVarV ,|1 .   stiststst SXSE ,|1  is the covariance between 
ܵ௦௧ିଵ and residuals from the regression of ߯௦௧ on ௜ܺ௦௧ and ܵ௦௧.  These residuals are zero 
from the definition of ߯௦௧ in (A2), and hence   0,|1  stiststst SXSE   also.  Similarly, 
       0,|,|,| 1111   stiststststistststiststiststst SXESXXESXSE   
where the second equality follows from exogeneity of 1istX , and the final 
equality is our identifying assumption.  An identical argument gives, 
       0,|,|,| 1111   stististststististstiststististst SXESXXESXSE   
and hence   .ˆ 33  E  
The intuition underlying this result is straightforward.  Since ௜ܺ௦௧ିଵ is exogenous, 
only the “shock” component of lagged test scores, 1st , is potentially endogenous.  
Equation (A2) implies that ܵ௦௧  is a valid control function for ߯௦௧.  Thus the only potential 
source of endogeneity in the long regression is conditional covariation between 1st  and 
unobserved heterogeneity that is orthogonal to current test scores, i.e., st  and the 
component of ist that is orthogonal to ܵ௦௧.   Our identifying assumption rules this out. 
Our identifying assumption would be violated under the following conditions.  
First, E  st1st | Xist, Sst   0 if there are time-varying unobserved school-specific factors 
(including school-level policy and teacher quality) that are correlated with lagged test 
scores and current separations, but uncorrelated with current test scores (and ௜ܺ௦௧).  
Similarly, E  st1ist | Xist, Sst   0  if there are unobserved student characteristics that are 
correlated with lagged test scores and current separations, but uncorrelated with current 
test scores (and ௜ܺ௦௧).  It is difficult to construct realistic examples where these conditions 
 96 
would arise.  We nevertheless implement several falsification tests (see the Results 
section and Appendix B) to assess the validity of our identifying assumption, and find no 
systematic evidence to the contrary. 
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2.10.2. Appendix B: Additional Tables 
Table 2.A1. Sample Means of Control Variables 
 (1) (2) 
 
Sample Mean or 
Proportion 
Sample Standard 
Deviation 
Individual Characteristics   
Male 0.506 0.500 
Aboriginal 0.047 0.211 
Non-English Home Language 0.324 0.468 
Disabled 0.036 0.187 
Gifted 0.017 0.128 
Enrolled in ESL Program 0.307 0.461 
Changed Schools Prior to Grade 4  0.348 0.476 
Own FSA Reading Score 0.050 0.964 
Own FSA Numeracy Score 0.062 0.983 
School Characteristics   
Proportion Excused from FSA Reading  0.084 0.069 
Proportion Excused from FSA Numeracy  0.086 0.070 
Proportion Male 0.514 0.074 
Proportion Aboriginal 0.038 0.048 
Proportion Non-English Home Language 0.323 0.266 
Proportion Disabled 0.060 0.045 
Proportion Enrolled in ESL Program 0.250 0.245 
Proportion Enrolled in French Immersion 0.062 0.168 
Cost of Changing Schools   
Enrolled in French Immersion 0.068 0.251 
Number of Public Schools Nearby 2.60 1.42 
Number of Private Schools Nearby 8.64 6.05 
Travel Distance to School (km) 1.19 2.20 
Census Characteristics   
Mean Household Income / $1000 64.9 25.5 
Proportion Visible Minority 0.329 0.257 
Proportion One-Parent Families 0.146 0.088 
Proportion of those Aged 25+ Unemployed 0.065 0.052 
Average Value of Dwelling / $1000 292 133 
Proportion Dwellings Owned 0.717 0.211 
Proportion Moved Last Year 0.159 0.090 
Proportion Moved in Last 5 Years 0.484 0.160 
Proportion Less than Grade 9 Education 0.072 0.065 
Proportion Some High School 0.185 0.082 
Proportion with High School Diploma 0.131 0.051 
Proportion with BA or higher 0.175 0.117 
Proportion Immigrant 0.337 0.168 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment database and auxiliary data. 
Notes: “Nearby” is defined as a circle with radius equal to the 75th percentile of travel distance to school. 
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Table 2.A2. Distribution of School Achievement Measures 
   Correlation 
   School-Average FSA Score  Fraser Institute Score 
 Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
1999 / 
2000 
2000 / 
2001 
2001 / 
2002 
2002 / 
2003  
3 Year 
Avg. 
2001 / 
2002 
2002 / 
2003 
 
Public Schools           
1999/2000 FSA 0 1 1        
2000/2001 FSA 0 1 0.708 1       
2001/2002 FSA 0 1 0.637 0.672 1      
2002/2003 FSA 0 1 0.563 0.619 0.665 1     
3 Year Avg. FI 0 1 0.790 0.808 0.784 0.669  1   
2001/2002 FI 0 1 0.616 0.639 0.813 0.619  0.886 1  
2002/2003 FI 0 1 0.667 0.632 0.661 0.801  0.782 0.713 1 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment database and auxiliary data. 
Notes: “FSA” refers to the school-average of FSA reading and numeracy scores. “FI Score” refers to the 
Fraser Institute school score. All scores are normalized to have mean zero and variance one over schools in 
each year. 
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Table 2.A3. Complete Coefficient Estimates, Difference-in-Differences Estimator 
 (1) Full Sample (2) English (3) Non-English 
Lagged Score  -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Lagged Score*(Yr=2000) -0.007 -0.010** 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
Yr = 2000 -0.047* -0.073** 0.033 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.050) 
Proportion Disabled 0.015 0.059 -0.093 
 (0.060) (0.079) (0.102) 
Proportion Non-English Home Language 0.017 0.062 -0.107 
 (0.045) (0.061) (0.070) 
Proportion Aboriginal -0.133 -0.077 -0.330** 
 (0.087) (0.106) (0.130) 
Proportion Enrolled in ESL Program -0.002 0.042 -0.027 
 (0.056) (0.076) (0.077) 
Proportion Male -0.046 -0.127*** 0.165*** 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.062) 
Proportion Enrolled in French Immersion -0.165** -0.122 -0.356** 
 (0.072) (0.080) (0.154) 
Proportion Disabled*(Yr≥2000) -0.029 0.097 -0.291*** 
 (0.079) (0.108) (0.110) 
Proportion Non-English*(Yr≥2000) 0.071** 0.092** 0.028 
 (0.034) (0.043) (0.061) 
Proportion Aboriginal*(Yr≥2000) 0.022 0.016 0.088 
 (0.073) (0.084) (0.126) 
Proportion Enrolled in ESL Program*(Yr≥2000) -0.052 -0.057 -0.025 
 (0.037) (0.053) (0.058) 
Proportion Male*(Yr≥2000) 0.060 0.096* -0.047 
 (0.045) (0.053) (0.090) 
Proportion French Immersion*(Yr≥2000) 0.027* 0.026 0.076** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.036) 
Proportion Excused from FSA      -0.040 -0.113** 0.005 
 (0.037) (0.053) (0.046) 
Non-English Home Language 0.011 0.000 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Aboriginal 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.055 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.049) 
Enrolled in ESL Program -0.019** -0.041*** -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) 
Male -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Disabled 0.025** 0.021* 0.032 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.022) 
Gifted 0.000 0.004 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.023) 
Changed Schools Prior to Grade 4 0.064*** 0.072*** 0.041*** 
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 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Own FSA Reading Score -0.005* -0.006* -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Own FSA Numeracy Score -0.006** -0.007** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Mean Household Income / $1000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
SE of Mean Household Income / $1000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Proportion Visible Minority 0.001 0.006 0.011 
 (0.030) (0.038) (0.052) 
Proportion One-Parent Families 0.014 -0.017 0.071 
 (0.034) (0.042) (0.059) 
Proportion of those Aged 25+ Unemployed 0.015 0.042 0.001 
 (0.054) (0.069) (0.087) 
Average Value of Dwelling / $1000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Proportion of Dwellings Owned -0.016 -0.031 0.012 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.031) 
Proportion Moved Last Year 0.047 0.054 0.008 
 (0.030) (0.040) (0.052) 
Proportion Moved in Last 5 Years 0.001 0.018 -0.032 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.044) 
Proportion Less than Grade 9 Education 0.048 0.062 -0.029 
 (0.069) (0.093) (0.109) 
Proportion Some High School 0.013 0.028 -0.066 
 (0.044) (0.057) (0.079) 
Proportion with High School Diploma -0.010 0.030 -0.135 
 (0.051) (0.062) (0.093) 
Proportion with Bachelor’s or Higher 0.172*** 0.199*** 0.142 
 (0.046) (0.056) (0.088) 
Proportion Immigrant -0.009 -0.027 -0.002 
 (0.041) (0.049) (0.082) 
Travel Distance to School (km) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Enrolled in French Immersion -0.019* -0.016 -0.033 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.035) 
Number of Public Schools Nearby -0.002 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Number of Private Schools Nearby 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.078** 0.084* 0.138* 
 (0.037) (0.044) (0.078) 
Notes: This table reports all coefficient estimates for the specifications reported in columns 1-3 of Table 2.4. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. ***indicates statistically 
significant at the 1% level, **indicates significant at the 5% level, *indicates significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.A4. Complete Coefficient Estimates, Control Function Estimator 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Full Sample English Non-English 
1999 FSA Score*(Yr=2000) -0.009** -0.013*** 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
2000 FSA Score*(Yr=2001) -0.011* -0.011 -0.015 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 
1999-2001 FI Score*(Yr=2002) -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.046*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) 
2002 FI Score*(Yr=2003) 0.001 0.006 -0.011 
             (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
1999 FSA Score*(Yr>2000) -0.001 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
2000 FSA Score*(Yr>2001) 0.009 0.006 0.016* 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
1999-2001 FI Score*(Yr>2002) -0.027*** -0.024** -0.032** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) 
Current FSA Score -0.005 -0.002 -0.011* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Current FSA Score*(Yr>2001) 0.009* 0.003 0.020** 
             (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Proportion Male -0.047 -0.083** 0.048 
             (0.030) (0.035) (0.051) 
Proportion Disabled 0.044 0.113 -0.079 
             (0.064) (0.069) (0.098) 
Proportion Non-English Home Language -0.039 0.026 -0.122** 
             (0.041) (0.047) (0.056) 
Proportion Aboriginal -0.100 -0.067 -0.172 
             (0.070) (0.088) (0.109) 
Proportion Enrolled in ESL Program 0.016 0.030 0.016 
             (0.043) (0.053) (0.053) 
Proportion Enrolled in French Immersion 0.014 0.009 0.066 
             (0.040) (0.042) (0.107) 
Proportion Disabled*(Yr ≥2000) 0.048 -0.001 0.110 
             (0.079) (0.097) (0.111) 
Proportion Non-English*(Yr≥2000) 0.038 -0.037 0.125** 
             (0.038) (0.047) (0.053) 
Proportion Aboriginal*(Yr≥2000) 0.022 -0.026 0.071 
             (0.086) (0.106) (0.125) 
Proportion Enrolled in ESL Program*(Yr≥2000) -0.044 0.017 -0.113** 
             (0.040) (0.049) (0.054) 
Proportion Male*(Yr≥2000) 0.061 0.106** -0.037 
             (0.042) (0.050) (0.075) 
Proportion French Immersion*(Yr≥2000) 0.017 0.025 -0.015 
             (0.019) (0.022) (0.037) 
Proportion Disabled*(Yr≥2002) -0.043 0.051 -0.199 
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             (0.099) (0.125) (0.131) 
Proportion Non-English*(Yr≥2002) 0.050 0.120** -0.034 
             (0.046) (0.058) (0.057) 
Proportion Aboriginal*(Yr≥2002) 0.184 0.188 0.346** 
             (0.134) (0.160) (0.165) 
Proportion Enrolled in ESL Program*(Yr≥2002) -0.060 -0.115** -0.002 
             (0.044) (0.058) (0.055) 
Proportion Male*(Yr≥2002) -0.059 -0.023 -0.141 
             (0.074) (0.091) (0.099) 
Proportion French Immersion*(Yr≥2002) -0.047*** -0.034* -0.095** 
             (0.017) (0.018) (0.044) 
Prop. Excused from 1999 Reading FSA*(Yr=2000) 0.052 0.078 -0.038 
             (0.246) (0.217) (0.570) 
Prop. Excused from 2000 Reading FSA*(Yr=2001) 0.003 -0.015 0.186 
             (0.208) (0.255) (0.326) 
Prop. Excused from 2001 Reading FSA*(Yr=2002) -0.234* -0.266** -0.162 
             (0.127) (0.132) (0.223) 
Prop. Excused from 2002 Reading FSA*(Yr=2003) -0.020 0.026 -0.137 
             (0.081) (0.100) (0.141) 
Prop. Excused from 1999 Numeracy FSA*(Yr=2000) -0.049 -0.062 -0.002 
             (0.275) (0.235) (0.613) 
Prop. Excused from 2000 Numeracy FSA*(Yr=2001) -0.036 -0.002 -0.228 
             (0.201) (0.248) (0.318) 
Prop. Excused from 2001 Numeracy FSA*(Yr=2002) 0.156 0.210* 0.048 
             (0.112) (0.123) (0.189) 
Prop. Excused from 2002 Numeracy FSA*(Yr=2003) -0.084 -0.200 0.064 
             (0.107) (0.123) (0.157) 
Prop. Excused from 1999 Reading FSA*(Yr>2000) 0.054 0.132 -0.269 
             (0.202) (0.172) (0.478) 
Prop. Excused from 2000 Reading FSA*(Yr>2001) -0.003 -0.224 0.473* 
             (0.181) (0.220) (0.268) 
Prop. Excused from 2001 Reading FSA*(Yr>2002) -0.141 0.009 -0.333* 
             (0.119) (0.142) (0.174) 
Prop. Excused from 1999 Numeracy FSA*(Yr>2000) 0.107 0.055 0.388 
             (0.231) (0.190) (0.526) 
Prop. Excused from 2000 Numeracy FSA*(Yr>2001) -0.059 0.143 -0.490* 
             (0.175) (0.213) (0.265) 
Prop. Excused from 2001 Numeracy FSA*(Yr>2002) 0.164* 0.054 0.347** 
             (0.094) (0.108) (0.150) 
Year=2000   -0.009 -0.011 -0.001 
             (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) 
Year=2001  -0.037 -0.052* -0.004 
             (0.024) (0.029) (0.041) 
Year=2002  -0.022 -0.039 0.020 
             (0.026) (0.031) (0.042) 
Year=2003 0.008 -0.037 0.112* 
             (0.040) (0.046) (0.058) 
Non-English Home Language 0.009* 0.000 0.000 
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             (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Aboriginal 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.077** 
             (0.007) (0.008) (0.037) 
Enrolled in ESL Program -0.013** -0.034*** 0.005 
             (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) 
Male -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
             (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Disabled 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.010 
             (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) 
Gifted 0.005 0.008 -0.002 
             (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) 
Changed Schools Prior to Grade 4 0.060*** 0.066*** 0.046*** 
             (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Own FSA Reading Score -0.004** -0.005** -0.002 
             (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Own FSA Numeracy Score -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.003 
             (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Mean Household Income / $1000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 
             (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SE of Mean Household Income / $1000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
             (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Proportion Visible Minority 0.032* 0.034 0.036 
             (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) 
Proportion One-Parent Families 0.002 0.009 -0.015 
             (0.018) (0.021) (0.032) 
Proportion of those Aged 25+ Unemployed -0.000 -0.026 0.051 
             (0.032) (0.039) (0.051) 
Average Value of Dwelling 0.000 0.000 0.000 
             (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Proportion of Dwellings Owned -0.013 -0.010 -0.021 
             (0.010) (0.013) (0.018) 
Proportion Moved Last Year 0.039** 0.033 0.037 
             (0.020) (0.025) (0.033) 
Proportion Moved in Last 5 Years -0.005 0.002 -0.017 
             (0.012) (0.013) (0.023) 
Proportion Less than Grade 9 Education 0.013 0.038 -0.013 
             (0.036) (0.046) (0.056) 
Proportion Some High School 0.044* 0.048 0.005 
             (0.026) (0.031) (0.043) 
Proportion with High School Diploma 0.010 0.023 -0.028 
             (0.027) (0.032) (0.051) 
Proportion with Bachelor’s or Higher 0.062*** 0.059** 0.068 
             (0.023) (0.027) (0.041) 
Proportion Immigrant -0.025 -0.029 -0.029 
             (0.022) (0.027) (0.039) 
Travel Distance to School (km) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003** 
             (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Enrolled in French Immersion -0.014 -0.006 -0.038** 
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             (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) 
Number of Public Schools Nearby -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
             (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Number of Private Schools Nearby -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
             (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.088*** 0.070** 0.130** 
             (0.025) (0.028) (0.054) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment database and auxiliary data. 
Notes: This table reports all coefficient estimates for the specifications reported in Table 2.5 in the main text. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. ***indicates statistically 
significant at the 1% level, **indicates significant at the 5% level, *indicates significant at the 10% level. 
 105 
Table 2.A5. Robustness Checks for Control Function Estimator 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
English only Fraser Institute Rankings 
  
All Without Aboriginals 
Without 
Fr.Imm. English 
Non-
English 
1999 FSA Score*(Yr=2000) -0.013*** -0.011** -0.014*** -0.013** 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
2000 FSA Score*(Yr =2001) -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.015 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) 
1999-2001 Mean FI Score*(Yr =2002) -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.027***   
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)   
2002 FI Score*(Yr=2003) 0.006 0.008 0.007   
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)   
1999-2001 Mean FI Ranking*(Yr 
=2002)    0.027** 0.048*** 
    (0.012) (0.015) 
2002 FI Ranking*(Yr =2003)    -0.005 0.010 
    (0.007) (0.008) 
1999 FSA Score*(Yr >2000) -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
2000 FSA Score*(Yr >2001) 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.018* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
1999-2001 Mean FI Score*(Yr>2002) -0.024** -0.026** -0.022*   
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)   
1999-2001 Mean FI Rank*(Yr >2002)    0.018* 0.033** 
    (0.010) (0.015) 
Current Mean FSA Score -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.011* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Current Mean FSA Score*(Yr>2001) 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.020** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Number of Observations 44077 41149 40182 44077 21103 
Number of Schools  361 361 357 361 360 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment database and auxiliary data. 
Notes: Column (1) reproduces estimates from column (2) of Table 2.5 in the main text. Column (2) 
excludes Aboriginal students and column (3) excludes French Immersion students. Columns (4) and (5) 
replace the school’s Fraser Institute score with the school’s rank based on the Fraser Institute score. “FSA 
Score” refers to the school-average of FSA reading and numeracy scores. “FI Score” is the Fraser Institute 
school score, and “FI Rank” is the school’s published Fraser Institute ranking based on FI Scores.  Note that 
larger values of FSA Score and FI Score indicate better performance, whereas larger values of FI Rank 
indicate worse performance.  See notes to Table 2.5 in the main text for additional control variables. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. *** indicates statistically significant at 
the 1% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.A6. Falsification Test 1 for Control Function Estimator 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Full Sample English Non-English 
False “News” Measures 2000 FSA Score*(Yr=2000) -0.005 -0.010* 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
2001 FSA Score*(Yr=2001) -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
2002 FSA Score*(Yr=2002) -0.011 -0.012 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) 
2003 FSA Score*(Yr=2003) -0.012 -0.015* -0.001 
             (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) 
False “Old News” Measures 2000 FSA Score*(Yr>2000) -0.001 -0.004 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
2001 FSA Score*(Yr>2001) -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
2002 FSA Score*(Yr>2002) 0.005 0.009 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Current Mean FSA Score 0.007 0.010* 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Number of Observations 65180 44077 21103 
Number of Schools 361 361 360 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment database and auxiliary data. 
Notes: These estimates replicate the specifications reported in Table 2.5, except that all genuine “news” 
measures (based on lagged test scores that parents could observe) have been replaced with false “news” 
measures based on contemporaneous test scores (which parents could not observe until the following 
school year). All genuine “old news” measures have also been replaced with corresponding false measures. 
The interaction between the current mean FSA score and Year>2001 was dropped because of collinearity 
with the false news measures. Given the high degree of inter-temporal correlation between school-average 
test scores (see Table 2.A2 in this Appendix), it is not surprising that some estimates in column (2) are 
weakly statistically significant. On the whole, however, there is little evidence of a systematic relationship 
between false “news” and separations; and the overall pattern of results differs substantially from those 
reported in Table 2.5. See notes to Table 2.5 for details of specification. Complete coefficient estimates for 
these specifications are available from the authors on request. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered at the school-by-year level. ***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, **indicates 
significant at the 5% level, *indicates significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 2.A7. Falsification Test 2 for Control Function Estimator 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Full Sample English Non-English 
False “News” Measures 2001 FSA Score*(Yr=2000) -0.007 -0.010* 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
2002 FSA Score*(Yr=2001) -0.004 -0.007 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
2003 FSA Score*(Yr=2002) -0.010* -0.014** -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
False “Old News” Measures 2001 FSA Score*(Yr>2000) -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
2002 FSA Score*(Yr>2001) 0.002 -0.001 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Current Mean FSA Score 0.003 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Number of Observations 52381 35900 16481 
Number of Schools 361 361 360 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on B.C. Ministry of Education enrollment database and auxiliary data. 
Notes: These estimates replicate the specifications reported in Table 2.5, except that all genuine “news” 
measures (based on lagged test scores that parents could observe) have been replaced with false “news” 
measures based on future test scores (which parents could not observe). All genuine “old news” measures 
have also been replaced with corresponding false measures. The interaction between the current mean 
FSA score and Year>2001 was dropped because of collinearity with the false news measures. Because of 
the structure of false news measures, and because we have no 2004 FSA scores, this specification was 
estimated for 1999/2000-2002/2003 only. Given the high degree of inter-temporal correlation between 
school-average test scores (see Table 2.A2 in this Appendix), it is not surprising that some reported 
estimates are statistically significant. On the whole, however, there is little evidence of a systematic 
relationship between false “news” and separations; and the overall pattern of results differs substantially 
from those reported in Table 2.5. See notes to Table 2.5 for details of specification. Complete coefficient 
estimates for these specifications are available from the authors on request. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at the school-by-year level. ***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, 
**indicates significant at the 5% level, *indicates significant at the 10% level.  
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2.10.3. Appendix C: Data Appendix 
2.10.3.1. Control Variables 
Controls for individual characteristics include an indicator of whether the student 
separated from their school in an earlier school year, and indicators for gender, 
Aboriginal identity, language spoken at home (any language besides English), disability, 
giftedness, ESL status, and the student’s own FSA exam score.  We also control for a 
set of socioeconomic characteristics of the Census Enumeration or Dissemination Area 
(EA or DA, respectively) in which the student resides as proxies for unobserved student 
background characteristics.  Specifically, we control for the proportion of household 
heads in the EA/DA who immigrated to Canada in the previous five years; whose 
education level was less than grade 9, without a high school diploma, with a high school 
diploma, and with a bachelor’s degree or higher (the omitted category is those with more 
than high school but less than a bachelor’s degree); who are visible minority; who are 
single parents; who moved into the EA or DA in the last year or in the last five years; and 
the unemployment rate among those over age 25, the average dwelling value, average 
household income, and the fraction who own their dwelling. Details of the construction of 
these variables are provided below. 
Controls for school characteristics include the proportion of grade 4 students who 
are Aboriginal, speak a language other than English at home, are male, are disabled, 
are in an ESL program, were excused from the reading or numeracy test, or are enrolled 
in French Immersion.  Finally, we include several proxies for students’ cost of changing 
schools: their travel distance to school, the number of public and private schools within 
the 75th percentile of the distribution of student travel distance to school, and an indicator 
for attending a French Immersion program (because this program is offered in a limited 
set of schools).  French Immersion programs, which are the most popular form of 
magnet programs in the Lower Mainland, provide French-only instruction to non-
francophone students. 
2.10.3.2. Coding of Neighborhood Characteristics 
Neighborhood characteristics are based on public-use aggregates of the Census 
of Population “long form,” administered by Statistics Canada to one in five households in 
1996 and 2001.  The lowest level of geography for which Statistics Canada produced 
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aggregate statistics based on the 1996 Census is an Enumeration Area (EA).  Statistics 
based on the 2001 Census were produced at the Dissemination Area (DA) level.  EAs 
are geographic areas designated for the collection of Census data.  Prior to the 2001 
Census, EAs were used for both Census data collection and dissemination.  In the 2001 
Census, they were replaced by DAs for dissemination purposes.  In the 1996 Census, 
EAs were composed of one or more neighboring blocks containing between 125 and 
440 dwellings (in rural and urban areas, respectively). In the 2001 Census, DAs were 
composed of one or more neighboring blocks with a population of 400 to 700 persons. 
These definitions are sufficiently similar for our purposes.  
EA/DA-level Census characteristics were integrated with our enrollment data via 
students’ residential postal code in each year.  The integrated EA/DA characteristics are 
based on the most recently administered Census for each year of our sample.  We link 
postal codes and EAs/DAs using Statistics Canada’s Postal Code Conversion File 
(PCCF).  The PCCF contains a complete longitudinal correspondence between postal 
codes and EAs/DAs (postal codes are occasionally retired and subsequently recycled). 
Postal codes are smaller than EAs/DAs and usually lie entirely within an EA/DA. In 
cases where postal code boundaries span multiple EAs/DAs, we use the PCCF’s Single 
Link Indicator (which identifies the best link to an EA/DA) to link to a unique EA/DA. 
In a small number of cases, we were unable to assign EA/DA-level 
characteristics to residential postal codes.  This arose when residential postal codes did 
not appear in the PCCF (most likely due to mis-reported postal codes), or when EA/DA-
level characteristics were suppressed by Statistics Canada for confidentiality reasons. 
Overall, these cases comprised about 1 percent of grade 4 students in the enrollment 
database.  
2.10.3.3. Coding of Distance and School Density Measures 
Our measures of the distance between students’ residence and the school they 
attended are based on reported postal codes.  We obtained postal codes for all schools 
attended by grade 4 students who met our other sample restrictions from public sources 
(most notably, school and district websites).  We used the PCCF to assign a latitude and 
longitude to each postal code in each year, and calculated the great circle distance (in 
km) between the student’s residence and schools.  For each residential postal code in 
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each year, we then calculated the number of active public and private schools within a 
circle centered on the residential postal code and with radius equal to the 75th percentile 
of in-sample travel distance to public and private schools, respectively. 
2.10.3.4. Coding of Other Key Variables  
In all regressions, the reference category for home language is students who 
always report speaking English at home.  Students are coded as speaking a non-English 
language at home if they report speaking a language other than English at home in any 
year between kindergarten and grade 5.  Similarly, students are coded as Aboriginal, 
disabled, or gifted if they ever report that status.  Students are coded as ESL if they are 
designated as such in the current school year.  Annual school-by-grade averages of 
these variables were computed by aggregating the student-level data.  
2.10.3.5. Missing Data and Other Sample Restrictions 
As reported in the main text, we restrict our analysis sample to students who 
entered kindergarten at a Lower Mainland school between 1995/1996 and 1999/2000, 
subsequently made regular progress through grade 5 at Lower Mainland schools, and 
were enrolled in grade 4 at a public school between 1999/2000 and 2003/2004. By 
regular progress, we mean students advanced through each grade level with their entry 
cohort, and were observed attending a school in BC in each year from kindergarten 
through grade 5.  We excluded 6,681 observations where a student did not progress 
through the grades along with her cohort, and we excluded 64 observations where the 
measured distance between the student’s residence and the school they attended 
exceeded 50km (since it is likely that this distance indicates measurement error in the 
postal code).  Our sample comprises 106,344 Grade 4 students after applying these 
sample restrictions.  Of these, 41,164 additional observations were excluded because of 
missing data.  The most commonly missing data items, including those described 
elsewhere in this Appendix, were: 
• the Fraser Institute school score/ranking, because the Fraser Institute only 
generated scores for schools with at least 15 students enrolled in both grade 4 
and grade 7, and because two public school districts (Coquitlam and 
Chilliwack) were excluded from the 2003 report card (the three-year average 
Fraser Institute score is missing for 22,277 observations, the Fraser Institute 
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score based on the 2001/2002 exam is missing for 19,529 observations, and 
the score based on the 2002/2003 exam is missing for 4,313 observations); 
• neighborhood characteristics, as described above (876 observations); and 
• students’ own FSA exam result (6,849 observations were missing either a 
reading or numeracy score). 
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3. Noise or News? 
Learning About the Content of Test-Based 
School Achievement Measures 
3.1. Introduction 
Proponents of school choice argue that the structure of the public educational 
system – where education is mainly provided by government with substantial monopoly 
power and largely no competition – leaves educational consumers with limited choice 
among schools.  They further suggest that this may result in a disconnect between 
school quality and parents’ preferences.  There is a growing literature in economics that 
suggests that expanding school choice could improve educational outcomes by 
increasing disadvantaged children’s access to high quality schools, and by causing 
underperforming schools to become more effective or to shrink as families “vote with 
their feet” (Friedman 1955; Becker 1995; Hoxby 2003; Belfield and Levin 2003). 1 These 
ideas have gained strong currency in education policy circles, leading to policy 
innovations such as open enrollment systems, magnet and charter schools, private 
school vouchers, and expanded public school choice for students in poorly performing 
schools.  
One suggested approach to make these policies more effective is to increase 
parents’ access to information about school quality and performance.  A growing body of 
evidence suggests that information about school-level achievement affects behavior in 
ways that may have real consequences for educational outcomes (Hastings et al. 2007; 
Hastings and Weinstein 2008).  For example, Friesen, Javdani, Smith and Woodcock 
(2012) find that the public release of information about school-level achievement had a 
substantial effect on the inter-school mobility of Grade 4 public school students.  
                          
1 However, it should be also mentioned that there are some concerns regarding these kinds of 
policies.  For instance, some people argue that issues of equity will be passed over in the 
push for school choice, causing at-risk students to fall further behind. 
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However it remains an open question whether measures of school-level achievement 
actually provide parents with meaningful information about school quality, or whether 
they are too imprecise to do so. 
A growing body of literature (Kane and Staiger 2002; Mizala, Romaguera and 
Urquiola 2007), suggests that there are two sources of transitory variation in school 
average test scores.  The first is sampling variation which is purely a statistical 
phenomenon.  It is the variation in a school’s test score arising from random year-to-year 
variation in the composition of its student body.  In this context, we can think of different 
cohorts of students entering a school over time as random draws from a local population 
feeding that school.  The magnitude of sampling variation depends on school size: it is 
decreasing in the number of students who write the test.  The second source of 
transitory variation is idiosyncratic factors that generate non-persistent differences in 
schools’ mean test scores; for example a school-wide illness at the time of the exam, 
existence of a few disruptive students in a class, special chemistry between a teacher 
and a cohort of students, inclement weather, etc.  Throughout the paper, I refer to this 
second source of transitory variance as “other transitory factors” to distinguish it from 
sampling variation. 
It is well-understood that mobility decisions are costly.  Cullen et al. (2000) find 
little evidence that students systematically achieve higher school quality (measured by 
value-added of schools to student outcomes) by choosing a non-neighborhood school.  
Hanushek et al. (1999) find that family-initiated moves with district changes, which are 
largely the consequence of parents changing district in pursuit of a higher quality school, 
reduce achievement growth.  They also find that mobility generates negative 
externalities for students who attend schools with high turnover rates.  Together, these 
results suggest that basing school choice decisions on highly transitory information 
about school-average achievement might make many students worse off. 
A related literature shows that information about school-average achievement 
affects real estate prices (Figlio and Lucas 2004; Fiva and Kirkebøen 2008;  and others).  
Again, if test-based measures of school-average achievement are highly transitory, then 
making costly location decisions to obtain access to (currently) high-achieving schools 
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could generate a lot of costly churning in the real estate market, making families worse 
off.  
I investigate the content of published information about schools’ average test 
scores to determine whether they provide parents with meaningful information about 
persistent or permanent inter-school differences in achievement and school quality.  I 
extend the work of Kane and Staiger (2002) with a more rigorous statistical model that 
shows how one can separately measure the effect of sampling variation and other 
transitory factors on the cross-sectional variance of school mean test scores.  I find that 
sampling variation and one-time mean reverting shocks are a significant source of 
observed variation in schools’ average test scores.  
3.2. Previous Literature 
Not much is known about the statistical properties of school-level measures of 
test-based achievement.  Kane and Staiger (2001) find that test-based elementary 
school rankings in North Carolina resemble a lottery, and argue that small within-school 
sample size is the main cause.  They decompose the variance of school-level test 
scores and find that gain scores tend to have less signal variation and more variation 
due to non-persistent factors than test score levels.  Therefore, they caution against the 
use of gain scores in evaluating schools’ or teachers’ performance.  They also find little 
evidence that schools with significant improvement in their test scores over time 
improved on any measures of student engagement.  In their 2002 study, Kane and 
Staiger estimate that 14 to 15 percent of the variation in 4th grade math and reading test 
scores for an average school in their sample is due to sampling variation.  They also find 
that 50 to 80 percent of the variance in the change in 4th grade mean test scores is due 
to nonpersistent factors.  
Mizala, Romaguera and Urquiola (2007) find evidence that test-based rankings 
mostly reflect socioeconomic status.  They also argue that the more correlated are test-
based achievement and socioeconomic status, the lower is the year-to-year volatility in 
rankings based on test-based achievement.  Finally, using evidence from Chile’s P-900 
program, Chay, McEwan and Urquiola (2005) show that noise and mean-reverting 
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shocks in schools’ test scores complicate evaluation of policies to improve schools’ 
quality.  They find that for a median-sized school, 33 percent and 21 percent of the 
variance in language and math scores, respectively, are due to transitory factors.  They 
argue that such noise in mean test scores might limit the ability to identify “good” schools 
from “bad” schools.  
3.3. Institutional Background and Data 
3.3.1. Testing and Information 
Since the 1999/2000 school year, all public and provincially-funded private 
schools in the province of British Columbia (B.C.) have been required to administer 
standardized Foundation Skills Assessment (FSA) exams to students in Grades 4 and 7 
in May of each year.  Students are examined in Reading Comprehension, Writing, and 
Numeracy.  The FSA exams do not contribute to students’ academic records and play 
no role in grade completion, and there are no financial incentives for teachers or schools 
related to student performance.   
The Ministry of Education first provided individual and provincial-, district-, and 
school-level FSA exam results to schools in fall 2000, and instructed them to share the 
information with parents upon request (B.C. Ministry of Education 2000).  The results of 
the 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 FSA exams were first posted on the Ministry’s website in 
October 2001 (B.C. Ministry of Education 2001), and each subsequent set of FSA 
results has been posted the following fall.  Beginning in 2003, schools were required to 
share individual students’ exam results with parents before September 30th of each 
school year.   
The Fraser Institute, an independent research and advocacy organization (Fraser 
Institute 2008), began issuing annual “report cards” on B.C.’s elementary schools in 
June 2003 (Cowley and Easton 2003).  These include school scores constructed by the 
Fraser Institute from FSA exam results, and rankings based on these scores.  From the 
outset, the Fraser Institute’s school report cards have received widespread media 
coverage.   
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3.3.2. School Choice in B.C. 
In 2002, the government of British Columbia made school catchment boundaries 
permeable and gave B.C. parents and students the right to choose between schools.  
However, students in a local catchment area still have the first priority to enroll in their 
neighborhood school and cannot be displaced.  This legislation was a departure from the 
previous neighborhood school policy that offered uniform education service to all 
students.  Because students in the local catchment area still retain priority access to 
schools under the new policy, however, residential location choice remains an important 
component of school choice in British Columbia.   
3.3.3. Data 
The student-level data used in this study are derived from two administrative files 
maintained by the B.C. Ministry of Education: an enrollment database and an FSA exam 
database.  The two databases are linked by a unique student identifier.  Records in the 
enrollment database are based on an annual enrollment form collected on September 30 
of each year for all students in the public and private school system between 1999 and 
2006.  It includes personal characteristics including gender, aboriginal status, home 
language, English as a second language (ESL) status, special education status, and 
postal code.2  I use the postal code information to augment the raw data with selected 
characteristics of each student’s neighborhood as measured in 2001 and 2006 Canadian 
Census of Population at the Dissemination Area (DA) level.3  These proxy for parental 
income, education, and demographic information not measured in the administrative 
data. 
Records in the FSA exam database include the student’s grade 4 and grade 7 
reading and numeracy exam results in each year.  All students who were registered in 
grade 4 or grade 7 in a British Columbia public or private school between the 1999/2000 
and 2006/2007 school years are included in the database, whether or not they wrote the 
                          
2 A postal code is an area as small as one side of the street on a city block in urban locations. 
3 DA is the name given to a relatively stable area targeted to contain 400-700 people. 
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FSA exam.  Each student has two indicators: whether or not the student was excused 
from writing the test, and whether or not the student actually wrote the test.   
I exclude public and private schools with fewer than 5 students with valid reading 
and numeracy scores in any year between 1999 and 2006.  Individual test scores are 
normalized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one in each year.  Table 
3.1 provides summary statistics for some variables of interest.  There are 1067 grade 4 
schools and 798 grade 7 schools in my sample.  Among schools that offer grade 4 and 
meet my sample restriction, 87 percent are public and 13 percent are private.  For grade 
7, the numbers are 84 percent and 16 percent, respectively.  Average enrolment among 
schools offering grade 4 is 41, and 50 for grade 7.  The proportion of aboriginal students 
in my final sample is 8.5 percent in both grade 5 and grade 7.  The proportion of 
students who report a language other than English as their home language is 22.4 
percent in grade 7 and 21 percent in grade 4.  Other socioeconomic characteristics 
obtained from the census such as neighborhood-level average family income, incidence 
of low income and education seem to be very similar between grade 4 and grade 7 
students.   
3.4. Volatility in School Mean Test Scores 
I begin with a descriptive analysis of variability in school-average test scores.  
Then I decompose the variation in school-average test scores to two different 
components: the variation that is due to sampling variation and the variation that is due 
to other nonpersistent factors. 
Figures 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 portray the distribution of regression-adjusted average 
grade 4 and grade 7 reading and numeracy test scores by grade enrollment between 
 118 
1999 and 2006.4  It is immediately apparent that there is more variation in average test 
scores among small schools than big schools.  The most likely cause is sampling 
variation, since its magnitude is a decreasing function of school size.  We return to this 
hypothesis below.  Although one might argue to the contrary that higher variability in 
mean test scores among small schools is due to long-term differences between small 
and large schools or unobserved heterogeneity, figures 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 suggest 
otherwise.  Specifically, they show that small schools also experience more year-to-year 
fluctuation in their grade 4 and grade 7 average test scores compared to big schools, 
which rules out this hypothesis. 
Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 further illustrate transitory year-to-year variation in grade 4 
and grade 7 average test scores.  They are based on the idea that if mean test scores 
are strongly influenced by transitory factors, a ranking based on these scores will be 
similar to a ranking based on a pure lottery.  The upper panel of each table uses FSA 
reading scores and the lower panel uses FSA numeracy scores to compare school 
rankings under different scenarios. 
Column 1 illustrates the case where school-average test scores are completely 
stable over time.  Under this scenario, 20 percent of schools will always appear in the 
top 20 percent of the distribution of school-average test scores, and 80 percent of 
schools will never appear in the top 20 percent.5  In contrast, column 2 illustrates the 
case where schools are assigned to different percentiles based on a pure lottery: all 
schools have an independent 20 percent probability of appearing in the top 20 percent of 
the distribution of school-average test scores in each year.  Under this scenario, we 
expect nearly 17 percent of schools to never appear in the top 20 percent, only 0.1 
                          
4 School-average test scores are adjusted by regressing individual test scores on a series of 
observable socioeconomic status variables (indicators for: sex, aboriginal status, ESL status, 
whether the student is French Immersion, special need status, 3 categories of home 
language (Chinese, Punjabi, English), neighbourhood-level average family income, incidence 
of low income, proportion of total immigrants, proportion of parents without high school 
degree, with high school degree and with bachelor degree or higher) and fixed school effects. 
5 It is clear that total stability of schools’ performance will never happen under any useful school 
achievement measure, but it will allow me to lay out a framework with two extreme scenarios 
to explore the extent to which different test-based rankings resemble a lottery. 
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percent appear in the top 20 percent 6 times out of 8, and none to appear in the top 20 
percent in all 8 years.  
Column 3 ranks schools based on their actual school-average FSA scores.  The 
data lie somewhere between the two extremes of complete stability and a lottery.  
Looking at grade 4 results, 46 percent of schools never appear in the top 20 percent of 
average FSA reading scores and 2.2 percent appear in the top 20 percent for all 8 years, 
these numbers are 39 percent and 6 percent for grade 7, respectively.  The results are 
almost identical for numeracy scores.  However, one should bear in mind that the 
ranking based on simple levels does not account for differences in socioeconomic status 
of students across schools.  Controlling for students’ observable characteristics, columns 
4 results more closely resemble a lottery.6  Columns 5 and 6 also control for students’ 
observable characteristics, but restrict the sample to schools with enrolment less than 30 
and 20 students, respectively.  The results suggest that among smaller schools, the 
volatility in schools-average test scores is even more similar to a lottery.  The most likely 
cause is sampling variation, whose magnitude decreases with sample size.  
Finally, as column 8 illustrates, school gain scores (the change in school-average 
test score from one year to the next) are even more volatile than score levels, and 
consequently rankings based on gain scores are even more similar to a lottery.7  This is 
potentially due to the fact that gain scores are based on differences in test scores over 
two consecutive years, which magnifies the effect of nonpersistent factors on variation in 
schools’ test scores. 
3.4.1. Sampling Variation 
If we think of successive cohorts of students entering a school as random draws 
from a local population feeding that school, then school-average test scores will vary 
                          
6 Adjusted levels are the vector of school-specific intercepts (࢈) in the regression  
ࢅ࢏࢐ ൌ ࢈ ൅ ࢄ࢏࢐ᇱ ࢼ ൅ ࢁ࢏࢐ where ௜ܺ௝ is the vector of student characteristics explained in footnote 4. 
7  These results are in line with Kane and Staiger (2001) finding that gain scores exhibit more 
volatility due to transitory factors compared to average test scores (levels). 
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from year to year due to sampling variation.  There are two factors that determine the 
magnitude of sampling variation: the number of students who write the test in the school, 
and the variance of individual test scores in the local population.  Conditional on all other 
factors that could influence a school’s average test score over time, smaller schools will 
experience more volatility in their mean test scores due to sampling variation than bigger 
schools. 
I apply basic sampling theory to estimate the expected amount of variance in a 
school’s average test score due to sampling variation.  Consider a simple model of test 
score determination: 
(1)    ௜ܻ௝௧ ൌ ߣ௝ ൅	ߜ௝௧ ൅	ߠ௜ ൅ ௜ܷ௝௧ 
Here, 	y୧୨୲ denotes student ݅’s test score at school ݆ in year 	t , 	λ୨  is the school-
level permanent component of a student’s score, 	δ୨୲ is the school-level time-varying 
component (decomposed below into a persistent component and a transitory 
component), 	θ୧ is student-level permanent component (representing test-taking ability, 
socioeconomic characteristics, and other factors), and U୧୨୲ is a student-level transitory 
shock.  
Assumption 1: Transitory shocks are idiosyncratic:	U୧୨୲ ∼ iid	ሺ0, σ୳ଶሻ. 
Assumption 2: Different cohorts of students entering a school in a given year are 
analogous to random draws from a local population feeding that school, so that θ୧ ∼
iid	ሺμ஘, σ஘ଶሻ for a local population.  
Given equation (1), the average test score for a given school 	j  in year 	t  has the 
form: 
(2)   തܻ௝௧ ൌ ∑ ௒೔ೕ೟ேೕ೟୧є୨ ൌ ߣ௝ ൅ ߜ௝௧ ൅ ∑
ଵ
ேೕ೟୧є୨ ߠ௜௧ ൅ ∑
ଵ
ேೕ೟୧є୨ ௜ܷ௝௧. 
Where ௝ܰ௧ is enrolment level at school ݆ at time ݐ.  The cross-sectional variance 
in average test scores over all schools in a given year is: 
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(3)  ܸܽݎ൫ തܻ௝௧หݐ൯ ൌ ܸܽݎ൫ߣ௝൯ ൅ 	ܸܽݎ൫ߜ௝௧|ݐ൯ ൅ ܸܽݎ൫̅ߠ௜ሺ௧ሻ|ݐ൯ ൅ ܸܽݎ	ሺ ഥܷ௜௝௧|ݐሻ  
   ൌ σ஛ଶ ൅	σஔଶ ൅ ሾσ஘ଶ ൅ σ୙ଶ 	ሿE୨ ൬ ଵ୒ౠ౪൰.  
Defining ߝ௜௝௧ ൌ ߠ௜ ൅ ௜ܷ௝௧ , I can re-write equation (1) as: 
(4)    Y୧୨୲ ൌ λ୨ ൅	δ୨୲ ൅ 	ε୧୨୲ . 
An unbiased estimator of the within-school variance of individual test scores at a 
given school is: 
(5)										ܸܽݎ൫ݕపఫ௧|ଔ, ݐ൯෣ ൌ ௝ܵ௧ଶ ൌ ଵேೕ೟ିଵ∑ ൫ݕ௜௝௧ െ ݕത௝௧൯
ଶேೕ
௜ୀଵ ൌ 	 ଵேೕ೟ିଵ∑ ൫ߝ௜௝௧ െ ߝ௝̅௧൯
ଶ
୧є୨  
ൌ	ܵఌଶ 	ൌ 	ܵఏଶ ൅ ܵ௎ଶ. 
Therefore, the expected variance in school-average test scores due to sampling 
variation is: 
(6)   ܸܽݎ൫ݕതఫ௧|ଔ, ݐ൯෣ ൌ ௌೕ೟
మ
ேೕ೟ ൌ	 ൌ
ଵ
ேೕ೟ ሺܵఏ
ଶ ൅ ܵ௎ଶሻ, 
Averaging equation (6) over all schools gives the expected variance in mean test 
scores due to sampling variation for an average school: 
 
(7)   
∑ ௏௔௥෢ ൫௬തೕ೟|௝,௧൯಻ೕసభ
௃ ൌ 	 ሾܵఏଶ ൅ ܵ௎ଶ	ሿሾሺ∑ ሺ
ଵ
ேೕ೟ሻሻ/ܬሿ
௃
௝ୀଵ . 
Note this is an unbiased estimator of the last component in equation (3).The 
average within-school variance of FSA reading and numeracy scores is 0.88 and 0.83, 
respectively, for both grade 4 and grade 7.  Since the overall variance of individual FSA 
reading and numeracy scores is normalized to one, this implies that within the average 
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school, heterogeneity in students’ test scores is nearly as large as in the overall 
population.8  In other words, on average, the test scores of two students drawn randomly 
from a given school are likely to differ nearly as much as two students drawn from the 
population of B.C. students at large. 
The estimated expected variance in mean FSA reading and numeracy scores for 
an average school due to sampling variation, from equation (7), is 0.028 (reading) and 
0.025 (numeracy) for grade 4, and 0.026 (reading) and 0.024 (numeracy) for grade 7.9  If 
we focus on schools of average size by looking only at the two middle quartiles of 
enrolment by grade, the overall cross-sectional variance of school-average FSA reading 
and numeracy scores is 0.13 and 0.17, respectively, for grade 4; and 0.13 and 0.19, 
respectively, for grade 7.  It follows that for these average-sized schools, 21.5 and 14.7 
percent of the total variation in 4th grade mean FSA reading and numeracy scores, 
respectively, is due to sampling variation.  For grade 7, the figures are 20 and 12.6 
percent, respectively.  These estimates are similar in magnitude to those reported by 
Kane and Staiger (2002) for grade 4 students. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the importance of sampling variation, I 
calculate the 95 percent confidence interval for an average school’s mean test score 
using the estimated expected variance due to sampling variation: 
ܥܫଽହீ௥௔ௗ௘ସ_ோ௘௘ௗ௜௡௚ ൌ തܻோ௘ீସ േ 1.96ሺටܧ௝ ቂܸܽݎ൫ തܻఫ൯ሿ෣ ቁ ൌ ሾെ0.35	, 0.34ሿ  
ܥܫଽହீ௥௔ௗ௘଻_ோ௘௘ௗ௜௡௚ ൌ തܻோ௘ீ଻ േ 1.96ሺටܧ௝ ቂܸܽݎ൫ തܻఫ൯ሿ෣ ቁ ൌ ሾെ0.30	, 0.32ሿ  
Where Yഥୖୣ is the overall mean of school-average FSA reading scores.  The 
confidence interval extends from roughly the 17th to 84th percentile of the distribution of 
                          
8 Here we are averaging over all years between 1999 and 2006.  A similar result holds in each of 
those years. 
9 As it is also pointed out by Staiger and Kane (2002), with any peer effects, the effect of 
sampling variation will be amplified and these calculations will underestimate sampling 
variation. 
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school-average FSA reading scores for grade 4, and from the 19th to 80th percentile for 
grade 7.  This implies that for an average grade 4 school in our sample, we cannot rule 
out with 95 percent probability that its average score the following year is as large as the 
84th percentile, or as small as the 17th percentile, due to variability induced by sampling 
variation alone. 
A more conservative measure is based on the 50 percent confidence interval for 
an average school’s mean test score given sampling variation, which measures the 
degree of variability induced by sampling variation with the probability of a coin toss.  
This confidence interval extends from the 36th to 63rd percentile of the distribution of 
school-average reading scores for both grade 4 and grade 7.  This remains a very wide 
interval. 
3.4.2. Other Transitory Factors 
Sampling variation is only one of the transitory factors that can affect school-
average test scores.  There are other transitory shocks that generate nonpersistent 
changes in schools’ mean test scores in addition to sampling variation. Specifically, the 
school-level time-varying component of student test scores (i.e., ߜ௝௧ in equation 1) will 
also induce nonpersistent variation in school-average test scores.  Real-world examples 
include the existence of a disruptive student in a class, a dog barking in the playground 
or construction noise on the day of the exam, a school-wide illness, or special chemistry 
between a teacher and a class of students, etc. 
Following Kane and Staiger (2002) and given the framework developed in 
section 2.4.1, I apply an indirect method to estimate the nonpersistent variation in test 
scores attributed to these other transitory factors.  First, I estimate the total variation in 
mean test scores due to all transitory factors by measuring the degree of persistence in 
change in test scores between two consecutive years.  Then I back out the portion due 
to sampling variation.  The remainder is component attributable to other transitory 
factors. 
I first decompose the school-level time-varying effect on student scores in 
equation (1) into two components: 
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(8)    δ୨୲ ൌ ν୨୲ ൅	τ୨୲  
where ߥ௝௧ is the persistent component which is assumed to pick up from where it 
left off last year in addition to a new innovation each year (ߥ௝௧ ൌ ߥ௝௧ିଵ ൅ ߩ௝௧),  and τ୨୲ is 
the transitory component.  
Assumption 3: ߩ௝௧ ∼ ݅݅݀	൫0, ߪఘଶ൯ and ௝߬௧ ∼ ݅݅݀	ሺ0, ߪఛଶ) 
The average test score for a given school 	j  in year 	t  will therefore have the 
form:  
(9)     ݕത௝௧ ൌ ߣ௝ ൅ ߥ௝௧ ൅	 ௝߬௧ ൅ ̅ߠ௜ሺ௧ሻ ൅ ഥܷ௜௝௧  
(10)  ߂ݕത௝௧ ≡ ݕത௝௧ െ ݕത௝௧ିଵ ൌ ߩ௝௧ ൅ ௝߬௧ െ ௝߬௧ିଵ ൅ ̅ߠ௜ሺ௧ሻ െ ̅ߠ௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ഥܷ௜௝௧ െ ഥܷ௜௝௧ିଵ 
The correlation between test score gains this year and last year can be written 
as: 
(11) ܥ݋ݎݎሺ߂ݕത௝௧, ߂ݕത௝௧ିଵሻ ൌ ஼௢௩ሺ௱௬തೕ೟,௱௬തೕ೟షభሻඥ௏௔௥ሺ௱௬തೕ೟ሻ	∗	ඥ௏௔௥ሺ௱௬തೕ೟షభሻ ൌ
ିሼாೕሺఙഓమሻାൣఙഇమାఙೠమ൧ாೕሾ భೀ೟ሿሽ
௏௔௥ሺ௱௬തೕ೟ሻ  
The numerator is the negative of the total variance of all transitory factors and the 
denominator is the total variance of gain scores (Δyത୨୲).  Since I can calculate the left 
hand side of equation (11) directly, as well asVar y jt , I can recover the total variance 
of all transitory factors from their product.  Subtracting from this our earlier estimate of 
the magnitude of sampling variation (from equation 7), I can back out the variance of all 
other transitory factors.   
Tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 summarize the results for different quartiles of grade 4 
and grade 7 enrolment for both FSA reading and numeracy scores.  The analysis is 
done separately for different years, while the bottom panel of each table presents the 
results of the variance decomposition for all years.  As expected, the estimated sampling 
variance is bigger for small schools than bigger schools and the magnitudes are stable 
over time.  The estimated variance of other transitory factors however varies over time, 
which is due to the random nature of the events that generate them.  Overall, the results 
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suggest that school-average FSA reading and numeracy scores are not very reliable 
measures of persistent or permanent differences in school-average achievement, 
particularly among small schools.  Looking at the bottom panel of each table, nearly 47 
percent of the variance of school-average grade 4 FSA reading scores and 40 percent of 
FSA numeracy scores among schools in the smallest quartile of enrollment size is due to 
sampling variation and other nonpersistent factors.  For grade 7 the estimates are 38 
percent and 34 percent respectively.  As expected, transitory factors account for a 
smaller share of the cross-sectional variance among larger schools.  For the two middle 
quartiles, 33 percent and 29 percent of the cross-sectional variance in grade 4 and 
grade 7 average FSA reading scores is due to nonpersistent factors respectively.  The 
corresponding numbers are 30 percent and 23 percent for numeracy scores.  For 
schools in the largest quartile, 23 percent of the variance across schools in grade 4 and 
grade 7 average FSA reading scores is due to transient factors, while for numeracy 
scores these numbers are 21 percent and 17 percent for grade 4 and grade 7 
respectively.  It also worth mentioning that almost across the board, the amount of 
imprecision in average FSA numeracy scores due to nonpersistent factors is smaller 
than average FSA reading scores.  
3.5. Conclusion 
I find that sampling variation and one-time mean reverting shocks are a 
significant source of observed variation in schools’ average test scores.  This is of critical 
importance because there is growing evidence that suggests providing information about 
school-level achievement has real effects on parents’ school choice decisions.  Since 
these decisions are inherently costly, if they are shaped by imprecise or noisy measures 
of school performance, they could potentially impose a net cost on parents and make 
them worse off.  Moreover, if it becomes apparent to parents that these measures are 
very noisy and fluctuate significantly from one year to the next, they might stop paying 
attention to new information about school-level achievement, undermining the 
effectiveness of school choice policies that hinge upon ability to distinguish high-
achieving schools from low-achieving schools. 
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Nonpersistent factors induce greater year-to-year variation in average test scores 
of small schools than bigger schools.  This suggests that families should treat significant 
changes in average test scores of big schools as a stronger signal about changes in 
long-term performance compared to small schools. 
These results also warn educational authorities against naïve policies or 
interventions that attach monetary/nonmonetary rewards or sanctions to schools based 
on noisy measures of school performance.  As a growing literature attests, designing 
meaningful measures of school effectiveness continues to be a challenge (Hægeland et 
al. 2004; Mizala, Romaguera and Urquiola 2007).10  As Chay et al. (2005) suggest, it is 
also critical to bear in mind that policy evaluations based on such noisy measures of 
school effectiveness have the potential to be misleading.  
  
                          
10 Kane and Staiger (2001) propose a filtered estimation to generate a more reliable measure of 
school achievement over time by exploiting the time-series dimension of them. 
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3.7. Tables and Figures 
Figure 3.1.1. Grade 4 Adjusted Reading and Numeracy Average Test Scores by 
Enrolment Level (1999-2006) 
 
Figure 3.1.2 Grade 7 Adjusted Reading and Numeracy Average Test Scores by 
Enrolment Level (1999-2006) 
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Figure 3.2.1 Grade 4 Adjusted Reading and Numeracy Gains by Enrolment Level 
(1999-2006) 
 
Figure 3.2.2 Grade 7 Adjusted Reading and Numeracy Gains by Enrolment Level 
(1999-2006) 
 
  
-2
-1
0
1
2
sc
ho
ol
_l
ev
el
 a
dj
us
te
d 
re
ad
in
g 
ga
in
 s
co
re
s 
0 20 40 60 80 100
school enrolment
-2
-1
0
1
2
sc
ho
ol
_l
ev
el
 a
dj
us
te
d 
nu
m
er
ac
y 
ga
in
 s
co
re
s 
0 20 40 60 80 100
school enrolment
-2
-1
0
1
2
sc
ho
ol
_l
ev
el
 a
dj
us
te
d 
re
ad
in
g 
ga
in
 s
co
re
s 
0 20 40 60 80 100
school enrolment
-2
-1
0
1
2
sc
ho
ol
_l
ev
el
 a
dj
us
te
d 
nu
m
er
ac
y 
ga
in
 s
co
re
s 
0 20 40 60 80 100
school enrolment
 132 
Table 3.1. Sample Characteristics. Grade 4 Schools with valid FSA test scores 
between 1999-2006 
  
Variable Grade 4 
Sample percent 
Grade 7 
Sample percent 
Number of schools in each year        1067         798 
% Public Schools 87% 84% 
% Private Schools 13% 16% 
Average enrolment           41 50 
School-level average proportion of students:   
excused from reading test 4.4% 4.1% 
excused from numeracy test 4.3% 4.2% 
excused from both 3.9% 3.6% 
Not excused and test written but no reading score 3.0% 2.3% 
Not excused and test written but no numeracy score 2.6% 2.9% 
% of aboriginal students 8.5% 8.5% 
%  of special need students 6.6% 8.0% 
%  of gifted students 1.4% 2.4% 
% of students in French Immersion programs 5.5% 6.1% 
% of students reporting non-English home language 21.0% 22.4% 
% Chinese home language 6.7% 8.2% 
% Punjabi home language 4.5% 3.6% 
% other home language 9.7% 10.6% 
% English as a second language (ESL) 15.0% 7.0% 
Average Family Income (in 2000 C$) C$66034 C$67015 
Average percentage of Incidence of low income 15.1% 15.2 % 
Average proportion of parents with education:   
Without high school 14.0% 14.0% 
With high school 14.0% 14.3 % 
With bachelor or higher 12.6 % 13.2 % 
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Table 3.2.1.  Proportion Ranking in the Top 20% on 4th Grade Test Scores 1999-
2006 
# of 
years 
in top 
20  
Certainty Lottery 
Actual 
average 
scores 
Actual Adjusted average scores 
Lottery 
Gain 
Scores All 
schools 
Enrol. < 30 
(N=328) 
Enrol. < 20 
(N=116) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
School Ranking Based on Average Reading Scores 
Never 80.0 16.7 45.8 37.6 27.1 24.1 20.9 16.4 
1 year 0.0 33.5 19.1 22.6 23.4 20.6 36.7 40.9 
2 years 0.0 29.3 9.5 15.7  21.0 21.5 27.5 30.9 
3 years 0.0 14.6 7.9 9.4  11.2 14.6 11.4 9.9 
4 years 0.0 2.6 5.6 4.5  5.1 5.1 2.8 1.7 
5 years 0.0 0.9 3.8 4.0 4.8 7.7 0.4 0.0 
6 years 0.0 0.1 2.8 3.0  4.5 5.1 0.0 0.0 
7 years 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8 years 20.0 0.0 2.2 1.0 0.6 0.8   NA   NA 
School Ranking Based on Average Numeracy Scores 
Never 80.0 16.7 44.3 38.8 30.4 25.0 20.9 16.6 
1 year 0.0 33.5 19.9 23.1 22.5 22.4 36.7 40.5 
2 years 0.0 29.3 10.5 13.6 17.3 19.8 27.5 31.3 
3 years 0.0 14.6 8.3 9.1 13.4 13.7 11.4 9.1 
4 years 0.0 2.6 4.8 5.0 4.8 6.9 2.8 2.2 
5 years 0.0 0.9 4.4 4.1 3.9 6.9 0.4 0.0 
6 years 0.0 0.1 2.7 2.6 3.6 2.5 0.0 0.0 
7 years 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.9 2.7 1.7 0.0 0.0 
8 years 20.0 0.0 2.2 1.4 0.9 0.8   NA   NA 
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Table 3.2.2.  Proportion Ranking in the Top 20% on 7th Grade Test Scores 1999-
2006  
# of 
years 
in top 
20   
Certainty Lottery 
Actual 
average 
scores 
Actual Adjusted average scores 
Lottery 
Gain 
Scores All 
schools 
Enrol. < 30 
(N=241) 
Enrol. < 20 
(N=86) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
School Ranking Based on Average Reading Scores 
Never 80.0 16.7 38.85 33.21 23.24 20.93 20.9 7.27 
1 year 0.0 33.5 17.17 18.30 19.5 22.09 36.7 27.69 
2 years 0.0 29.3 11.78 14.16 16.18 16.28 27.5 40.10 
3 years 0.0 14.6 7.52 9.90 15.35 20.93 11.4 20.93 
4 years 0.0 2.6 4.64 7.02 6.64 1.16 2.8 3.88 
5 years 0.0 0.9 4.64 5.51 5.39 6.98 0.4 0.13 
6 years 0.0 0.1 5.26 5.14 5.81 3.49 0.0 0.0 
7 years 0.0 0.0 4.26 3.38 2.49 3.49 0.0 0.0 
8 years 20.0 0.0 5.89 3.38 5.39 4.65 NA NA 
School Ranking Based on Average Numeracy Scores 
Never 80.0  16.7 38.22 32.46 21.58 19.77 20.9 7.52 
1 year 0.0   33.5 15.66 18.92 22.41 20.93 36.7 26.82 
2 years 0.0   29.3 11.9 13.53 16.60 18.60 27.5 40.98 
3 years 0.0   14.6 8.65 10.28 10.79 16.28 11.4 20.80 
4 years 0.0   2.6 7.02 8.02 13.28 9.30  2.8 3.76 
5 years 0.0   0.9 4.76 6.02 5.39 6.98  0.4 0.13 
6 years 0.0   0.1 4.39 4.26 2.07 1.16  0.0 0.0 
7 years 0.0   0.0 5.26 3.13 2.90 2.33  0.0 0.0 
8 years 20.0  0.0 4.14 3.38 4.98 4.65    NA   NA 
  
 135 
Table 3.3.1. Decomposition of Variance in Schools’ Mean FSA Scores (Grade 4) 
School 
enrolment 
quartile 
Average 
size 
Total 
variance 
Sampling 
variance 
Other 
non- 
persistent 
variance 
Total 
proportion 
non- 
persistent 
Total 
variance 
Sampling 
variance 
Other non- 
persistent 
variance 
Total 
proportion 
non- 
persistent 
  Grade 4 FSA Reading Scores Grade 4 FSA Numeracy Scores 
Year = 2000 
Bottom quartile 21 0.156 0.051 0.042 0.600 0.175 0.045 0.054 0.571 
2 Middle 
quartiles 41 0.100 0.022 0.020 0.435 0.126 0.022 0.026 0.380 
Top quartile 66 0.081 0.013 0.014 0.343 0.105 0.013 0.010 0.225 
Year = 2001 
Bottom quartile 20 0.202 0.049 0.036 0.424 0.267 0.045 0.048 0.349 
2 Middle 
quartiles 40 0.151 0.022 0.026 0.326 0.187 0.021 0.037 0.317 
Top quartile 68 0.109 0.013 0.012 0.234 0.137 0.012 0.014 0.197 
Year = 2002 
Bottom quartile 20 0.221 0.049 0.033 0.374 0.276 0.043 0.043 0.313 
2 Middle 
quartiles 39 0.137 0.023 0.020 0.318 0.166 0.022 0.026 0.295 
Top quartile 65 0.104 0.014 0.004 0.182 0.129 0.013 0.004 0.140 
Year = 2003 
Bottom quartile 20 0.178 0.051 0.037 0.499 0.234 0.042 0.051 0.402 
2 Middle 
quartiles 40 0.131 0.023 0.020 0.333 0.167 0.022 0.021 0.261 
Top quartile 67 0.115 0.013 0.016 0.259 0.156 0.013 0.017 0.199 
Year = 2004 
Bottom quartile 19 0.226 0.052 0.069 0.540 0.336 0.043 0.123 0.495 
2 Middle 
quartiles 39 0.144 0.023 0.024 0.332 0.209 0.021 0.035 0.271 
Top quartile 67 0.115 0.013 0.008 0.191 0.146 0.013 0.021 0.239 
Year = 2005 
Bottom quartile 19 0.235 0.052 0.051 0.440 0.244 0.043 0.040 0.345 
2 Middle 
quartiles 39 0.140 0.023 0.025 0.344 0.175 0.022 0.030 0.300 
Top quartile 66 0.099 0.013 0.005 0.193 0.133 0.013 0.019 0.246 
All Years (2000-2005) 
Bottom quartile 20 0.203 0.050 0.046 0.475 0.253 0.044 0.058 0.406 
2 Middle 
quartiles 40 0.132 0.023 0.022 0.339 0.171 0.021 0.029 0.299 
Top quartile 66 0.104 0.013 0.010 0.230 0.134 0.013 0.015 0.213 
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Table 3.3.2. Decomposition of Variance in Schools’ Mean FSA Scores (Grade 7) 
School 
enrolment 
quartile 
Average 
size 
Total 
variance 
Sampling 
variance 
Other 
non- 
persistent 
variance 
Total 
proportion 
non- 
persistent 
Total 
variance 
Sampling 
variance 
Other non- 
persistent 
variance 
Total 
proportion 
non- 
persistent 
  Grade 7 FSA Reading Scores Grade 7 FSA Numeracy Scores 
Year = 2000 
Bottom quartile 20 0.142 0.050 0.010 0.418 0.183 0.047 0.027 0.401 
2 Middle 
quartiles 42 0.109 0.022 0.028 0.456 0.130 0.021 0.013 0.267 
Top quartile 97 0.064 0.010 0.014 0.371 0.108 0.011 0.009 0.184 
Year = 2001 
Bottom quartile 20 0.182 0.051 0.016 0.368 0.252 0.042 0.042 0.335 
2 Middle 
quartiles 42 0.125 0.022 0.003 0.206 0.186 0.022 0.021 0.232 
Top quartile 97 0.119 0.011 0.012 0.194 0.179 0.011 0.014 0.141 
Year = 2002 
Bottom quartile 20 0.188 0.048 0.004 0.276 0.250 0.042 0.032 0.295 
2 Middle 
quartiles 44 0.137 0.021 0.015 0.268 0.189 0.021 0.030 0.266 
Top quartile 98 0.114 0.011 0.010 0.179 0.170 0.011 0.006 0.098 
Year = 2003 
Bottom quartile 20 0.235 0.047 0.053 0.425 0.270 0.044 0.054 0.363 
2 Middle 
quartiles 43 0.150 0.022 0.011 0.219 0.198 0.020 0.021 0.206 
Top quartile 99 0.116 0.011 0.016 0.232 0.214 0.010 0.035 0.212 
Year = 2004 
Bottom quartile 20 0.270 0.048 0.058 0.393 0.327 0.043 0.048 0.280 
2 Middle 
quartiles 43 0.141 0.021 0.021 0.298 0.218 0.020 0.029 0.225 
Top quartile 99 0.119 0.011 0.015 0.217 0.194 0.010 0.025 0.182 
Year = 2005 
Bottom quartile 19 0.232 0.052 0.047 0.427 0.278 0.048 0.065 0.405 
2 Middle 
quartiles 43 0.144 0.022 0.023 0.309 0.214 0.020 0.018 0.177 
Top quartile 98 0.104 0.011 0.014 0.246 0.169 0.011 0.013 0.142 
All Years (2000-2005) 
Bottom quartile 20 0.210 0.050 0.031 0.385 0.262 0.045 0.044 0.341 
2 Middle 
quartiles 42 0.135 0.022 0.017 0.289 0.190 0.021 0.022 0.226 
Top quartile 97 0.105 0.011 0.014 0.232 0.169 0.011 0.018 0.167 
 
